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ABSTRACT: 
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth (1173-1140) has long been considered one of the leading 
heroes of Wales.  The life and rule of Llywelyn, known as Llywelyn the Great, is 
explored in detail in this thesis. The grandson of Owain Gwynedd, ruler of North 
Wales from 1137-1170, Llywelyn grew up during the period of turmoil following 
Owain‘s death. After wresting control of Gwynedd from his rival family members 
in the latter decade of the 12
th
 century, he proceeded to gain recognition as the 
foremost representative of Wales on the political stage. 
 
Although viewed as a legendary hero in Welsh history, poetry and culture, 
Llywelyn's route to power is more complex than that. The thesis explores the 
development of the man from rebel and warlord, to leader and spokesman, to 
statesman, traces the expansion of his hegemony throughout wales, and discusses 
the methods he used to gain and maintain power. Particular attention is paid to his 
use of family, marriage, allies, rivals and the church to achieve his goals. These 
insights can be derived from the surviving charters, letters, and other acta of 
Llywelyn and the Royal Chancery of England, the titles accorded therein, Welsh 
and English chronicles, as well as, occasionally, Venedotian Poetry.  Finally, this 
thesis seeks to address the limitations on Llywelyn‘s successes, in light of 
succeeding events and concludes with a discussion of Llywelyn‘s legendary status 
in the modern world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than eight hundred years worth of hindsight has allowed historians 
to look upon the reign of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth with rose-tinted glasses.  As a 
boy, disinherited and exiled from his patrimony, his story presents as ‗rags-to-
riches‘, the struggle from a puppy in hiding to top dog.  Arguably, a unifier of 
Wales, he was the inspiration for his grandson Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, and the first 
to attempt to unite Wales as a single entity under one ‗prince‘.  Dealt with on a 
semantic basis, the above statement is technically accurate.   
Of course, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s rise to the top and rule is far more 
problematical than the previous paragraph would lead one to believe.  It seems to 
most that Llywelyn was always destined for greatness.  His final epithet, 
enshrined in the memory of many a Welsh historian: ‗Mawr‘, elucidates a picture 
of a man larger-than-life who by sheer force of will and political acumen united 
Wales under his person.  However, it is unjust to suggest that this diplomat and 
ruler was such from the moment he appeared on the Welsh political scene, a mere 
stripling.  Perhaps it is fair to say that he developed many of the qualifications of 
being an elder statesman and ruler, but his beginning was much bloodier and more 
war-torn.  Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, to become that great hero: Llywelyn Mawr, had 
to experience all the vagaries of life and perhaps learn from not only his own 
mistakes but his chance misfortunes as well.  Perhaps, the most damning comment 
that can be made of the man was that he was a victor of circumstances as much as 
by his own acumen and talent.  It is these aspects of his life and rule that this 
thesis will discuss more fully.   
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SOURCES 
The historian studying Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and his place in the history of 
thirteenth century of Medieval Wales is generally felt to be in luck.  Most primary 
sources are readily available in modern or nineteenth century printed editions, 
easy to access and use.  However, there remains a wide variety of problems in 
using and interpreting these documents.  These can come in the form of a range of 
intricate primary sources, the complexity of their interpretation and use, the 
difficulty of languages, both in the sources and in modern secondary literature, 
and in both the preponderance and lack of secondary literature specific aspects of 
the period.   
The difficulties involved in working with primary sources for the student 
of Medieval Welsh History come in many forms, including problems involved in 
dealing with modern editions of printed sources; or in the interpretation of bias by 
the authors of surviving records; or, finally, the date of the surviving documents 
themselves.  The complications of consulting printed material are manifestly 
wide.  Generally considering these problems is the task of most historians using 
any form of primary source.  In the first instance, the discerning scholar should be 
aware that the printed text is an edited version of the original, often including 
expansions of abbreviations common in medieval texts.  They often also include 
minor changes that reflect what the editor believed to be corrections of the 
original text.  It is worth remembering that this problem can also be found in 
seemingly ‗contemporary‘ sources where a scribe has changed the original 
document from which he is copying, or in the case of a re-issued charter most 
commonly, has omitted sections of the original that he found objectionable.  
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However, printed material is far more accessible, as well as easier for the modern 
historian to read than the original manuscripts and therefore widely used.  
Moreover, many manuscripts found in earlier collections of materials are no 
longer extant, and thus some earlier printed editions of medieval documents are 
problems in and of themselves.  There is no way to guarantee to what extent the 
transcribers were true to the originals, and one has to simultaneously accept these 
printed sources on faith as well as viewing the text with a dose of scepticism.   
The primary sources relating to thirteenth century Wales that are extant in 
printed editions exist in the form of chronicles, legal codes, poetry, and a variety 
of letters and charters.  Most of the chronicles and legal codes as well as some of 
the letters that are found in English archives are printed in the University of Wales 
Press History and Law Series.  In many of these volumes the introduction and 
notes are in English and in the case of the chronicles, the text employs facing-
page translation or a separate volume of translation.  However, the best edition in 
which to consult the poetry is found the University of Wales Press‘s Bardd o’r 
Tywysogyon series; in this is found a wealth of scholarly discussion, as well as the 
poetry itself, in both modern scholastic Welsh and middle Welsh.  This facilitates 
a non-native speaker with determining nuances of the original.  The poet of most 
interest to the scholar of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth is his chief court poet, Llywarch ap 
Llywelyn.  His poetry can be used by the historian, provided a dose of common 
sense is also applied, to illustrate events in Llywelyn‘s rule and how they were 
perceived within Wales, as well as examining how the myth of Llywelyn, ‗hero of 
the Welsh,‘ was created and perpetuated.   
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The acta of the Welsh princes, their correspondence, decrees, and charters, 
are some of the most important contemporary sources to shed light upon the 
medieval Welsh polity.  Helpfully, the recently published The Acts of the Welsh 
Rulers 1120-1283, edited by Huw Pryce, collects all of these sources into one 
very convenient book, with reliable transcriptions, as well as detailed English 
summaries provided to the reader.
1
  
However, the majority of the primary sources surviving are those which 
reveal the English perspective on Wales in the 13
th
 century; the best editions of 
which remain in the printed collection entitled, The Chronicles and Memorials of 
Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages, known collectively as ‗the 
Rolls Series‘ by most medievalists.  This serial includes both the work of English 
chroniclers and the surviving writs, charters and other documentation from the 
reigns of the English kings.  Of most note are those of the reign of Henry III.  
These are books of collected manuscripts, transcribed into printed editions and 
remaining untranslated.  Although they were works printed in the 19
th
 century, 
they are still referenced by most modern medieval historians.  Included among the 
surviving Anglo-Norman sources of use to the historian of the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries are the chronicles of Roger of Howden,
2
 Matthew Paris,
3
 
Roger of Wendover,
4
 Ralf de Diceto
5
 and the Anglo-Welsh Arch-deacon and 
                                                 
1
 Huw Pryce, The Acts of Welsh Rulers 1120-1283, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2005. 
2
 Ends 1201.  Chronica Magestri Rogeri de Houedene,  William Stubbs (ed) Rerum Britannicarum 
Medii Aevi Scriptores, (Rolls Ser. 51) Vols 1-4, London, Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer, 
1868-1871. 
3
 Matthaei Parisisensis, Monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica Majora, Henry Richards Luard, ed, 
Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, (Rolls Ser, 57) , Vols 1-4, London, Longman & Co, 
187—1882. And Matthæi Parisiensis, Monachi Sancit Albani, Historia Anglorum, Rerum 
Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores (Rolls Series, 44) Vols.1-3, London, Longmans, Green, 
Reader and Dyer, 1866-1869.   
4
 Flores Historiarum, Henry Richards Luard, ed,Vols I-III, Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi 
Scriptores,(Rolls Ser, 95)  London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1890. 
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prolific author Giraldus Cambrensis,
6
 all of which provide detailed insight into 
England and English history as well as occasional mentions of Wales in this 
period.  Importantly, both Matthew Paris and Giraldus Cambrensis deal heavily 
with Wales and the English dealings with that country and its princes.  Provided 
that it is remembered that these documents were recorded through the eyes of 
English and Anglo-Marcher perspectives, often years after the events they 
transcribe, they can help pinpoint and define the past dealings of Wales and its 
rulers with England.  Also found amongst the printed editions of their original 
Latin in the Rolls Series, are the charters, letters and other general acta of the 
English kings. 
Despite these problems with extant sources, it must be remembered that in 
dealing with thirteenth century Wales, there remains a dearth of reliable sources.  
Most extant versions of Welsh chronicles post-date Edward‘s conquest of Wales 
in 1283 by over a century and—for the Welsh historian of Gwynedd—most of the 
chronicles that survive originate in the south of Wales.  The dating of the original  
manuscripts in which these chronicles survive can itself often be a problem.  For 
instance, both of the versions of the Welsh chronicle Brut Y Tywysogyon, 
‗Peniarth 20‘, and ‗The Red Book of Hergest‘, and their brother, Brenhinedd y 
Saesson exist in their earliest manuscript form from the fourteenth century.
7
  This 
dating discrepancy presents problems because the Red Book version of the 
                                                                                                                                     
5
 Ends 1202. Radulfi de Diceto Decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica, William Stubbs, ed, Vols I-
II, Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, (Rolls Ser. 68), vols. London, L Longman & Co. 
1876. 
6
 Giraldi Cambrensis Opera,Dimcock, James F. Ed, Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, 
(or Rolls Ser. 21)  vols. I – VIII, London, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyewe, 1861-1891. 
7
 Jones, Thomas, Brut Y Tywysogyon: Red Book of Hergest Version, Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press, 1955 and Thomas Jones, Brut Y Tywysogyon: Peniarth MS 20 Version, Cardiff, University 
of Wales Press, 1952 and Thomas Jones, Brenhinedd Y Saesson, Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press, 1971. 
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Brutiau chronicle stops in 1283.  Therefore, in the Red Book version, the earliest 
surviving text is not contemporary with the last entry, but easily post-dates it by 
over 60 years.  This can be contrasted with the continuation in Peniarth 20 which 
Charles-Edwards, in his study of the orthography of the text, concluded was 
produced by a single scribe.  He pointed out that the scribe in question used 
different inks as he continued the chronicle, first by adding the material from 1282 
to 1290, and then adding the material from 1291 to 1330 as a single block, finally 
concluding with two separate entries for 1331 and 1332.
8
  Charles-Edwards 
suggests a probable history of Peniarth 20 that began with the composition of a 
Latin version
9
 of the Brutiau at Strata Florida, a copy of which was continued 
beyond 1282 (when the RBH stops) up to 1290.  Charles-Edwards then suggests 
that a separate Latin annal was compiled that included the period from 1291 to 
1330, the combination of these was then translated into Welsh at Valle Crucis 
which was then compiled by two scribes, the second of whom (‗Hand B‘) added 
to the first‘s record in glosses.  The end result was Peniarth 20, a ‗fair copy‘ that 
Charles-Edwards maintains was extended in 1331 and 1332 as a year-on-year 
record.
10
  This gives us an earliest date for the completion of the first part of 1290, 
but a more likely date of completion in the early thirteenth century, before 1331.  
While this is not completely divorced from Llywelyn‘s career, nearly a century 
                                                 
8
 Thomas Charles-Edwards, ‗Brut Y Tywysogion in Peniarth MS. 20‘ in E. B. Fryde, ed., Essays 
and Poems Presented to Daniel Huws, Aberystwyth, National Library of Wales Press, 1994, pp. 
294-305, p. 300. 
9
 David Stephenson pointed out that the existence of a lost Latin exemplar has been challenged by 
Julian Harrison in his article on ‗Cistercian Chronicling in the British Isles‘ (c. 2007).  However, 
the general consensus of scholarship until that point remains in favour of a Latin Brut. –David 
Stephenson, ‗The ―Resurgence‖ of Powys in the late Eleventh and Early Twelfth Centuries,‘ in C. 
P. Lewis, ed., Anglo-Norman Studies: Proceedings of the Battle Conference, 2007, Vol. 30, 
Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2008, pp. 182-195, p. 183. 
10
 Charles-Edwards, ‗Brut Y Tywsogion in Peniarth MS. 20,‘ pp. 303-304. 
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may have passed between the events it records for Llywelyn and the work of the 
scribes in Valle Crucis that resulted in Peniarth 20. 
This still allows for the possibility that earlier events could well have been 
misinterpreted, misplaced, or even invented in the intervening decades or even 
centuries.  More importantly, although all versions of Brut, as well as the other 
main Welsh chronicle sources, the Cronica de Wallia and Annales Cambriae, are 
all believed to stem from lost, Latin exemplars, little is known from which part of 
Wales the authors and compilers of theses chronicles hailed or when they lived.  
However, certain observations open intriguing possibilities.  David Stephenson 
has argued that the period from 1100 until around 1127/30 may have been the 
work of a single annalist, Daniel ap Sulien.
11
  He makes several observations to 
support this.  Firstly, the fact that this thirty-year period makes up over a quarter 
of the RBH text leads him to assume that this period was of particular interest to 
the author.
12
  Similarly, the interest of the chronicle at this time with actions of 
Henry I as well as the strong connections with events at Llanbadarn Fawr and the 
wealth of genealogical material relating to the family of which Bishop Sulien 
were a part, all point towards the interests and observations of David ap Sulien.
13
  
Stephenson argues that this suggests that this period of the chronicle was 
compiled ‗more or less contemporaneously with the episodes of which it treats.‘14  
He argues that this makes Brut a more credible source that the Annales Cambriae 
for events taking place in the early twelfth century.  Stephenson‘s argument 
differs from that put forward by Kari Maund; she claims that the text for these 
                                                 
11
 Stephenson, ‗‖Resurgence‖ of Powys,‘ p. 188. 
12
 ibid, p. 185. 
13
 ibid, pp. 184-185, & pp. 187-189. 
14
 ibid, pp. 184-185, & pp. 187-189. 
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thirty years found in Brutiau was as much a polemic as the Historia Gruffudd ap 
Cynan.  She suggests instead that the Brutiau represents the ambitions and claims 
of Owain Cyfeiliog and was composed in the later 12th century.
15
  
Recently, J. Beverly Smith has put Brenhinedd under similar scrutiny.  He 
refers to the two surviving manuscripts of Brenhinedd, Cotton MS Cleopatra B v 
and the Black Book of Basingwerk, which date from the early fourteenth century 
and the late fifteenth century respectively, as ‗closely comparable, but not 
identical.‘16  Beverly Smith maintains the previous existence of a now lost Latin 
exemplar for both Welsh language manuscripts and argues that Brenhinedd was 
designed to be a continuation of Brut y Brenhinedd, the Welsh translation of 
Geoffrey of Monmouth‘s Historia Regum Britanniae.17  While he rejects the use 
of Annales Cambriae, Beverly Smith does suggest that the Latin sources used to 
compile the Latin Brut, or even the Latin Brut itself, may have formed the Welsh 
portion of Brenhinedd alongside the use of the Annals of Winchester (until 1095) 
for English material and either the Breviate of Domesday (1095-1197) or a text to 
which the Breviate was closely related for material related to the De Braose 
family until 1197.
 18
  After that date, the compiler of Brenhinedd seems to have 
stuck to the Latin Brut.
19
  When considering where the Latin Brenhinedd was 
compiled, Beverly Smith points that the resources needed by the compiler 
included material known to be housed at Whitland and Neath, and suggests these 
                                                 
15
 Kari Maund, ‗Owain ap Cadwgan: A Rebel Revisited,‘ Haskins Society Journal, vol. 13, 
Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2004, pp. 65-74, p. 69.  Stephenson quotes an entire passage of 
Maund‘s argument directly, in order to challenge it.  See, Stephenson, ‗‖Resurgence‖ of Powys,‘ 
p. 184. 
16
 J. Beverly Smith, ‗Historical Writing in Medieval Wales: The Composition of Brenhinedd y 
Saesson,‘ Studia Celtica, vol. 42, 2008, pp. 55-86, p.55. 
17
 ibid, pp. 55-56. 
18
 ibid, pp.56, 59-60, 65, 67-70. 
19
 ibid, p. 71. 
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alongside Strata Florida as part of an axis of manuscript transmission, that 
resulted in the compilation of Brenhinedd and its translation at Valle Crucis 
around 1300.
20
 
The Cronica de Wallia and the B and C texts of Annales Cambriae have 
also been subjected to similar studies.  While discussing the origins of some of the 
information contained in Brenhinedd, Beverly Smith concludes that the extended 
entries in Cronica between 1190 and 1266 suggested the author, writing around 
1277, drew on a detailed narrative source.
21
  In comparison, when considering the 
Annales Cambriae and Gerald of Wales‘s influence upon them, Stephenson points 
out that the B-text copies Gerald‘s Itinerary of Wales, ignore the role of 
Llywelyn‘s cousins and uncle in the exile of Dafydd ab Owain, attributing 
Dafydd‘s downfall to Llywelyn alone.22  He does not believe, however, that 
Gerald was the author of any part of B-text, but rather that he was familiar and 
friendly with the man who was.
23
  Moreover, he argues that there is no evidence 
for the claim that Strata Florida acquired the B-text in 1202,
24
 but rather that the 
entry for 1202 mirrors that in the C-text, known to be compiled in St. David‘s.25  
Furthermore, in a separate account, Stephenson argues that the restricted 
geographic scope of the B-text, in comparison to the C-text, may have been the 
product of the compiler rather than the available sources.
26
  Beverly Smith 
                                                 
20
 ibid, pp. 72-82. 
21
 ibid, pp. 57-58 
22
 David Stephenson, ‗Gerald of Wales and Annales Cambriae,’ Cambrian Medieval Celtic 
Studies, no. 60, 2010, pp. 23-37, p. 35. 
23
 ibid, p. 36. 
24
 Made by Kathleen Hughes in ‗The Welsh Latin Chronicles: Annales Cambriae and Related 
Texts,‘ in Celtic Britain in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Scottish and Welsh Sources, David 
Dumville ed., Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1980, pp. 76-85, p. 76. 
25
 ibid, p. 28. 
26
 David Stephenson, ‗Welsh Chronicles‘ Accounts of the Mid-Twelfth Century,‘ Cambrian 
Medieval Celtic Studies, no. 56, 2008, pp. 45-59, p. 49. 
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suggested a specific scribe at Neath as the copyist employed in the production of 
the B-text within the Breviate of Domesday.
27
  His suggestion lends itself to the 
conclusion that the author may have been familiar with the B-text.
28
 
These recent studies make several items readily apparent.  Firstly, 
although parts of the chronicles can be linked to individuals such as Daniel ap 
Sulien or Gerald of Wales for some of their information, the present forms of 
these texts are compilations, post-dating the events they describe.  Furthermore, 
the identification of many of these texts with the religious houses at Strata Florida, 
Whitland, Neath and – in their Welsh language form – Valle Crucis, lends itself to 
a southern and western bias.  Although this does not directly discount the use of 
Welsh chronicles, it does make it difficult to use any one of them as a single, 
reliable source for early thirteenth century Gwynedd.  Rather, their use must be 
carefully considered in relation to the provenance of the surviving manuscripts, 
the interests of their compilers and translators, and the dating of the material from 
which they draw.  Despite these considerations, and with them in mind, the 
chronicles can provide a sense of the Welsh perspective on events, and which 
events were considered important when the compilers and authors were working. 
Charters attributed to Llywelyn also must be dealt with conservatively.  
Although fully republished in a very thorough and scholarly edition by Huw 
Pryce,
29
 it is worth bearing in mind the provenance of each manuscript and 
therefore not only how, but also why, each charter survived the centuries.  In 
many instances, the only reason that a Welsh charter survives is if it had been 
reissued after the Conquest by Edward I, or II.  Many of these have altered place 
                                                 
27
 Beverly Smith, ‗Historical Writing in Medieval Wales,‘ p. 76. 
28
 ibid, p. 77. 
29
 Pryce, Acts, pp. 344-444. 
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names, because the English scribe who was copying out the charter from its 
original was unfamiliar with the Welsh names and their phonetic spelling system 
or even the pronunciation of the places, even inventing his own phonetic spelling.  
This can lead to problems in interpreting the extent of land grants.  A similar 
problem can be found in the English Chroniclers works, as they are often 
unfamiliar with Wales and can misplace a battle, meeting or other event in their 
attempt to convey the place-name into Latin or perhaps write the name in a way 
that suggests a place far from where the battle occurred.  However, trusting even 
contemporary Welsh writers to provide accurate geography for events is a sticky 
business.  The problem lies not only in the changes over time to names of places, 
or even the changes to the rules on transcribing phonetically the places into the 
Roman alphabet, but mainly in interpretation of a place.  For example, when 
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth hanged William de Braose for having an affair with 
Llywelyn‘s wife Joan, the Welsh records place the event at Crogen, believed to be 
in the region Gwynedd Is Conwy, but also possibly meaning ‗hang-dog‘ 
suggesting the possibility that the place name was not that at all but a description 
of what happened there.
30
  Problems of this sort can arise when dealing with the 
place-names of 13
th
 century Wales and make placing some battles and other 
important events difficult, unless they are at well-known castles or religious 
centres.   
However, there is a more pressing concern when working with some texts, 
most significantly noticeable in the Welsh law codes.  In many instances, most 
notably the 13
th
 century Llyfr Iorwerth, it is difficult to discern the 13
th
 century 
                                                 
30
 J. J. Crump, ‗Repercussions of the Execution of William de Braose: a Letter from Llywelyn ab 
Iorwerth to Stephen de Segrave,‘ Historical Research, 73, 2000, pp. 197-212. 
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reality from the idealised ‗ancient‘ or ‗archaic‘ codes.  This is compounded in 
Llyfr Iorwerth with the possibility that Iorwerth changed some of the aspects of a 
Queen‘s role limiting her place and influence in the King‘s court in response to 
the position of Joan, wife of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth had taken as emissary to 
England.   
Bias and misconception in primary documentation is not the only 
consideration for the scholar of Welsh history.  The secondary source material can 
also prove difficult.  Books, articles and other resources that interpret, analyse, or 
otherwise discuss subjects in 13
th
 century in Wales, England, and on the continent 
must be consulted and the ideas of other scholars considered when attempting to 
delve into the history of 13
th
 century Wales.  However, it is important to keep in 
mind that in dealing with the history of a nation like Wales, as with Ireland and 
Scotland, one must be aware of the political and social situation of the era in 
which each scholar wrote.  Some historians may demonstrate a decidedly 
nationalistic or anti-nationalistic slant in their writing.  Historians such as John 
Edward Lloyd had their own personal beliefs; these often infused their writing.  
J.E. Lloyd, who published his treatment of ancient and medieval Welsh History in 
1911, for instance, held tightly to the view that any Welsh ruler who 
communicated and worked closely with the English was to be commended as 
having fantastic foresight in light of the subsequent annexation of North Wales by 
Edward I of England in 1283 and should be considered one of the ‗Great‘ leaders.  
Into this category he placed Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.  However, not every Welsh 
historian agrees this viewpoint and it is important to note that Lloyd did skip 
certain periods of history, especially the reigns of specific rulers such as Dafydd 
13 
 
and Rhodri ab Owain Gwynedd, in his History of Wales from the Earliest Times 
to the Edwardian Conquest
31
 because there was little evidence surviving to 
suggest that these rulers displayed those characteristics which he admired.  The 
other works whose treatment of Wales included a discussion of Llywelyn ab 
Iorwerth, are R. R. Davies‘s The Age of Conquest32 first published in 1987, and 
the more recently published work of Roger Turvey: Llywelyn the Great
33
.  
Common to general discussions of the rule of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth is the view 
that Llywelyn‘s skills as a ‗statesman‘ lead to his remarkable authority over much 
of native Wales in the period after 1220.  J. E. Lloyd and R. R. Davies, as 
historians of Welsh medieval history who hail from different ends of the twentieth 
century, agree on the basic facts of Llywelyn‘s reign.  Where they disagree is 
marginal.  However, it is possible to discern the slight differences in tone and take 
on the career of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, as these fuel and feed the interpretations of 
other historians such as Turvey, who takes his tone from not only these two, but 
from the many historians who followed their research, focusing on specific 
aspects of Llywelyn‘s rule, such as his adoption of the title Prince of Aberffraw, 
Lord of Snowdon in 1225. 
 This does not take into account the wealth of articles published in the past 
two decades which discuss varying aspects of Llywelyn‘s rule, written by D. A. 
Carpenter, A. D. Carr, J. J. Crump, Charles Insley, Huw Pryce, K. William Jones, 
and R. F. Treharne to name but a few.  These historians have limited their articles 
to studying specific aspects of Llywelyn‘s career, making Llywelyn‘s rule one of 
                                                 
31
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the more studied of Welsh princes.  This does not negate the need for a full 
biography of Llywelyn to collate these new theories and studies into one academic 
study, as Roger Turvey noted in his own preface to his biography.
34
  New 
interpretations are always arising, with different eyes to study the sources, 
providing insight into the life of this celebrated Welsh ruler.  Roger Turvey‘s 
biography began the collation that this thesis hopes to continue, providing some 
new insights and stressing different aspects of Llywelyn‘s rise to power.  Amidst 
this study, the historiography of Llywelyn will be discussed and applied to the 
events within his life. 
 
TWELFTH CENTURY WALES 
Twelfth century Wales was a land of uncompromising terrain and factious 
men.  The Cambrian Mountains, which stretch across the whole of Wales, were 
sparsely populated and heavily forested, the prime breadbasket was on the Isle of 
Anglesey in the north, and the population gathered in small narrow plains in the 
South and West and around the lowland coastal areas.  The problems with terrain 
were made worse by the nature of the law of partible-inheritance which allowed 
all recognised sons to share equally in the inheritance of their patrimony.  While 
at first glance perfectly fair, this ever-dividing practice reduces the land—and 
therefore livelihood—available to each individual in each successive generation.  
This can create disputes, disagreements, and ultimately warfare between those 
who feel they deserve either a larger portion, or the whole, of the available 
patrimony.  After all, how do you divide a kingdom or principality? 
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By 1188, when Gerald of Wales took his eponymous Journey Through 
Wales and Description of Wales, he wrote about a Wales of three constituent 
parts: Gwynedd, Deheubarth, and Powys.  He cited the division of Wales into 
these three ‗parts‘ to the death of Rhodri Mawr in 87835 and its division as part of 
the inheritance of Rhodri‘s sons Merfyn, Anarawd, and Cadell.36  Although 
Gerald focused on the legendary origins of these three principalities, they 
correspond loosely to the ruling dynastic kindreds of the twelfth century.   
In the south of Wales, The Lord Rhys (Rhys ap Gruffudd), ruled native 
Deheubarth, including Dyfed, until his death in 1197.  Although Deheubarth had 
descended into chaos upon the death of Rhys‘s father Gruffudd ap Rhys in 1130, 
Rhys emerged as the prominent ruler by 1155 when the native Welsh kingdom 
had been ‗reconstituted‘.37  As the sole surviving son of Gruffudd ap Rhys, this 
Rhys found it easier to control the patrimony than he might have had his brothers 
survived.  Although limited by massive Anglo-Norman intrusions into the south, 
including the creation of the Earldom of Pembroke by King Stephen and given to 
the Clares, Rhys managed, mostly through a concerted campaign of warfare, to 
gain a hegemony of cantrefs and commotes under native rule.  The Lord Rhys was 
so successful and powerful that he was named Justiciar of South Wales by Henry 
II in 1172 in an attempt to pacify the Welsh before the English King left for 
France to continue a war there.
38
  Rhys‘s rule was spent primarily warring with 
Henry (in 1157, 1163, 1171), as well as the marcher lords of southern Wales, such 
as Clare, the de Braose family, the Earls of Pembroke and any family members 
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that may have posed a threat to his hegemony in the south.  Thus, twelfth-century 
Deheubarth was strong and united when Llywelyn ab Iorwerth first came onto the 
scene in the north. 
 In Powys, the ruler was less easy to determine.  By 1160 the practice of 
partible-inheritance had divided the land between five co-heirs: Owain Cyfeiliog, 
Gruffudd Maelor, Owain Fychan, Owain Brogyntin (Cyfeiliog‘s cousins), and 
Iorwerth ‗Goch‘ their uncle.  Powys seems to have been divided several times 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, at one point becoming known as 
Powys Fadog and Powys Wenwynwyn (after the rulers who controlled the 
constituent cantrefs that made up the respective regions).  In fact, these problems 
with division of rule amongst rival claimants came earlier.  Davies notes the 
destruction of at least six members of the Powysian line between 1111 and 1130,
39
 
and that trend continued forward.  By the 1190s, the only claimants left standing 
were Owain Cyfeiliog, his son Gwenwynwyn, Gruffudd Maelor, and his two sons: 
Madog and Owain, and the sons of Owain Fychan and Owain Brogyntwyn.  
Together, the heirs of 1160 had limited their own numbers to two surviving from 
their generation, and expanded the claimants to eight, among the succeeding 
generations.   
Gwynedd, itself, in late twelfth century seems to be an amalgamation of 
the other two ‗parts‘ in its history.  Owain Gwynedd‘s name is synonymous with 
the area he ruled for over thirty years.  Unfortunately for nationalists who like to 
tote the successes of Owain Gwynedd, his appellation was not earned from his 
long or successful reign, but as a way to distinguish him from the other ‗Owain ap 
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Gruffudd‘ (Owain Cyfeiliog) ruling in Powys.  Owain, and his brother Cadwaladr, 
succeeded their father in 1137, and by 1152, Owain had exiled his brother,
40
 
leaving him as sole ruler in Gwynedd.  This led to a relative stability within 
Gwynedd for Owain.  He was challenged by Henry II during his campaigns into 
Wales to subdue the native rulers in 1157 and 1163.  Although, it was Owain who 
quashed the English Fleet sent by Henry to attack Anglesey—the breadbasket of 
Gwynedd—in 1157,41 in the end, he had to accept back his brother and surrender 
Tegeingl.
42
  In the second of Henry‘s campaigns, Owain and Cadwaladr worked 
together to take back Basingwerk and Ruddlan.
43
  Unfortunately, the strength of 
Gwynedd fell apart upon the death of Owain Gwynedd in 1170.  Owain‘s 
surviving sons made war upon each other in the ensuing power struggle.  Uniting, 
the youngest sons, Rhodri and Dafydd first killed the presumed edling and poet-
prince, Hywel ab Owain,
44
 in 1170 before turning towards their other brothers in 
an attempt to become the sole-surviving ruler in Gwynedd.   
But even this territorial division into the ruling houses of Deheubarth, 
Powys, and Gwynedd is misleading and arbitrary, as R.R. Davies notes.  Conquest 
of lands both within the patrimony and outside it was commonplace amongst 
native Welsh rulers in the eleventh century,
45
 and this can be seen to continue into 
the twelfth century.  Just one example from a century‘s worth was in 1142, when 
Brut notes that Anarawd ap Gruffudd ‗the hope and strength and glory of the men 
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of the South‘—and eldest brother to the future Lord Rhys—was killed by the war 
band of Cadwaladr ap Gruffudd, Owain Gwynedd‘s brother.46   
It was into this fratricidal and war-filled world that Llywelyn ab Iorwerth 
was born.  The only child of Owain‘s third known son, Iorwerth Drwyndwn—
broken nosed—Llywelyn would not have been unaware of the nature of rulership 
in Wales in the twelfth century.  The stories of his patrilineal rule and the death of 
his uncles and father would have been what moulded his world and informed his 
actions in it, upon exiting childhood.  
As noted above, Llywelyn‘s reign in Gwynedd and his ascent to the lofty 
heights that earned him the moniker ‗Mawr‘ (Great) have been studied in detail in 
the past.  Where this thesis attempts to distinguish itself from previously 
published works is in its attempt to recognise, define and present not just the 
Llywelyn Mawr of fame, but the more impetuous and immature prince Llywelyn 
of the beginning of the 13
th
 century and examine how the latter grew to become 
the personage so beloved of medieval Welsh history scholars today.   
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PART 1: 
FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE 
20 
CHAPTER 1  
A WELSH WARLORD: 1173-1211 
Llywelyn‘s beginnings as a Welsh ruler were bloody and war-torn.  In his 
early years he displayed few, if any, of the qualities that made him the leading 
Welsh prince and earned him the epithet ‗Mawr‘.  In fact, it can be argued that his 
early career was more that of a warlord, than a prince.  
 Due to the scarcity of sources, it is impossible to be exact with the dating,  
but Llywelyn ab Iorwerth must have been born by or in 1174, as his father is 
believed to have died sometime before 1174.
1
  Unfortunately, Gwynedd at the 
time was in crisis.  Llywelyn was born into a bellicose family in the midst of a 
feud.  His father was one of Owain Gwynedd‘s many sons, and his mother was a 
daughter of the house of Powys.   
Owain Gwynedd, Llywelyn‘s paternal grandfather, ruled North Wales 
from 1137 until his death in 1170.  Upon Owain‘s death, his realm descended into 
chaos, which Turvey blamed on the Welsh partible inheritance.
2
  According to 
Welsh law codes, the structure of inheritance Wales provided for equal division 
amongst all recognised sons of the father; theoretically, if strictly applied, this 
made for factitious interregna.  In fact, Gerald of Wales noted the effects of this 
practice upon a principality.
3
  However, while individual farms could be 
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subdivided and parcelled out, dividing kingdoms is often more difficult as few 
typically wish to share governance.  J. Beverley Smith has persuasively argued 
that this system of inheritance was never meant to be applied to kingdoms or 
principalities, but was limited in the thirteenth century to what he called ‗the 
patrimonies of free proprietors.‘4  He points explicitly to the designation of an 
edling, as well as the creation of apanages for other kinsmen as evidence that the 
Welsh did not intend to divide principalities in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.
5
 However, although Welsh law explicitly provided for an heir-apparent 
in the edling, the codes are not clear exactly who is an edling,
6
 and this ambiguity 
in practice led to fratricide and concerted campaigns to rid the family of any male 
member who fell within the kinship degree necessary for inheritance.   
In 1170, Owains‘ sons by his second wife and first-cousin, Crystin, refused 
to acknowledge Hywel‘s status as edling, or heir-apparent.7  Although Owain 
himself had designated his eldest surviving son, Hywel, as edling, this was 
strongly contested by the other claimants to the principality.  The ensuing power 
struggle lead to the probable deaths of at least four of the six known sons of 
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Owain Gwynedd: Hywel, Iorwerth, Maelgwn, and Cynan.  Insley points out that 
the situation was complex; throughout the 1170s, 1180s and 1190s the control of 
Gwynedd was in flux, sometimes with Dafydd as primary ruler, and at other times 
his brother Rhodri controlled the majority of Gwynedd.
8
  Aside from the death of 
Hywel at Pentraeth, the battles between the many sons of Owain Gwynedd 
seldom make the chronicles, but they do make it into the poetry.
9
  This was the 
world into which Llywelyn ab Iorwerth was born and the world that shaped him 
on his rise to power. 
Little is known about Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s childhood, although some 
hypotheses can be made.  His mother was the daughter of Madog ap Maredudd, of 
Powys.  Llywelyn refers to William Corbet as ‗uncle‘10 suggesting a familial tie 
with the Corbet marchers.  Some historians, including Lloyd, have suggested that 
this could indicate a marriage between Llywelyn‘s mother and a Corbet.11  This 
provides two possible places for Llywelyn to grow up, one of which would be at 
the court of one of his maternal uncles, as suggested by Turvey.
12
  The other 
possibility is that he was raised across the border on the marcher lands of the 
Corbet family.  However, there is no conclusive evidence of this.   The marriage 
of Gwenwynwyn to Margaret Corbet is evidence that the Corbets and the House 
of Powys intermarried in later years, but there is no further evidence as to where 
Llywelyn spent his formative years.  Wherever he spent them however, Llywelyn 
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was informed of his own claims in Gwynedd and by the time he was twenty he 
appears in historical record, attempting to make good those claims. 
 The first victims of Llywelyn‘s ambitions were his family members, the 
uncles and cousins at whose expense Llywelyn‘s initial expansion was achieved.  
Llywelyn began his early career through a combination of intrigue, alliance and 
subversion.  His first appearance in the Welsh chronicles is in 1194 when they 
record that Llywelyn ab Iorwerth united with his uncle, Rhodri ab Owain, and his 
cousins, Gruffudd and Maredudd ap Cynan ab Owain Gwynedd against another of 
Llywelyn‘s uncles, Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd.13  However, as Insley points out, 
it is difficult to truly discern who was actually active in the battle at Aberconwy; 
Brut is vague, and the court poet, Llywarch ap Llywelyn (Prydydd Y Moch), 
seems to credit both Llywelyn and Rhodri, in different poems, with the victory.
14
  
It is possible that Llywelyn was active, even earlier, in 1193 when Rhodri ab 
Owain was expelled by his brother Cynan‘s sons.15  However, there is no 
evidence to specifically state which side, if any, Llywelyn took during this part of 
the ongoing upheaval in Gwynedd that began with the death of Owain Gwynedd 
in 1170.  All that appears in the documents is Llywelyn‘s first appearance 
amongst the various warring factions of the Venedotian princely family.   
 Llywelyn‘s actions and part in the events leading up to his eventual take-
over of Gwynedd are murky indeed and it is relatively difficult to discern how 
much he profited from the machinations of others and how much he was 
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orchestrating the conflicts.
16
  In 1196, Llywelyn was presumably amongst ‗all the 
princes of Gwynedd‘ who aided Henry, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
English earls in laying siege to Gwenwynwyn at Welshpool.
17
  But there is no 
specific indication of his involvement.  
 Interestingly, it is possible to track the loss of power suffered by Dafydd 
ab Owain, Llywelyn‘s uncle and erstwhile enemy by consulting the self-styling 
that Dafydd used in his grants, through four charters he issued between his rise to 
power in 1177 and his exile in England from 1198 onwards until his death.
18
  The 
first of these was a grant naming Dafydd as ‗King, son of Owain‘.19 Although 
there is no specific date on the document, it can be tentatively dated to Dafydd‘s 
early reign (1177 -1190), the period during which Dafydd‘s rule was relatively 
stable.  Another charter dated early in Dafydd‘s reign, before the death of the 
Bishop Gwion in 1190, named Dafydd ‗King of north Wales‘.20  By Dafydd‘s 
third extant charter, dated before April of 1194, he styles himself ‗Dafydd son of 
Owain, Prince of North Wales.‘21  By the fourth, probably sometime after the last 
and before his death in 1203, Dafydd dropped any styling at all and made the 
grant merely as ‗Dafydd son of Owain.‘22  The successive loss of Dafydd‘s 
control over North Wales is very evident in the changes, and shows, in effect, a 
downgrading of Dafydd‘s status throughout his rule in Gwynedd.   
 A similar situation can be found in the charter record of the sons of Cynan 
ab Owain. Both granted charters during their period of alliance with Rhodri ab 
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Owain and Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.  Gruffudd granted a charter dated to between 
1194 and 1199 to Aberconwy abbey styling himself ‗I…son of Cynan prince of 
North Wales.‘23  By Gruffudd‘s second charter he stated ‗I Gruffudd, son of 
Cynan.‘24  His brother, Maredudd, likewise styled himself ‗Maredudd son of 
Cynan‘25 in his charter to St. Mary‘s church, dated before 1199.  This suggests 
some limitations upon their conception of their own power. 
 In 1197, Llywelyn captured his uncle Dafydd. The following year, 
Llywelyn‘s cousin Maredudd ap Cynan was captured by the English during 
Gwenwynwyn‘s war to ‗restore to the Welsh their ancient proprietary rights and 
bounds.‘26  Stephenson argues that by 1199 that Llywelyn is defacto overlord of 
Gwynedd, citing the Aberconwey charters of 1199.
27
  In 1201 Llywelyn expelled 
Maredudd from Llyn ‗because of his treachery‘.28  In 1202, Maredudd‘s nephew, 
Hywel ap Gruffudd then likewise expelled Maredudd from Meirionnydd.
29
  It is 
likely that Hywel acted at Llywelyn‘s instigation; there is no mention of Hywel in 
any chronicle records, and Llywelyn is shortly thereafter recognised as in control 
of Merionydd.  The whittling down of rivals during the end of the twelfth century 
is illustrative of Llywelyn‘s ability to capitalise upon existing situations in order 
to strengthen his position. 
 This constant shifting of alliances on Llywelyn‘s part may be viewed as 
crafty.  Llywelyn created alliances to whittle down rivals claimants before turning 
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on erstwhile allies to further his ambitions.  The goal: to be the last edling
30
 
standing.  But it also denotes one important aspect of Llywelyn‘s character often 
overlooked by other scholars: Llywelyn was power hungry.  Not content to accept 
the power division inherent in an alliance, Llywelyn acted in his own interests in 
order to obtain the lands that his cousins held.   
 But Llywelyn did not devote himself merely to establishing himself as sole 
ruler of native Gwynedd.  In 1199, the Annals of Chester record the capture of 
Mold Castle.
31
  There is some discrepancy here as to who actually held the castle, 
as the annals seem to suggest that it was held by Llywelyn and lost to Chester.  
Insley notes that the text is possibly corrupt, but suggest there is ambiguity in 
regards to the battle at Mold.
32
  Lloyd categorically states that Mold was held by 
Robert of Montault, the seneschal of the Earl of Chester.
33
  If Lloyd is right, this 
action is illustrative of Llywelyn‘s slow eastward expansion into Chester.  Given 
Ranulf‘s succeeding actions with regards to both Llywelyn and Gwenwynwyn, 
this seems the most likely assumption.  Moreover, the reaction to the Welsh re-
conquest of Mold, last taken by Llywelyn‘s famed grandfather Owain Gwynedd, 
was significant for both Llywelyn and Ranulf.  The Welsh were jubilant.  
Cynddelew, a Welsh poet described the original event with delight, writing that 
the River ‗Alun was red with blood.‘34  And Llywarch records a similar for 
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Llywelyn
35
 that could support Lloyd interpretation.  If so, the success would have 
brought back memories of the victories of Owain Fawr that alluded to similar 
glories in store for Llywelyn.  Mold Castle, on the Welsh-Chester border, was a 
significant outpost for protecting Ranulf‘s interests in Flint, as well as protecting 
Hawarden Castle and western Cheshire and its loss was felt heavily. Ranulf could 
ill afford the loss of Mold, and he probably seethed with anger at his seneschal‘s 
failure to adequately defend the castle. 
 However, Insley argued for a closer look at the Annals of Chester, 
suggesting that if they were not corrupted, then it throws doubt upon the use of the 
poetry to support Llywelyn‘s success.36  He further argues that the fact that John 
took Llywelyn under his protection in 1199 may indicate a weakness on 
Llywelyn‘s part.37  This makes some sense, as the first of these charters, dated the 
28
th
 of September 1199 states that John takes Llywelyn into his protection, as well 
as his lands and anything he could win from his enemies.
38
  This seems to be 
encouraging Llywelyn to lay claim to land he does not yet hold and moreover, it 
suggests that Llywelyn is not yet in a very strong position.  The fact that Llywelyn 
is merely ‗Llywelyn son of Iorwerth‘ supports this idea.  Moreover, as Insley 
notes, the fact that John granted a similar charter to Gruffudd ap Cynan
39
 in 
December reflects the continued flux in Gwynedd during 1199.
40
  Of further note 
is the fact that while Llylweyn is granted what he can win, only Gruffudd has 
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confirmed his castles and tenements   in North Wales‘41 perhaps indicating that it 
is he who held the upper hand in 1199.   
 Despite his lack of interference during the Venedotian power struggles of 
the 1190s, Ranulf was no stranger to English-Welsh politics.  In December of 
1204,
42
 King John wrote a Letter Close to the sheriffs of Lincolnshire, 
Nottingham, Yorkshire, Leicestershire, and Warwickshire directing the sheriffs to 
seize all of Ranulf‘s lands and possessions.  Ranulf‘s support of Gwenwynwyn, in 
the face of John‘s imprisonment of same Welsh prince, had angered the English 
king.  Ranulf however, had interpreted Gwenwynwyn‘s imprisonment as implicit 
support for John‘s son-in-law, Llywelyn.  As Llywelyn‘s interest extended into 
the march of Cheshire as well as Powys Wenwynwyn, it was in Ranulf‘s interests 
to keep Llywelyn distracted by Gwenwynwyn rather than by his interest in the 
earldom.  However, it is impossible to ignore John‘s animosity towards Ranulf 
over the earl‘s spirited defence of Gwenwynwyn.  The significance is in Ranulf‘s 
wish to support Gwenwynwyn in the face of his King‘s disapproval because he 
saw Llywelyn‘s power and land hunger as a far bigger threat to Cheshire than 
John‘s disappointment.   
 Gwenwynwyn, another eastern neighbour of Llywelyn, was forever at 
odds with the Venedotians over their shared border and surrounding lands.  Their 
ongoing disputes are fully documented in following chapters, and best illustrated, 
in this early period, by Llywelyn‘s conquest of Powys Wenwynwyn while 
Gwenwynwyn was imprisoned by John.  The general policy of both the Angevin 
Crown and the marcher lords in this period was to play upon the rivalries between 
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and amongst the native Welsh rulers.  While squabbling between themselves, the 
native rulers were often unable to turn their attention to the machinations and 
advances of the Marcher lords into native Welsh lands.  This was how, as 
discussed above, Ranulf‘s ancestors had originally claimed so much of Gwynedd.  
Ranulf had learned from his oversight and underestimation of Llywelyn in the last 
decade of the twelfth century.  His policy in the early decades of the thirteenth 
century was different; he focused his attention upon the division between 
Gwenwynwyn and Llywelyn.  Due to Llywelyn‘s raids across the Chester border 
and his probable conquest of Mold in 1199, Ranulf followed the tried and tested 
policy of divide and conquer, by supporting Gwenwynwyn as the ‗lesser of two 
evils‘ over Llywelyn.  His goal was to keep Llywelyn‘s attention turned towards 
the Gwynedd-Powys border rather than the Gwynedd-Chester border.  Llywelyn 
dutifully obliged until 1208. 
 By 1201, Llywelyn‘s ascendant star had been noted by the English Crown 
and a peace concluded between emissaries from the English and Venedotian 
leaders.  This heralded the beginning of a fourteen-year association between 
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, self-styled Prince of North Wales, and his sometime 
supporter, adversary, bitter enemy, and father-in-law, King John of England.  The 
rockiness of a relationship between the rulers of England and Wales respectively 
was in part borne out of the constant possibility of turbulence borne of the English 
wish for dominion.  The Marcher barons who wanted to carve out lands in Wales 
on the one hand, and the Welsh who wished to maintain independence on the 
other, added further strain to these relationships.  However, while such a sense of 
hostility could have easily seethed under the surface of their relationship, the 
30 
reality of the clash between Llywelyn and John was more complex.  Born partly 
of mistrust and misinterpretation; both rulers second-guessed how each saw the 
other‘s role in their association.  This fuelled the mistrust with which each 
approached and interpreted early agreements, treaties, and contracts.   
 The document that provides testament to the earliest foundations of the 
relationship between Llywelyn and the King John is the 1201 accord.  Although, 
as Rowlands noted, it has received limited commentary,
43
 this peace, agreed 
between Llywelyn and the English king‘s representatives, provides a glimpse as to 
how John viewed his ideal relationship with ‗Llywelyn son of Iorwerth.‘44  The 
document accords Llywelyn no further title, and this limitation upon the 
recognition of his power is indicative of further limits he accepted in exchange for 
being recognised at all by King John‘s representatives.  The accord specifically 
dictates that Llywelyn is to do homage to John for his lands in Gwynedd.  ‗And 
when the lord king comes in England, Llywelyn will go toward him and he will 
do homage by his hand to the lord who is his liege of the lands.‘45  Rowlands 
notes that both this fealty and homage were simultaneously conventional and the 
most comprehensive and demanding and binding form of fealty.
46
  The text is also 
very specific as to how Llywelyn gained control of his lands, stating that 
Llywelyn received seisin over his lands from the English King‘s Justiciar 
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Geoffrey fitz Peter.
47
  Thus, the English King‘s representatives ignored the reality 
of Llywelyn‘s triumph over his uncle Dafydd, who had been previously backed by 
the English King, Henry II, while simultaneously relegating him to the role of a 
vassal, invested with his land by the English Kings.  Rowlands points out that the 
formal delivery of the seisin of Llywelyn‘s lands is a powerful message of his 
client status.
48
  The combination of these two clauses set out at the beginning of 
the document drawn up by the English royal chancery suggests an English feeling 
of superiority over the Welsh leader.  It appears that King John was quite happy to 
instruct his lords to recognise Llywelyn‘s control of the lands. However, he also 
stipulated that Llywelyn held them from the English king, not by right of 
inheritance or conquest.  It thereby ignores or invalidates Llywelyn‘s own claim 
to those rights as the sovereign ruler of north Wales.   
Llywelyn appears to have conceded this point.  His decision to do so is 
probably based on two considerations.  One is that his predecessors throughout 
Wales, not just in Gwynedd, had traditionally sworn homage to the English King.  
There is a further argument to be made, common to most historians commenting 
upon the relationships of Welsh rulers with English Kings.  Ever since the Anglo-
Saxon period, the English kings had maintained that allegiance is owed to them 
from the Welsh rulers.  Asser, a Welsh native who served King Alfred and later 
became his biographer, claims the idea that native Welsh rulers swearing 
allegiance for their lands in Wales to the Anglo Saxon Kings dates to the reign of 
Alfred the Great.  Asser notes that the Welsh, with the Franks, Frisians, Gauls, 
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pagans, Scots and Britons subjected themselves willingly to Alfred.
49
  While 
Anglo-Saxon England was no more united than Wales in this period, and it is, 
therefore, difficult to claim that such an idea dated in a concrete form from so 
early a period, the notion that Welsh rulers owed allegiance to the English crown 
is not in doubt.  In fact, Asser states that the Welsh kings of Dyfed, Glywysing, 
Gwent, Brycheiniog, and the sons of Rhodri Mawr submitted themselves to 
Alfred‘s imperium.50  Llywelyn‘s forbears dating back to the sons of Rhodri 
Mawr, both in Gwynedd, and in other areas of Wales, owed allegiance to the 
English King.  This may have been a nominal promise, to keep faith with the 
English.  However, Owain Gwynedd, The Lord Rhys, and Llywelyn‘s uncle 
Dafydd all swore allegiance to Henry II while he ruled.
51
  Dafydd went so far as 
to marry the illegitimate sister of King Henry and, after Llywelyn had exiled 
Dafydd, the former prince of Gwynedd and his wife lived in England on her 
estates.  Llywelyn was quick to follow this pattern.  In the past, the recognised 
rulers of Gwynedd and other major principalities had sworn allegiance to the king 
of England; Llywelyn was intent on placing himself on equal footing with 
previous Venedotian rulers.  He saw no threat in the swearing of homage, and by 
extension gaining English recognition of his conquests in Gwynedd.
52
   
The second consideration was that Llywelyn was also getting something 
out of it.  After he had done homage to the King, John would pardon all offenses 
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committed before Llywelyn had so sworn.
53
  This ameliorated any strain between 
Llywelyn and the Crown and, coincidentally left Llywelyn free to make his way 
back to Gwynedd without threat of being drawn into a case regarding his 
holdings.  As Rowlands points out, Llywelyn had amassed a wealth of enemies in 
his rise to prominence, and this clause is a form of protection.
54
  As Dafydd had 
been living in English exile since January of 1198, it is likely that this clause is 
specifically designed to protect Llywelyn from any claim his uncle might have 
wished to bring against Llywelyn.
55
  As the agreement was reached while John 
was in Poitou, this was effectively a ‗go-ahead‘ for Llywelyn to continue his 
campaigns in Wales.  After all, he would be forgiven once John returned and he 
did homage!  Considering that Llywelyn‘s interests were in ruling Gwynedd, the 
whole of Gwynedd if he could arrange it, this is a remarkably generous clause, 
and with the English King tied up with his interests in France,
56
 it was entirely 
possible for Llywelyn to complete his conquest of Gwynedd before John returned 
to England.  Llywelyn was not interested in rocking the proverbial boat and he 
wasn‘t interested in Gwynedd‘s, much less Wales‘s, independence from King 
John.  What Llywelyn wanted, as a new upstart prince, was recognition of his 
status and to be left alone in order to deal with those cousins whose hold on 
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Arwystli and other areas threatened his security.  While he was at it, the 
possibility to expand the borders of the Gwynedd he controlled was not something 
he would overlook.   
 In a discussion of Llywelyn‘s ‗wars of independence‘, slanted heavily by 
Welsh nationalism, David Moore makes the erroneous conclusion that Llywelyn 
was hesitant to perform homage to the John, noting that when Llywelyn was faced 
with his cousin Gruffudd ap Cynan ab Owain Gwynedd, it was Gruffudd who 
promised homage to King John for Gwynedd in 1199, not Llywelyn.
57
  His 
discussion of the 1201 peace treaty is then slanted, granting that Llywelyn 
conceded King John‘s points on Llywelyn‘s lack of rights to harbour fugitives in 
an attempt to safeguard Gwynedd from Gwenwynwyn‘s grasping Powysian 
hands.
58
  However, the reality is, as I have pointed to above, more complex than 
that.  Moore fails to discuss the idea that recognition of his status as a ruler of 
lands was important to a young Llywelyn.  He notes the fact that all Welsh princes 
for the past two generations had promised homage to the English crown, but fails 
to acknowledge the implications of this in respect to his nationalist agenda.  
However, as previously discussed, English recognition, especially when granted 
by a king who was far more interested in his lands in France, allowed Llywelyn to 
go after possible threats to his supremacy in Gwynedd without English 
interference.  While there are some truths in Moore‘s argument, Moore portrays 
Llywelyn as very aware of his attempts at independence from England, even at 
such an early date as 1201.  It is doubtful that Llywelyn spared much thought for 
the terms of the treaty in 1201, or what it may have meant for the future.  He 
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appears comfortable with agreeing not to harbour fugitives of the English King. 
This only became an issue in 1224 when Llywelyn argued that as an independent 
sovereign, he was entitled to harbour English fugitives.
59
  Moreover, it is even 
more debatable whether Llywelyn even cared if the English King claimed 
overlordship in 1201, so long as he had recognition of his rule in Gwynedd.  That 
year, the Brenhinedd Y Saesson remarks that Llywelyn conquered Llŷn from his 
cousin, Maredudd ap Cynan.
60
  Clearly, securing Gwynedd from his family was 
paramount in the young Llywelyn‘s mind that year. Furthermore, the following 
year, the Welsh chronicles note Llywelyn set out to subdue Gwenwynwyn, the 
eponymous prince of Powys Wenwynwyn and now Llywelyn‘s neighbour.61 
Llywelyn seems more concerned with Gwynedd and his rivals in Wales than any 
possible threat from England and was willing to give the English Justiciar and 
Archbishop what they wanted in the 1201 charter agreement. 
There is more to this document that just homage.  It also forms a legal 
framework for charges against Llywelyn.  Rowland points out that the treaty 
contains the first reference in existing English royal documents to ‗lex Wallie’.62  
Furthermore, Rowlands points out that the charter contains a distinction between 
Llywelyn's right and his possessions.
63
  Llywelyn may have been given seisin 
over his lands but his rights could still be challenged. Once charged, Llywelyn 
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had the right to decide what law would be used, English or Welsh.
64
  Royal 
intervention, Rowlands points out, is in the guise of supervision, and is probably 
designed to limit Llywelyn‘s ability to hide behind his own law.65   
Despite what might have been, at other times, large concessions, Llywelyn 
was not in a very strong negotiating position, and seemed happy with the terms.  
At the very least, it confirmed some limited recognition of Llywelyn‘s status as a 
ruler in North Wales from external dignitaries and powers, such as the English 
crown.  This placed Llywelyn firmly on the world scene.  This was important to 
his status as a leader in Gwynedd and the long fights that he engaged in against 
his uncles and cousins on his way to becoming a ruler of Gwynedd indicated that 
his position in the preceding years was far from secure.  In this document, the 
English acknowledged Llywelyn‘s place on the Welsh stage of politics and 
warfare.  This, in itself, is a major triumph for Llywelyn.   
It would have been difficult for Llywelyn to stake his claim to the 
Venedotian leadership without either the support, or at least the recognition, of at 
least one of the important policy-makers in Europe.  These could have come either 
from the Church or from his neighbouring rulers. In Llywelyn‘s case these 
neighbouring rulers would be either the other Welsh leaders or the English 
Crown. Thus, sometime between 1199 and 1201 Llywelyn was among those 
Welsh rulers who wrote to the Pope, seeking independence for the Welsh Church 
from Canterbury.
66
  In the letter, Llywelyn and his ‗allies‘ are on equal footing; 
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Llywelyn is styled in the letter (which pre-dates his peace accord with King 
John‘s Justiciar Geoffrey fitz Peter) ‗Llywelyn son of Iorwerth, Prince of North 
Wales‘ and the other Welsh rulers are listed on the same status level as Llywelyn 
‗Gwenwynwyn and Madoc, Princes of Powys, Gruffudd and Maelgwn, Rhys and 
Maredudd sons of Rhys, Princes of South Wales‘.67  Llywelyn was clearly seeking 
to state his position as the ruler of North Wales, and be recognised as such by the 
Pope—ruler of the Church and the other Welsh rulers: Gwenwynwyn ab Owain, 
Madoc ap Gruffudd the rulers of Powys, the East of Wales and Maelgwn, 
Gruffudd, Maredudd, and Rhys, current rulers of South Wales.  Clearly, Llywelyn 
is a prince in Wales by 1201, yet he is not accorded that title in the English Royal 
Chancery and King John clearly sees the young ruler as subordinate and not a 
sovereign equal.   
Interestingly, Kevin Mann noted that Llywelyn is the only Welsh ruler to 
bear the title princeps (prince)—and rarely at that—in English royal documents 
from John‘s reign. He also noted that the title occurs in English documents only 
when John was currying Llywelyn‘s favour to achieve the marriage between 
Llywelyn and Joan in 1204 and 1205.
68
  This is significant because although the 
title was awarded in rare cases to Llywelyn, he does not appear to have acquired it 
in the eyes of the English as of 1201, regardless of the fact that Llywelyn did style 
himself as ‗Prince of North Wales‘ in his own correspondence.  This indicates that 
Llywelyn was perhaps not as significant a player on the Welsh scene as he hoped 
to be, as well as hinting at a general English disregard of Welsh rulers and the 
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English need to assert supremacy over the native Welsh.  Although Llywelyn was 
using ‗princeps norwalliae’ (prince of North Wales), the title does not appear in 
the wording of the 1201 treaty.  This suggests either that he maintained less power 
within Wales in 1201 than in 1205, or that the title was only accorded to pander to 
Llywelyn during marriage negotiations.  Either way, he was not a major player, let 
alone the force he had become by the 1220s.  Llywelyn was not much of a threat 
to John and as such, was left to his own devices.  This was useful for Llywelyn, 
because, as he would learn in 1211, when it came to people whom he determined 
threatened his maintenance of control, John was ruthless.  An angry King of 
England, with all the wealth and might of his country behind him, was not 
something Llywelyn was in a position to withstand in 1201.  Thus, Llywelyn 
contracted a peace that appeared to be little threat to the aspirations of the English 
King, and protected his holdings from royal invasion, if not royal interference. 
In 1202, Llywelyn, having secured the Principality of Gwynedd as his 
own, turned his sights upon his eastern neighbours.  He first attacked both 
Gwenwynwyn of Northern Powys and the Earl of Chester, aiming to expand 
Gwynedd.   
In 1199, King John made treaties of alliance with both princes, appearing 
first to back Llywelyn in September and then Gwenwynwyn in December.  Both 
were promised ‗all lands they could win against the king‘s enemies.‘69  Again in 
1200, the English King made a second treaty with Gwenwynwyn and followed 
this up in 1201 with the treaty with Llywelyn in which John recognised 
Llywelyn‘s control of the whole of Gwynedd.70  It is misleading to interpret these 
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actions on the part of the English king as many historians have—as a tit-for-tat 
alliance with the English crown siding with first one side and then the other in a 
long-term dispute between two rival leaders.  In fact, between 1199 and 1201, 
Llywelyn and Gwenwynwyn were among those who signed their names to a letter 
to Pope Innocent III, asking for independence from Canterbury for the Welsh 
Church.
71
  The idea that Gwenwynwyn and Llywelyn would both sign their names 
to a document if they were not in agreement is ludicrous, suggesting that neither 
ruler felt remarkably hostile towards the other until Llywelyn‘s invasion of 
Penllyn in 1202.   
In 1202, however, Llywelyn ‗moved a host to Powys to subdue 
Gwenwynwyn and gain possession of his land‘72  Although, Gwenwynwyn 
defended his lands, Llywelyn managed to win both the cantrefs of Penllyn and 
Edeirnion, as well as the strategic castle of Bala on the banks of the Dee.
 Llywelyn‘s relations with the other Welsh rulers also seem dubious.  
However, he did not progress to out-right war against them, the way he did with 
Gwenwynwyn in 1202.   
Sometime in 1204, when John returned to England having lost Normandy 
to King Philip of France,
73
 Llywelyn performed his homage to the English King 
and it is likely at this point that English interest in the Welsh prince grew.  During 
John‘s absence, Llywelyn had been consolidating his position in Gwynedd.  The 
young prince‘s focus had shifted from securing recognition in his position as ruler 
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in Gwynedd to expanding his power and influence in addition to the land he 
directly controlled in this period.  The subjugation of Gwenwynwyn in 1202 
marks the beginning of the shift in Llywelyn‘s policies.  Llywelyn then made 
peace with Gwenwynwyn, the Prince of Southern Powys, and dispossessed Elise 
ap Madog ap Maredudd, Prince of Powys Fadog (Northern Powys).
74
  The 
following year, Llywelyn‘s uncle, Dafydd ab Owain, whom Llywelyn had 
captured back in 1197, and who ended his days in English exile, died at 
Ellesmere, the estate belonging to his wife, Emma.  These conquests are 
illustrative of Llywelyn‘s interests.  Although he made peace with Gwenwynwyn 
later in the same year and returned Crogen castle to Elise, ‗his uncle‘ ‗out of 
mercy,‘75  Llywelyn‘s goals had clearly changed; now he wanted to expand the 
land he controlled within Wales, not merely Gwynedd. In this sense, he was 
following the footsteps of a great many early medieval Welsh rulers who 
controlled vast areas of Wales through conquest, marriage and inheritance.   
It was around this point that following the precedent set by Henry II and 
Dafydd ab Owain, John offered his daughter, Joan, to Llywelyn as the 
Welshman‘s wife and Llywelyn accepted.76  The date of the marriage was 
between 1204 and 1206, according two English sources, the Annals of Chester 
and Worcester respectively;
77
 there is no record for the marriage in Welsh texts.   
The Welsh prince and his new in-laws appear to be at peace until 1208, 
when John interfered in Wales by capturing Gwenwynwyn, the Powysian prince 
at Chester.  Gwenwynwyn had decided to increase his mid-Wales lands by 
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invading the new lands of Peter fitz Herbert, new lord of the third part of 
Brecknock following to William de Braose‘s fall from John‘s grace.  John rapidly 
decided to support Peter, and summoned Gwenwynwyn to Shrewsbury on 8 
October to sue for peace, and imprisoned him.
78
  Llywelyn took advantage of 
Gwenwynwyn‘s imprisonment and went on an offensive campaign to acquire as 
much land as he could within Wales. But whilst Gwenwynwyn was in English 
captivity, Llywelyn seized the chance to claim further lands on his south eastern 
border.  Advancing from his 1202 position, Llywelyn attacked first Powys, and 
then Ceredigion, taking the lands of Gwenwynwyn and his ally Maelgwn ap 
Rhys.
79
  It is impossible to know the full extent that the imprisonment of 
Gwenwynwyn had on Llywelyn‘s plans.  It is clear from his actions that he was 
fully intending to expand his territories south and east.  His interests were not 
solely limited to conquests in Powys.  Llywelyn also looked south; he took the 
lands of his southern neighbour, Maelgwn ap Rhys, who controlled the north of 
Ceredigion.
80
  Unfortunately, Llywelyn‘s position was precarious; he had 
misinterpreted John‘s seizure of Gwenwynwyn as tacit agreement to his conquest 
and had made further enemies.  The other Welsh princes could easily see which 
way Llywelyn‘s interests and ambitions were heading.  Shortly before Christmas 
in 1208, Llywelyn was forced to write a letter to the English King making 
restitution to the English King for his actions in Powys.
81
  In fact, King John tried 
to foster hostility between Llywelyn and his fellow native rulers, by both 
recognising Llywelyn‘s conquests and then by releasing Gwenwynwyn in 1210 
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with the backing of an English Army to help the Powysian Prince reclaim what he 
had lost in 1208.
82
  He succeeded in raiding and taking control of Gwenwynwyn‘s 
lands.
83
  Unfortunately, John was neither amused nor pleased by such an action 
and requested that Llywelyn return the land.  
The Welsh chronicles record that Maelgwn ap Rhys, one of the sons of the 
Lord Rhys and prince of Deheubarth, destroyed his castles at Ystrad Meurig, 
Aberystwyth, and Dineirth ‗from fear of Llywelyn.‘84  Llywelyn reached 
Aberystwyth and rebuilt that castle,
85
 and his pattern of expansion appears to 
extend not just through southern Powys, but into Ceredigion, and the cantref of 
Penweddig.  While others could point to the fact that Llywelyn gave the lands of 
northern Ceredigion between the Dyfi and Aeron to the sons of Gruffudd ap Rhys 
to argue that Llywelyn was seeking either an independent Wales or the position he 
later achieved as the first among Welsh Princes, this does not seem to be the case.  
Llywelyn appears to have kept most of the lands that he could reasonably hold to 
himself.  Moreover, during his conquests he made more enemies than friends.   
Llywelyn‘s conquests of 1208 not only damaged his relationships with 
other Welsh rulers, they also threatened his relationship with John.  Although 
Turvey referred to John‘s reaction to Llywelyn‘s conquest as ‗indulgent‘, this is 
far from an accurate assessment.
86
  John‘s focus had shifted to England and her 
insular neighbours after his defeats in France and he set out to increase his 
influence over Wales; this is illustrated by his imprisonment of Gwenwynwyn.  
Meanwhile, Llywelyn was quick to apologise to the English king and sent a letter 
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to John to that effect by Christmas of 1208.
87
  It is possible that a wariness was 
growing on John‘s part when he considered his son-in-law.  John was possibly 
concerned about Llywelyn‘s growing power within Wales, but Llywelyn still 
appears willing to appease the English king. 
Two years later, while John was busy pursuing William de Braose and his 
family in Ireland, the Earl of Chester rebuilt the castle of Degannwy, which 
overlooked the Abbey of Aberconwy and bordered on the Conwy River in 
Gwynedd Is Conwy, as well as the castle of Holywell.  Llywelyn, the chronicles 
note, ravaged the Earl‘s domain so as to provide discouragement for any possible 
planned invasion.
88
 Ranulf III, Earl of Chester, was born in 1170 and ruled 
Chester from 1181 until his death in 1232.  His relationship with the Venedotian 
Welsh was based upon an extended history of both expansionism and periods of 
consolidation on the part of the Welsh princes.  Ranulf was a minor from 1181 to 
1193 and upon reaching his majority at age twenty-three, he was sidetracked by 
English Crown interests in France.  Ranulf had ignored the dynastic disputes 
between Llywelyn, his uncles and cousins that raged in Gwynedd.
89
  While 
Llywelyn was consolidating his position on Gwynedd, Ranulf‘s attention was 
turned elsewhere.  In 1198, Ranulf was attending to trouble within his interests in 
Normandy and elsewhere in England while Llywelyn was exiling his cousins.  
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Although previous Earls of Chester such as Hugh d‘Avranches and his nephew, 
Robert of Rhuddlan, had conquered most of Gwynedd by attacking whilst the 
Venedotian rulers were embroiled in dynastic disputes, Ranulf had not followed 
Hugh‘s example of conquest in Wales.  However, this history did fuel the flames 
of animosity between the Prince of North Wales and the Earl of Chester at the end 
of the twelfth century.  Clearly, Llywelyn had little interest in allowing the Earl of 
Chester gain a foothold in Gwynedd, as the Earl‘s lands bordered directly on 
Llywelyn‘s own.  A previous Earl of Chester, Hugh d‘Avranches, and his cousin 
Robert of Ruddlan had conquered deep into the heart of Gwynedd by the end of 
the eleventh century and Llywelyn sought to prevent any possible repeat of the 
event.
90
  Moreover, Llywelyn‘s relationship with John appears to be souring at 
this point.  While there is no evidence to suggest that the Earl was acting on the 
King‘s behalf, Llywelyn destroyed the hill-top fortress of Degannwy ‗for fear of 
the king‘ and thus appears to be wary of his father-in-law.  This wariness is 
understandable. The same year that Llywelyn was fighting with the Earl of 
Chester, John helped Llywelyn‘s rival, Gwenwynwyn, regain his lands in 
Southern Powys and made a pact with Maelgwn ap Rhys in support of his attack 
on the cantref of Penweddig.
91
  Llywelyn could have easily construed John‘s 
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interference amongst the Welsh princes as a withdrawal of support by the English 
King.   
In the summer of 1211, King John assembled an English army with the 
aim of humiliating Llywelyn.  With the English King in this endeavour, were all 
the princes who had felt threatened by Llywelyn‘s ambitions.  The princes who 
supported John in his two invasions of Gwynedd included Gwenwynwyn ab 
Owain Cyfeiliog, Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor, 
Maredudd ap Robert of Cydewain, and Maelgwn and Rhys Gryg ap Rhys  
 Llywelyn‘s fears were confirmed that year when John gathered a force in 
Chester.  Using the new alliances he had forged in the past year, the English king 
summoned all the rulers in Wales to meet with him in the city and join his force 
against the Venedotian prince.  Brut Y Tywysogion records that John‘s invasion 
was retaliation for Llywelyn‘s continued forays into English lands.92  Llywelyn 
faced a combined force of the English King, his English army and mercenaries, as 
well as the support of the Welsh princes of whom Llywelyn had made enemies 
over the past decade.  Llywelyn, and the people of Gwynedd Is Conwy—
encompassing the Perfeddwlad made up of the four cantrefs of Rhos, Rhufoniog, 
Dyffryn Clwyd and Tegeingl—withdrew in the face of John‘s advance, retreating 
into the mountains of Snowdonia.
93
  King John reached Degannwy without a 
problem, but found that his supplies were cut off by the Welsh circling behind 
him, attacking the supply train in their familiar form of guerrilla warfare.  Famine 
settled in over the English and Welsh combined forces and the chronicles noted 
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they even ate their horses before withdrawing back to Chester until August.
94
  
John returned to Gwynedd, angrier for his defeat, on the 1st of August.  He built 
castles as he advanced in order to protect against a repeat of the disastrous famine 
at Degannwy.  The King advanced deep into Gwynedd, his forces imprisoning 
Bishop Robert of Bangor and burning the town.
95
  Llywelyn, with the support of 
his key councillors, sent his wife, Joan, to make peace with her father.  He entered 
the English camp with the king‘s assurances of safety and agreed to a very costly 
peace.
96
   
John‘s first invasion of 1211 was, as noted previously, an abortive failure, 
but his second was a resounding success.  On 12 August 1211, Llywelyn formally 
quitclaimed to John the three cantrefs known collectively as the part of the 
Perfeddwlad—Rhos, Rhufoniog, and Dyffryn Clwyd, with their accompanying 
castles of Degannwy, Denbigh, Ystrad and Ruthin.
97
  More importantly, Llywelyn 
promised not to interfere in Edeirnion, and to allow Hywel ap Gruffudd to reclaim 
seisin over his lands—i.e. the lands of his father, Gruffudd ap Cynan.98  It is 
interesting that despite the vast concessions made to John in August of 1211, 
Llywelyn only made these two concessions in the charter agreement regarding the 
Welsh.  The claim to Edeirnion was recognised in favour of the minor Welsh lord, 
Owain Brogyntyn, and the charter expressly states that Owain held his land of the 
English king rather than either Gwenwynwyn or Llywelyn.
99
  This, interestingly, 
ended the dispute between Gwenwynwyn and Llywelyn over the cantref of 
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Edeirnion, as John was claiming it as his own.  However, it also sowed the seeds 
for the Welsh Alliance that began the following year in 1212.   
 Llywelyn‘s agreement with John on the 11th of August was meant to ruin 
the Venedotian prince, leaving him as nothing more than a petty lord in Wales.  
John clearly had lost patience with Llywelyn, as the prince had not lived up to 
John‘s expectations of a malleable ruler whose allegiance was in the service of the 
English King.  Llywelyn‘s interest in expanding his lands and power in Wales and 
the Marches of Wales had upset the English king and he hoped to humble the 
prince, restrict him to Gwynedd Uwch Conwy and keep him loyal with the threat 
of harm to the hostages Llywelyn provided.  The charter Llywelyn attested 
quitclaimed to King John all four cantrefs of the Perfeddwlad: Rhos, Rhufoniog, 
Ystrad,
100
 Dyffryn Clwyd with the castles within them: Degannwy, Denbigh, and 
Ruthin.
101
  He promised not to interfere with the native Welsh rulers, and granted 
that the king could have the allegiance of as many of Llywelyn‘s retainers as the 
King wished.
102
  Clearly, the King was worried about the extent of Llywelyn‘s 
aspirations within Wales.  If Rhys and Owain ap Gruffudd were willing to hold 
their lands from Llywelyn, and recognise him as their lord and if Llywelyn 
somehow managed to reconquer the lands he held before August 1211, then 
Llywelyn might rise to the sort of prominence that Rhodri Mawr, Hywel Dda, 
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Maredudd ab Owain and Gruffudd ap Llywelyn achieved in the ninth, tenth, and 
eleventh centuries respectively.  John preferred many smaller local rulers, to one 
major prince within Wales.  In order to complete his conquest of Gwynedd, John 
compelled Llywelyn to promise that if he failed to have an heir by Joan his lands 
would revert to the English king and would pass to Gruffudd only by gift of the 
English Crown, as well  as provide as one of his hostages his illegitimate son, and 
heir, Gruffudd.
103
  This could possibly have meant the end to the principality of 
Gwynedd, and its absorption into the English crown two generations earlier than 
Edward I‘s famous conquest of 1282-1283, or the reinforcement of a client 
kingdom held solely by the gift of the English King.  Llywelyn further conceded 
to the English, in compensation for the cost of John‘s campaign into Gwynedd, of 
10,000 cows, 40 destriers, 60 hunters,
104
 and as many of the Welsh lords as 
hostages as John demanded.
105
   
John‘s conquest of Gwynedd came fresh on the heels of his successes in 
both Scotland and Ireland.  In August of 1209, John led a large army to Norham 
and demanded that King William the Lion of Scotland hand over three castles in 
that country as security for the Scottish King‘s loyalty to the English crown.106  
John forced William‘s complete submission when the Scottish king arrived to 
avoid war, taking his two daughters as hostages, and gaining 15,000 marks in two 
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years to maintain the English King‘s goodwill.107  John was probably hoping to 
copy the terms of William‘s submission in Gwynedd, and perhaps Llywelyn 
worried about a similar war between himself and John during the ensuing two 
years.  Moreover, John‘s well organised and successful campaign in Ireland may 
have caused the prince further concern.  It was a major expedition and John was 
able to dispose of Anglo-Norman lords whose power he felt threatened him, such 
as Walter Lacy, and managed to secure with his vast army a good chunk of 
Ireland.
108
  John‘s successes in Ireland and Scotland illustrate his interest in 
controlling the whole of the British Isles, and could have warned Llywelyn of his 
eventual submission to John in the summer of 1211 had the prince been reading 
John‘s intentions in Ireland and Scotland that way.   
It is clear that 1211 ended in dismal failure for Llywelyn.  He had lost half 
of his patrimony to the Crown, all of the lands he had won at the expense of his 
neighbours and was forced to accept costly and humiliating terms from John.  
However, all was not lost, and this defeat would prove to the catalyst for 
Llywelyn‘s meteoric rise in the succeeding years.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE LEARNING CURVE: 1211 – 1228 
 Llywelyn had succumbed to a disastrous defeat in 1211; he had been 
humiliated and his patrimony had been drastically reduced.  There can be no 
doubt it was a depressing situation for the prince.  However, it was also a hard-
earned lesson; and one Llywelyn had clearly learned well.  Over the next decade 
and a half, Llywelyn addressed himself anew to his self-aggrandisement, but in a 
manner vastly different from his original approach.  Instead of setting out to 
subdue his fellow rulers and claim by conquest more of Wales, Llywelyn began to 
use a measure of diplomacy in his dealings with them.  Forging alliances with his 
fellow rulers, he set out once more to unite native Wales under his own standard. 
Llywelyn‘s relationship with John was irrevocably ruined after Llywelyn‘s 
dramatic defeat in August 1211.  But he was not the only Welsh ruler to suffer 
losses at John‘s hands.  It is difficult to determine the full extent to which John‘s 
actions in the disputed territory of Edeirnion—in effect dispossessing both 
Gwenwynwyn and Llywelyn—resulted in frustration and fuelled concerns 
amongst the native Welsh rulers, but it is likely that they saw John‘s ultimate goal 
as more comprehensive than merely dispossessing Llywelyn.  The fact that John 
had not recognised Gwenwynwyn‘s prior claim to Edeirnion, which Llywelyn had 
taken from him in 1202, probably irked Gwenwynwyn, and might have raised 
concerns among the Welsh princes that John‘s interest was about not only 
subduing Llywelyn, but all the other Welsh rulers as well.  Again, it appears that 
ambition got the better of rulers both in England as well as in Wales. John kept 
the castle of Aberystwyth for himself, rather than returning it to Maelgwn or 
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Rhys, sons of the Lord Rhys.
1
  Moreover, John also used his Welsh allies to attack 
Penweddig and wrest it, and the lands between the Dyfi and Aeron, from the sons 
of Gruffudd ap Rhys.  By the end of 1211, many of the Welsh rulers had begun to 
revolt against John‘s active incursions and apparent objectives in Wales.   
Llywelyn wanted to reclaim Perfeddwlad, the four cantrefs east of the 
Conwy he had ceeded to John in August 1211.  John had given them to 
Llywelyn‘s cousins Owain ap Dafydd and Gruffudd ap Rhodri2 in order to, 
according to Mann, maintain Llywelyn‘s new submissive position to the English 
Crown.
3
  Late in 1211, Rhys Gryg and Maelgwn ap Rhys violated their terms with 
the English king and sacked Aberystwyth castle.
4
  Although he was at Cambridge 
with John for Easter,
5
 Llywelyn joined the revolt shortly thereafter and later that 
same year, he moved back into lands he had given to the Crown.
6
  He also was 
quick to join forces with his former rivals.  The campaigns of August 1211 had 
taught Llywelyn that when the other Welsh rulers saw him as a threat to their 
security, they were willing to ally with the English Crown against him.
7
  He 
turned this knowledge on its head.  John‘s predatory actions had made his 
erstwhile enemies nervous and they were now willing to unite with Llywelyn.  As 
allies, the Welsh could help each other guard against John.  Burying the hatchet, 
the Welsh rose up against the King; Llywelyn regained all his castles except 
Degannwy and Rhuddlan and his allies were able to capture Mathrafal in Powys, 
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built by the Anglo-Norman Robert Vieuxpont.
8
  Llywelyn had learned one of his 
most important lessons about ruling in Wales: do not alienate potential allies when 
there is a greater threat to your security.  
 In 1212, the chronicles note that Llywelyn made a pact with the other 
rulers in Wales when he joined them in revolt.  Amongst those named as 
Llywelyn‘s‘ allies in Brut are Gwenwynwyn, Maelgwn ap Rhys, Madog ap 
Gruffudd Maelor, and Maredudd ap Robert.
9
 All four of Llywelyn‘s new major 
allies had made up part of the force that arrayed against Llywelyn in 1211.  This is 
important because it specifically highlights a shift in Llywelyn‘s policies in 
dealing with his fellow Welsh rulers.  From 1212 onwards, Llywelyn focused 
mainly upon creating a firm alliance.  Llywelyn‘s ambition was not diminished by 
this shift; instead, he sought new ways of accomplishing his ultimate objective of 
control of Wales.  The significance of the 1212 alliance cannot be overestimated.  
It is ultimately the defining moment in Llywelyn‘s history, the event which best 
illustrates the change in Llywelyn‘s policy, and his shift from a petty, land and 
power hungry warlord who attacked anyone he perceived as weak or whose land 
he coveted, to the diplomatic spokesman for native Wales; the man who acquired 
his power through alliances and his intelligent use of the trust of the other native 
Welsh rulers throughout the period.   
The Welsh allies, and Llywelyn in particular, also sought further help from 
international sources.  Because John had, in 1206, alienated England from the 
Papacy over his refusal to accept Stephen Langton as the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Innocent III excommunicated John and placed an interdict over both 
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England and Wales.  This dispute was still on-going in 1211 and 1212, and the 
Welsh were swift to capitalise on it.  Papal blessing for the Welsh revolt swiftly 
reached the princes; and Innocent dissolved their oaths of allegiance to John.
10
   
Llywelyn also wrote to Philip Augustus and received a royal gold-sealed 
letter in return, ratifying a treaty between France and Gwynedd.  Treharne argues 
that the treaty illustrates Llywelyn‘s knowledge of just how precarious the Welsh 
position was and that Llywelyn and his allies were in need of ‗powerful 
support.‘11  He also points out that the use of Philip‘s gold-seal suggests that it 
was a formal record of an alliance treaty.
12
  Llywelyn‘s letter to Philip stresses the 
need for mutual aid against enemies held in common.  He also explicitly states 
that he has not agreed a truce, or even parlayed, with the English and requests that 
Philip agree neither truce nor peace with the English without Welsh support.
13
  
Llywelyn states in his letter summarising the treaty that he had ‗summoned 
together all the princes of Wales, all of whom he has bound together in the 
friendship of this treaty.‘14  Moreover, this letter illustrates that he was the 
spokesman for the Welsh alliance to the wider world.  It is significant that by the 
summer of 1212, Llywelyn was in a position to call his fellow native Welsh rulers 
together and bind them to a treaty of his making.  It suggests that not only was 
Llywelyn a member of the Welsh rebellion against John and an ally of his fellow 
rebels, he was the ringleader.  His statement that he ‗bound them to the treaty‘ 
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further argues that Llywelyn actually had acquired some sort of leadership.  
Moreover, that there is no record of any other Welsh ruler writing to the French 
King, suggests that Llywelyn was recognised by both Philip and the other Welsh 
rulers as the spokesman for them all.  This could suggest one other thing, it is also 
possible either Philip or Llywelyn, himself, was the one who was instrumental in 
securing the absolution of the Welsh from their oaths of allegiance to John.  
Llywelyn‘s alliances were ultimately successful in supporting his ambitions; the 
chronicles note that the Welsh re-claimed the Perfeddwlad for him. 
When Llywelyn joined in Welsh rebellion the following year, to reclaim 
the lands east of the Conwy, John assembled a force to dispossess the prince 
completely.
15
  Once again, they congregated at Chester.  It was at Chester that 
John hung the twenty-eight hostages given by Llywelyn to ensure the peace of 
1211 and from there that he ordered the hanging of young Rhys Maelgwn‘s 
seven-year-old son, Rhys, at Shrewsbury.
16
  While ensuring the hanging of the 
hostages, John amassed a huge army in order to complete his destruction of 
Llywelyn.  However, Llywelyn and his allies were saved from John‘s wrath by 
letters from both the King of Scotland, William the Lion, and Joan, Llywelyn‘s 
wife, warning John that he faced the defection of his nobles after he crossed the 
border into Wales.
17
  Whether Joan was a spy for her father, or was writing the 
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letter on Llywelyn‘s orders to keep John out of Wales is a topic much debated.18  
Either way, John decided against the invasion, turning his focus upon the dissent 
of his English barons.  It appears that while John was busy subduing the Scots, 
Irish and Welsh, he was making enemies at home as well as on the borders of 
England.  Between 1212 and 1215, the Welsh revolt could actually be so termed.  
During the summer of 1212, Llywelyn wrote to his fellow Welsh princes 
declaring that they all should protect from theft and plunder religious lands 
including all the lands acquired by Walter Corbet ‗for the increase of religion.‘19  
That Llywelyn felt comfortable and secure enough to dictate to his allies in this 
way suggests that his role as leader of the Welsh allies was somewhat firm.  The 
following year, John focused on making peace with the papacy and protecting 
himself against his enemies within England as well as the proposed invasion by 
Louis of France backed by the papacy. The Welsh, meanwhile, recaptured 
Degannwy and Rhuddlan, putting Llywelyn back in possession of the 
Perfeddwlad.
20
  
John abandoned his campaign in Wales and arranged a truce with 
Llywelyn in June of 1213, with the help of Pandulf, the papal legate.
21
  In late 
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 This, of course, was in violation of Llywelyn‘s agreement with Philip.  However, as Treharne 
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summer of 1213, John sent a letter patent, naming Ranulf of Chester and Faulks 
de Breaute among his addressees, prescribing the rules of the peace the King had 
agreed with Llywelyn in June.
22
  The Earl of Chester was not among those who 
had been plotting to desert John in Wales.  Ranulf III was an adamant supporter of 
John and a crown loyalist in the English baronial uprisings of 1215 to 1217, and 
his position was unlikely to have been the opposite in the three years preceding 
the uprisings.
23
  However, he may have been seeking to augment his holdings 
under the guise of putting down the Welsh rebellion.  The message to these 
marchers was clear; the King did not want them to engage in further hostilities 
with Llywelyn. 
 Interestingly, multiple alliances amongst the Welsh against John were 
neither binding nor absolute.  In 1213, Rhys Ieunac appealed to John and not his 
fellow Welshmen, to be instated with a portion of territory in South Wales.  John 
ordered Rhys Gryg to ‗share‘ with Rhys Ieuanc and Rhys Gryg refused.  The two 
fell into a dispute over Brycheiniog.
24
  Rhys Gryg eventually capitulated and 
attempted to make peace with John but was captured at Carmarthen and 
imprisoned by the King.
25
  This infighting was one of many reasons for the peace 
treaty which was agreed in the summer of 1213 between Llywelyn and John.
26
  
This truce lasted until John‘s problems with his barons flared up in 1215.  It is 
noteworthy that during that time, the Welsh chronicles record King John‘s actions 
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in France and at the same time, mention no action on the part of any native Welsh 
ruler against the English.  Llywelyn was not the only Welsh prince to involve 
himself in English affairs during the baronial revolts of 1213 to 1218.  However, 
historians of Wales often cite Llywelyn as the primary instigator and leader of the 
Welsh aspect of the Baronial wars.   
 John spent most of 1214 in France, fighting once again for his continental 
patrimony; upon his failure, he returned to an increasingly unhappy England.  
King John had alienated many of his barons with his mistrust and heavy-handed 
governmental style.  The mistrust between the English King and his barons was 
previously illustrated in John‘s abortion of his planned invasion of Gwynedd in 
1213.  Joan and William both had warned John that he faced desertion and 
treachery from his barons when his force crossed the Venedotian border.  This 
cross-border alliance between Llywelyn and the Anglo-Norman barons is 
indicative of the future of Llywelyn‘s relationship with his Anglo-Norman 
neighbours and the English Crown.   
Like his continuing problems with the barons, John and Llywelyn‘s 
relationship also failed to repair itself during John‘s stay in France.  The Welsh 
record of the events of 1215 point to an alliance amongst ‗all the leading men of 
England and all the princes of Wales…against the King until…he restored to the 
leading men of England and Wales the lands and castles which he had taken from 
them at his pleasure, without either justice or law.‘27  Between 1215 and 1218, the 
Welsh were led in their rebellion against the English by Llywelyn, whose military 
success seemed assured.  He and his Welsh force took Shrewsbury and Llywelyn 
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and the Welsh princes ‗in general‘ gathered a host to capture Carmarthen.28  The 
united force attacking South Wales was made up of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Hywel 
ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, Llywelyn ap Maredudd ap Cynan, Gwenwynwyn ab 
Owain Cyfeiliog, Maredudd ap Robert of Cydewain, Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor, 
the sons of Maelgwn ap Cadwallon, Maelgwn ap Rhys, Rhys Gryg, Rhys Ieuanc 
and his brother Owain ap Gruffudd ap Rhys.  Notably, early in the year, Maelgwn 
ap Rhys and Rhys Ieuanc captured ‗all the Welsh of Dyfed.‘  In response, 
Maelgwn and Owain ap Gruffudd went to Gwynedd to complain about their 
treatment to Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.  Llywelyn was not only the one picked to 
mediate the dispute, but he managed to convince both sides to join forces to form 
part of the united front against the Crown in the south of Wales rather than fight 
amongst themselves.  This signifies the shift in the status of Llywelyn amongst his 
Welsh compatriots.  Instead of being seen as the aggressor, by 1215 Llywelyn, 
rather than the English King, is the one appointed as arbitrator of internal Welsh 
disputes.  This is further evidence of the native Welsh trust in Llywelyn and 
illustrates that Llywelyn was accepted by his fellow leaders to act as a fair and 
impartial judge for arbitration.  In 1216 Llywelyn summoned ‗all the princes of 
Wales‘ and as a committee, apportioned the lands in south Wales amongst the 
various local rulers there.
29
  What King John had failed to accomplish, Llywelyn 
managed three years later.   
The first mention in the Welsh chronicles of an Anglo-Norman alliance of 
Llywelyn‘s is in 1215, when the chronicles specifically state that Giles de Braose, 
Bishop of Hereford, organised an alliance between the Welsh rebels and the 
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Anglo-Norman ones, cemented in a meeting at Brycheiniog between the Welsh 
and Reginald de Braose.  It seems that Giles was the one who pushed for this 
alliance, and encouraged his brother, Reginald to ally with the Welsh.  It certainly 
was Giles who encouraged Reginald‘s alliance with the Welsh of Brycheiniog.30   
Gwladus, daughter of Llywelyn, married Reginald de Braose in 1215.
31
  
Reginald and his brother Giles, Bishop of Hereford, were prominent in the 
baronial rebellion against King John in 1213-1214. Llywelyn was supporting the 
barons against King John and that alliance therefore served the purpose of 
cementing a political union against a common foe.  But when Reginald became 
reconciled with King Henry III in 1217, Llywelyn became ‗enraged against 
Reginald de Braose for breaking his pact.‘32  Not only did he lead his troops 
against Reginald, but in 1219 he married another of his daughters, Margaret, to 
Reginald‘s nephew, John, as a rival claimant to Reginald‘s lands as well as a 
supporter against the crown.
33
    
Llywelyn and his Welsh allies supported the barons throughout the conflict 
and Llywelyn captured Shrewsbury without resistance while John suffered the 
loss of London at the hands of the barons.
34
  The Welsh also advanced in the 
south on the King‘s castles—mostly taken from William de Braose—and won 
Abergavenny, Pencelli, Skenfrith and White Castle.  Although, it was the English 
barons who brought John to submission at Runnymede in 1215, the interests of 
the Welsh, and especially Llywelyn, were not ignored.  Included in the resultant 
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charter was a provision to return Llywelyn and the Welsh princes their lands, 
liberties,
35
 the return of all Welsh hostages and charters held by John including 
Llywelyn‘s son Gruffudd.36  J.B Smith points out one aspect fundamental to the 
Welsh was the division of how to arbitrate disputed land.  The text is specific, ‗if a 
dispute arises over this [the land to be returned] let it be decided in the March by 
the judgement of their peers, for holdings in England according to the law of 
England, for holdings in Wales according to the law of Wales, and for holdings in 
the March according to the law of the March.‘37  The combined interests of the 
Welsh, the Marchers and the English provided for uneasy bedfellows.  Much of 
the land the Marcher lords held the Welsh laid claim to, and vice-versa.  It may 
well be that the Welsh were merely trying to safeguard their acquisitions to the 
best of their abilities, by insisting on Welsh law in Wales, and the Marchers 
retaliated with March law.  The problem, of course, lies in the fact that much of 
the Marches was disputed territory, claimed by both, and this division had the 
potentiality to present rival claimants for insisting on separate law.  Smith points 
out that this was the first formal recognition of three separate laws, but he takes 
the interpretation one step further, arguing that Llywelyn was seeking to ensure 
that the judicial process would ‗safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of a Welsh 
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prince.‘38  This peace, however, was not a lasting one.  John had the Runnymede 
charter annulled by the papacy because it was granted under duress.
39
  However, 
some provisions of the charter were met, and Gruffudd returned to his father‘s 
court in 1215.  
Llywelyn‘s support of the Baronial cause did not engender himself to all of 
the Marcher barons.  He and Ranulf remained on opposite sides of the battles 
between John and the English Barons that began in 1215 and lasted until the 
English King‘s death.  It was expedient, and most likely gratifying after the 
humiliation Llywelyn had suffered at John‘s hands, for Llywelyn to aid the 
barons.  Ranulf, on the other hand, remained a crown loyalist.  In order to reward 
Ranulf for his support, John granted many castles during this period to his trusted 
earl.  On 13 April 1216, John granted Shropshire, Staffordshire and Bridgenorth 
castle to Ranulf.
40
  It is likely John granted Shropshire in hopes that Ranulf would 
protect the border between Shropshire and Wales just as he had protected the 
Gwynedd-Cheshire border from Llywelyn when the latter had been raiding the 
English border in support of the baronial opposition to John.  James Alexander 
points out that these grants to Ranulf provided him with a ‗range of contiguous 
counties in the west and north-west of England.‘41  Alexander‘s interpretation 
centres upon Ranulf‘s position as a trusted supporter of John and loyalist baron 
and aims to prove this point.  However, Ranulf‘s swathe of counties brought him 
into further conflict with Llywelyn.  Llywelyn had taken Shrewsbury, in 
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Shropshire, in May of 1215 and the King‘s grant to Ranulf was a way to counter 
Llywelyn‘s grasp of the Shropshire countryside.  
 Llywelyn‘s successes in diplomacy with the native Welsh and the rebel 
barons were not all encompassing.  Gwenwynwyn renounced his alliance with 
Llywelyn and the other Welsh princes and for unknown reasons made peace with 
King John in 1216.  Although hostilities continued, after making peace with John, 
Gwenwynwyn ignored the oaths made to his fellow Welsh rulers.  Llywelyn, in a 
clear attempt at diplomacy, sent bishops to try and persuade Gwenwynwyn to 
honour his agreement with his fellow Welsh princes, but they were rebuffed, so 
Llywelyn used the excuse to reconquer Powys, with the help of his allies.
42
  
Llywelyn‘s attempt at diplomacy and his subsequent conquest of Powys illustrate 
that he had matured dramatically over the seventeen years of John‘s reign.  While 
he clearly still coveted Powys for himself, he acted first to gain the support of 
other Welsh princes and attempted negotiations before any conquest was 
endeavoured.  Thus, Llywelyn did not appear a threat to the lands of his Welsh 
allies in the south, or his baronial allies.  When negotiations failed, however, 
Llywelyn and the rest of the native Welsh princes attacked Powys Wenwynwyn.
43
  
The allies of Llywelyn captured that part of Powys and claimed it for him.  
Gwenwynwyn was driven into exile in Chester and, there, died.  Turvey suggests 
that Llywelyn fully intended to hold southern Powys for ‗longer than he did the 
last time he annexed the kingdom.‘44   
John had a lot to contend with during the last months of his rule.  Louis, 
the crown prince of France, invaded England with the support of the rebel barons, 
                                                 
42
 Brut: RBH, pp. 214-215. 
43
 Brut: RBH pp. 206-209. 
44
 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, p. 66. 
63 
and John, while he was on the offensive, took sick and died at the Bishop of 
Lincoln‘s castle on the 18 October 1216.45  Henry, John‘s infant son, was declared 
the new king, and the rebel barons who were supporting Louis quickly hastened to 
make peace with the new regency council.  The rebellion was at an end in 
England, but Llywelyn and his allies continued to fight in Wales. 
The new King of England was little more than nine years old but 
surrounded by experienced, intelligent advisors including Llywelyn‘s erstwhile 
enemy, the Earl of Chester, who functioned as a regency council and helped the 
young king ascend to the throne.  The rebel English barons rapidly made peace 
with the child Henry, preferring him to the adult French prince, Louis.  This 
situation was further aided by the reissue of the Runnymede charter in the same 
year: Henry‘s supporters secured his kingdom. 
England was in the process of defeating Louis and reintegrating itself after 
a civil war, while Llywelyn and his Welsh allies continued to expand their 
horizons.  As regent, the Earl William Marshal, a marcher lord of Pembroke, 
reconstructed the crown and gained the support of Pope Honorius III for Henry‘s 
interests.  Llywelyn, meanwhile, continued his war against the Anglo-Normans, 
both in Wales and the Marches.  When his son-in-law, the Marcher lord Reginald 
de Braose, made peace with the Henry‘s regency supporters, Llywelyn invaded 
Brecon with the support of Rhys and Owain, nephews of Reginald, who attacked 
Builth.
46
  Llywelyn set out to attack Brecon and the town surrendered, offering 
five hostages for their safety.  Llywelyn moved on to Gower, losing many of his 
men along the trek over the Black Mountain, before encamping at Llan-giwg.  
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Reginald and William de Braose approached Llywelyn there to surrender, and 
ceded the castle of Seinhenydd to the Welsh.
47
  Llywelyn passed the castle into 
the keeping of Rhys Gryg, and Llywelyn turned his attention back to his other 
main rival.   
The preceding English kings had settled Flemings in the March of Wales 
in an attempt to provide for their hired mercenaries.  It was against the Flemings, 
in Dyfed, that Llywelyn marched next but they, too, sued for peace before he 
advanced any further than Cefn Cynfarchan, near Whitland Abbey on the Taf 
River.  Llywelyn, however, marched further across Pembrokeshire and prepared 
for battle outside Haverford in Rhos.  Iorwerth, Bishop of St. Davids, spoke on 
behalf of the townspeople and Llywelyn agreed to peace in exchange for 20 
hostages and 1,000 marks by the next Michaelmas or else they would do him 
homage for their lands forever.
48
  Llywelyn was clearly still attempting to expand 
the sphere of his influence into the south but he was after the lands of his Anglo-
Norman enemies: the De Braose lands, and the Pembroke lands of William the 
Marshal.  In this way, Llywelyn was learning to extend his influence first by 
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alliance, and secondly by conquest of the lands that border on his allies.  If he had 
secured the loyalty and homage of Haverford, native-ruled Wales would have 
moved further south, all the way to the sea, and Llywelyn‘s allies would no longer 
have been hemmed in by Anglo-Normans, but by him.  Llywelyn might have 
hoped to maintain his own personal rule over lands, but it would have been a very 
difficult dream to fulfil as they were so far south and removed in relation to 
Gwynedd.  However, the increase of his sway and influence, while placing others 
in charge of lands newly-won from the Anglo-Normans, would encourage 
Henry‘s advisors to be wary of Llywelyn before he even ventured to the English 
bargaining table.   
While Llywelyn and his Welsh allies were making war on the Anglo-
Norman holdings of the Marshal in Wales, Henry‘s advisors agreed to a peace 
ostensibly with Louis, the son of Philip Augustus, but in reality with his English 
adherents.  The terms of the peace stated that Henry would restore to the English 
barons and earls their laws, and Louis would forswear the English Kingdom 
forever.  As Llywelyn and his Welsh allies had not agreed to the peace, William 
Marshal laid siege to Caerleon and then Rhys Gryg destroyed Seinhenydd and the 
castles of Gower.  The following year, Llywelyn and the southern Welsh princes 
made peace with the English.  Llywelyn had built himself a very firm position 
upon which he could expound his case as spokesman for the native Welsh and 
obtain a settlement much to his and his allies advantage.  He negotiated for the 
guardianship of Carmarthen and Cardigan castles, and then agreed to do homage 
to the English King.   
66 
 Llywelyn and his allies did not make peace with the English until 1218.  It 
is hard to argue with Davies‘s assessment that during this time ‗Llywelyn had 
hardly set a foot wrong.‘49  The faith that the Welsh princes had placed in 
Llywelyn had not been misplaced.  It was Llywelyn who organised the peace 
agreements with Henry III‘s minority council, pledging his homage as spokesman 
for all the Welsh princes.  Moreover, Llywelyn proved his trustworthiness to the 
Welsh princes in 1218 when, as part of his agreements with the English, he 
accepted the rule of Powys Wenwynwyn only until such a time as 
Gwenwynwyn‘s heirs came to age.50   
The Welsh chronicles Brenhinedd Y Saesson and Brut Y Tywysogyon tell 
different versions of the events.  Brenhinedd Y Saesson records that Llywelyn 
received Cardigan and Carmarthen and then advised the princes of South Wales to 
do homage to the king, and they followed Llywelyn‘s advice: ‗And Carmarthen 
and Cardigan were in the hand of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth.  And then Rhys Ieuanc 
and all the princes of the south went to do homage through the counsel of 
Llywelyn.‘51  Brut Y Tywysogyon records that Rhys Ieuanc ‗went alone from 
Deheubarth to the king‘s court to do homage to him.‘52  In fact, as shown below, 
Brenhinedd Y Saesson is the more correct of the two chronicles.  The first of two 
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letters of agreement from Llywelyn regarding his agreement with the crown 
concerned the peace between Llywelyn and the English Crown at Worcester.  It 
was written in mid-March 1218 and stated that he had handed over the castles of 
Carmarthen and Cardigan to the papal legate, Guala,
53
 and would advise the 
Welsh princes to make peace with the English king.
54
  Moreover, it is very 
important to note that if Brenhinedd Y Saesson was correct about who made peace 
with Henry‘s government in 1218 and what Llywelyn received in the bargain, 
then it is also correct in stating that the other Welsh Princes took the advice of 
Llywelyn as to when to make peace with the English Crown, a time when it would 
be mutually beneficial to all the Welsh allies.  This illustrates Llywelyn‘s growth 
in diplomacy in the seven years since his humiliating defeat by John.  Llywelyn 
had developed his position in Wales, not only as an ally of the other Welsh 
princes, but also as a trusted advisor to them as well.   
Llywelyn also issued another letter patent at Worcester notifying all and 
sundry that he received the lands of Gwenwynwyn, his archrival, which Llywelyn 
had won in the war against John.  Llywelyn received these lands ‗from the king 
and the legate Guala‘ and he would hold the lands until Gwenwynwyn‘s heirs 
came of age.
55
  Llywelyn clearly held out for a better deal from the regency 
government, and in so doing, managed to secure his hold on Powys Wenwynwyn 
for an extended period.   
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Overall, Llywelyn came out ahead in his dealings with the English crown 
in this instance.  The minority of Henry III represented an opportunity upon which 
Llywelyn could capitalise.  In March of 1218, when Llywelyn made peace with 
the English Government, they were willing to grant Llywelyn much of what he 
had won by force.  The English had recognised Llywelyn‘s influential position 
within Wales.  It was also in their best interest, especially William Marshal‘s and 
Ranulf of Chester‘s,56 to make peace with the Venedotian ruler and then use his 
considerable influence with the other Welsh princes to gain their homage and 
fealty to Henry.   
 Following the peace in 1218, Wales did not descend completely into quiet 
reflection.  Llywelyn composed a letter to the king on behalf of all the Welsh 
princes sometime after the agreements between him and Henry‘s officials had 
been concluded.  Llywelyn wrote directly to Henry, complaining about the boy‘s 
council, assuring Henry that his trust in the King was unchanged but he no longer 
trusted the regent council, which had demanded that Llywelyn hand over the 
custody of the manors of Knighton and Norton to Hugh Mortimer.
57
  It appears 
that Llywelyn‘s relationship with Henry was cautious.  He is careful to assure 
Henry that he trusted him implicitly: ‗of your brotherly affection I am sure.‘58  In 
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the same letter, Llywelyn implied that he did not trust the group of adults who 
advised Henry: ‗Truly, I complain of your council‘.59  Here Llywelyn is prepared 
to play to the eleven-year-old‘s sense of pride and to assure the King of his 
ultimate authority.  He achieves this by asking him to tell the council to remedy 
the disagreement in his favour.  While it can be argued that addressing the letter 
directly to Henry because he is the King was simply a matter of diplomatic 
correctness, the circumstances here seem to indicate otherwise.  However, 
Llywelyn does write to other members of the regency council when merited.  He 
wrote directly to Pandulf, the papal legate in twice in the spring and summer of 
1220 to complain, both of the actions of the men of Pembroke and regarding the 
request to transfer seisin to Henry of Audley for Maelienydd.
60
 
By the beginning of 1220, Llywelyn and his Welsh allies were once again 
on the move.  The Welsh chronicles record that the combined forces besieged the 
Flemings of Rhos, attacked Arberth, then Wizo‘s castle,61 burned it, and then 
burned Haverford before they crossed the Cleddyf and headed for Pembroke.  
Llywelyn brokered a truce with the Flemings on the 1 May 1220 and then 
returned to Gwynedd.  He wrote to Henry asking him to write to his council to 
provide him with safe conduct to Shrewsbury to meet the King.
62
  Clearly, 
Llywelyn wanted to cement his truce with the Pembroke and Rhos men with royal 
approval.  Again, while he was aware that the real power in England was the 
regency council, he addressed Henry, suggesting to the youth that he have his 
council issue the safe-conduct.  Llywelyn‘s knowledge and understanding of the 
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emotional state-of-mind of the growing King is quite insightful considering that 
he had failed to read and understand the mind-set of King John ten years 
previously.  It appears that he had learned to be perceptive in reading the English 
Kings and used this to pander to the King‘s ego to protect himself and his allies.  
It was also around this time that Llywelyn began to think of the future. As 
discussed previously, in chapter 1, the fratricidal wars stemming from the 
ambiguity of inheritance inherent in the Welsh system were what allowed the 
Anglo-Normans to make such vast forays into Welsh lands and helped the Kings 
of England maintain control and ultimate overlordship of the Welsh.   If patient 
enough, all a King of England needed to do was await the death of any strong 
Welsh leader who had proven capable of uniting the Welsh.  Upon his death, 
control over his lands would split amongst rival claimants all seeking ultimate 
control, i.e. the title or leadership of the kingdom or principality.  According to 
Welsh law, the principality could pass to any one of ‗the King‘s members‘, these 
being his sons, nephews, and first male cousins.
63
  This could lead to a wide 
number of claimants to the throne and the many long and drawn out interregnums 
of medieval Welsh politics provide adequate evidence that this practice did not 
foster strong, independent principalities. The Welsh attempted to circumvent this 
with the appointment of the edling, or heir-apparent, the one to whom the king 
gave ‗hope and expectation‘.64  This would presumably allow one possible heir a 
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seamless transition from a key position within the ruler‘s teulu to the leader of the 
principality.   
Llywelyn had profited from the descent into anarchy caused by his 
grandfather‘s death.  The multiplicity of rival claimants to the leadership of 
Gwynedd was what helped Llywelyn triumph.  Only by uniting with different 
uncles or cousins as his needs required, did he manage to expel or kill the other 
possible claimants to Gwynedd‘s rule.  But the civil war that had been so 
profitable to Llywelyn in the end of the twelfth century was something he feared 
by the middle of the thirteenth.  By 1220 he was already planning for a smoother 
transition.  But he went further than merely giving ‗hope and expectation‘ to the 
younger—and legitimate—of his two sons.  He even had the succession of 
Gwynedd confirmed by outside forces.  Both the English Crown and the Papacy 
recognised Dafydd‘s claim to the succession of Gwynedd.  
 In May 1220, Llywelyn met with Pandulf, the papal legate, and Stephen 
Langton, the Archbishop of Canterbury, at Shrewsbury.  One of the outcomes was 
a confirmation of Dafydd‘s status as his heir.65  At this point, Dafydd could not 
have been more than a child.  When Llywelyn had agreed to John‘s terms of 
surrender in August 1211, Dafydd was not yet born.  The agreement specifically 
states that if Llywleyn dies without heirs from Joan, Gwynedd will be passed to 
the English Crown.
66
  Given the reference to Gruffudd, both as hostage, and as a 
possible beneficiary of the King upon his ‗heirless‘ death, the lack of reference to 
Dafydd is suggestive of a lack of existence.  What is striking is that Gruffudd was 
a grown man by 1220, with his own teulu and land.  In fact, little more than a year 
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later the Welsh chronicles record that Llywelyn gathered a host to subdue his own 
son after the latter‘s razing of the cantref of Meirionnydd.67  Brut records the 
cause of the battle-that-wasn‘t was caused by Gruffudd‘s anger at the men of 
Meirionnydd for insult (sarhaed), and not Dafydd‘s promotion to edling status the 
year before.  The question then becomes why pick the child over the proved 
warrior?  There is always the possibility that Gruffudd did not want the role of 
prince in Gwynedd, but this is belied by the repeated imprisonment of Gruffudd 
by Llywelyn in 1228 and again by Dafydd in 1238.
68
  What might be closer to the 
truth is the fact that Gruffudd was stripped of his lands several times by Llywelyn 
and or Dafydd by the end of Llywelyn‘s reign.  It is possible that Llywelyn 
considered Gruffudd unable to rule his cantrefs without giving rise to insult and 
injury and did not feel Gruffudd well placed to rule in Llywelyn‘s stead.  
However, considering the first time Gruffudd rebelled dated to after Llywelyn 
promoted Dafydd, this seems unlikely.   
In the spring of 1222, Llywelyn formally petitioned Pope Honorius III for 
confirmation of Dafydd‘s status as Llywelyn‘s heir on the basis of his 
legitimacy.
69
 Interestingly, Llywelyn seems not to be arguing so much against the 
idea of partable inheritance, as the idea that Gruffudd held equal inheritance rights 
under Welsh law as did Dafydd, although Gruffudd was illegitimate.
70
 Honorius 
appears to have written back in the affirmative, granting Llywelyn‘s petition and 
acknowledging Dafydd as Llywelyn‘s heir.71  Lloyd notes that in 1226, Llywelyn 
went a step further in his goals to name Dafydd as his son.  He sought, and 
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apparently obtained, recognition of Dafydd‘s status as his heir to Gwynedd from 
his fellow Welsh rulers.
72
   
Lloyd interprets Gruffudd‘s imprisonment in 122873 as further proof 
Llywelyn was working in the best interests of Dafydd.  Gruffudd was a popular 
figure amongst the Welsh, and would serve as a rallying point against Dafydd, 
upon Llywelyn‘s death.74  Describing the imprisoning of Gruffudd in the best 
possible light, Lloyd writes ‗With Gruffudd under lock and key, David‘s path was 
clear of difficulties.‘75  But Llywelyn actually appeared more uncertain about 
Dafydd‘s future as heir.  Despite the support of other native Welsh rulers for 
Dafydd‘s preferment, Llywelyn still felt insecure in the future of his familial line.  
On the 5
th
 of September 1229, Dafydd ap Llywelyn was granted a safe conduct to 
England to swear homage to the king
76
 and agreed to pay £20 twice a year at 
Michaelmas and Easter to the king, when he inherited his father‘s patrimony.77 
 Llywelyn was not only focused upon Dafydd‘s future. In September of 
1220, Llywelyn wrote again to Henry. In his letter, he informed Henry that he had 
marched against Rhys Gryg and brought him to battle at the bridge of Carmarthen 
and on Sunday the 30
th
 of August, he had granted peace to Rhys and received the 
lands of Cedweli, Carnwyllion, Gwidigada and Gower as well as hostages. Rhys 
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had promised to serve ‗the king‘ and do homage to Henry by journeying with 
Llywelyn, or the Earl of Chester, or the Earl of Gloucester to the English Court.
78
  
Turvey argues that, alone amongst the native Welsh, Llywelyn attacked Rhys 
Gryg because the latter was threatening to ‗restore the greatness that was once 
Deheubarth,‘79  Yet, there seems to be little evidence of Rhys actually forming a 
threat to his hegemony.  In fact, the opposite is true.  There is a marked increase in 
Llywelyn‘s status and his role in Wales.  He is now the emissary, advocate and 
enforcer of the English Crown in Wales, similar to the role the Lord Rhys had 
played for Henry II as Justiciar of Wales.
80
  It was Llywelyn who forced Rhys 
Gryg back in line and required the other Welsh prince to go and swear homage to 
Henry on a date set by Llywelyn, with the escort to England provided by himself 
or one of two other important magnates from Henry‘s court.  Moreover, he prides 
himself on his position.  In fact, he lamented his exclusion from the king‘s council 
in a letter to the papal legate, Pandulf, written in May of that same year.
81
  
Clearly, Llywelyn wished to present himself as a councillor to the King who 
spoke for Wales and, therefore, ought to be present in all meetings of the king‘s 
council that discussed Wales.   
 It is upon this relationship that the future of Llywelyn‘s control over Wales 
and the remainder of the Welsh princes would arise.  His next interaction with the 
English court took place in 1221, when he met Henry and his earls and barons at 
Shrewsbury in March.
82
  There, Llywelyn and Rhys Ieuanc, who had argued with 
him over the apportionment of Cardigan and complained of the matter to the 
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English court,
83
 reconciled.  This reconciliation seems in retrospect, almost 
pointless, as Rhys Ieuanc died the following year and Llywelyn divided Rhys‘s 
lands between Rhys‘s only brother Owain ap Gruffudd and Maelgwn ap Rhys.84   
Sometime between the end of 1221 and the beginning of 1222, he wrote 
again to Henry, this time asking the King to protect Llywelyn‘s English manor 
and the men of Suckley in Worcester from the molestation of Roger Clifford.
85
  
Llywelyn is again pandering to the ego of the fourteen-year-old boy and his 
council.  The Venedotian prince wrote that he had no advocate or patron in 
England other than the king, and asks his ‗patron‘ to rectify the problem.86  This is 
an important technique of Llywelyn‘s.  By involving the king in his small dispute 
in England, he is effectively bowing to the English King‘s contention that the 
King is the only English lord with the right of private war, at least as far as his 
actions within England were concerned.  It is important to remember that 
Llywelyn concedes nothing of his own power and influence within Wales in this 
letter.  Rather, he is conceding his position as the lord of Suckley, an English 
manor.  This letter is illustrative of Llywelyn‘s careful maintenance of friendly 
relations between himself and his brother-in-law. 
Warfare erupted in Wales between Llywelyn and William Marshal at the 
end of April of 1223.  On 16
th
 of April, William returned from Ireland with a host 
of knights, soldiers and a fleet of ships.
87
  On Easter Monday, 24
th
 April 1223, the 
Marshal attacked Cardigan and the castle surrendered.  He continued on to 
                                                 
83
 Brut: RBH, p. 222-223. 
84
 Brenhinedd, p. 224. 
85
 Pryce, Acts, no. 249, p. 410. 
86
 ‗Et quia nullum advotatum vel patronum… in Angli(ia) nisi vos, si polacet qper iustriciarios 
vestros iuxta rationem no ‘et nostros homines’ deffensarae e…s.’—Pryce, Acts, no. 249, p. 410. 
87‗Y ulwydyn racwynep y deuth Gwillim Marscal o Iwerdon a Lluossogrwyd o varchogyon a 
phedyt gantaw mewn diruawr lyges y Vynyw y’r tir amgylch Sul y Blodeu.(palm Sunday.)- Brut: 
RBH, p. 222-224. 
76 
Carmarthen and captured it on Wednesday 26
th 
April.
88
  As these castles were held 
by Llywelyn as part of the peace agreement between Llywelyn and the regency 
council in 1218, Llywelyn sent his son Gruffudd to oppose William.  Llywelyn‘s 
Welsh allies were a part of Gruffudd‘s army and the two opposing forces met at 
Carmarthen Bridge on the Tywi River.
89
  Gruffudd was forced to withdraw his 
forces due to a lack of food.  During the period of respite, Henry and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury called William before them, to make reparations to 
Llywelyn.
90
  The king and the archbishop were unable to reconcile the pair.  
Henry‘s attempt at negotiation and mediation suggests that the king‘s regency 
council maintained their right to interfere with the interactions of Marcher Lords 
and native Welsh alike.  
 Llywelyn‘s relationship with Henry‘s council was souring.  He had lost 
Carmarthen and Cardigan to William Marshal and his continued warfare against 
the earl, who would marry King Henry‘s sister Eleanor in May of 1224, was 
alienating himself from both the English and his southern Welsh allies.  In 
October of 1223, Llywelyn wrote to the king stating that he swore on relics to 
indemnify the king and his men for the losses inflicted by Llywelyn when he 
captured Kinnerly castle on 7 October 1223.
91
  This apology can be contrasted 
with a letter the previous year to Pope Honorius III seeking papal support for 
Llywelyn‘s abolition of the Welsh practice of equal inheritance between both 
legitimate and illegitimate sons.  The earlier letter was written ‗with the consent of 
                                                 
88
 ibid, p. 224-225. 
89
 ibid, p. 224-225. 
90
 ibid, p. 224-225. 
91
 ‗Novertis me diacis sacroncanctis iurasse quot satisfaciam domino meo K. illustri regi Angli(ie) 
et suis infra terminus rationabiles quos mihi prefiget dominus Cantuar(iensis) archiepiscopus et in 
loco competienti, de dampnis eidem regi et suis illatis per me et meos a die captionis castri de 
Kinardesl’ usque ad diem absolutionis mee, diem videlicet sabbati in crastionio octavarum Sancti 
Mich(ael)is anno regni ipsius regis vii.’—Pryce, Acts, no. 254, p. 416.   
77 
Henry, illustrious king of England.‘92  The difference between being able to claim 
the King‘s support one year and promising to compensate the king for something 
that presumably had angered the same King the next year is important.  Llywelyn 
clearly wanted to avoid encouraging a repeat invasion in fear of a defeat similar to 
the one from 1211.  He still wanted the support of the English King, or Henry‘s 
acquiescence to his plans.  Nonetheless, things were beginning to look like they 
were arranging themselves against Llywelyn and he needed to apologise in a way 
that did not detract from his conquests.   
 In 1224, the slope upon which Llywelyn had been precariously standing 
became wet and slippery.  Henry‘s council was getting impatient.  Henry wrote to 
Llywelyn when he fell out with Falkes de Bréauté and directed him not to give 
Falkes aid or council.  Llywelyn replied that Falkes appeared at his court 
complaining about the King‘s council and the Baron departed again the same 
day.
93
  He argued strongly in the letter that he maintained the same independence 
as the King of Scotland.  While this claim is in direct opposition to the earlier 
treaty of 1201
94
 with the English King‘s father, John, it is worth considering that 
the situation was different in 1224 than it was in 1201.  In 1201, Llywelyn was a 
young upstart prince, intent on securing recognition for his successes in North 
Wales.  By 1224, Llywelyn was the leader of an alliance of native Welsh rulers, 
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for whom he negotiated peace to their terms in 1218.  He was claiming his 
independence within Wales on a stronger foundation and support structure than 
the treaty of 1201 provided and he had less to fear from the youthful Henry than 
the seasoned John.  Kevin Mann argued Llywelyn‘s claim was ‗specious‘ when 
considering the 1201 treaty between Llywelyn and John.
95
  However, my 
conclusions differ from those of Mann: it is difficult to reconcile the changes in 
Llywelyn‘s status and power with a strict application of the 1201 agreement.  The 
intervening years of warfare and reconciliation had changed the Venedotian-
English situation irrevocably.  Clearly, Llywelyn saw the 1201 treaty as defunct 
and he made no mention of its provision against his right to harbour English 
fugitives.  Moreover, and most importantly, the argument that Llywelyn makes is 
that he is as sovereign a ruler within Gwynedd as the King of Scotland is within 
his own kingdom.  Llywelyn‘s views on his political relationship with the English 
king are clearly expressed in this one argument: Llywelyn is not questing after a 
Wales completely independent of England.  He sees himself as a ruler on par with 
the King of Scotland.  He is a sovereign whose country is separate from England, 
although he owes homage to the King of England.  
However, Llywelyn was not unaware of the undercurrents of English 
politics.  In 1223, Stephen de Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Hubert de 
Burgh, chief Justiciar to Henry, had declared Henry ‗partially of age‘ in order to 
reclaim many of the castles that were being held by King John‘s old adherents, 
such as Llywelyn‘s ally Ranulf, Earl of Chester.96  Hubert de Burgh, despite 
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winning many detractors from this action, remained in power because his 
supporters outnumbered his adversaries.  However, the action coincided with 
Llywelyn‘s loss of Carmarthen and Cardigan Castles, and seemed to bode badly 
for Llywelyn.  It is doubtful that Llywelyn missed the implications of the 
declaration of Henry as ‗partially of age.‘  Not only did Llywelyn lose castles, like 
Carmarthen and Cardigan, which according to his agreement at Worcester on the 
16
th
 of March 1218, he held for Henry until he came of age,
 97
 but  he was also 
going to be dealing with a King who was supposedly making the decisions 
himself.  This presented him with a problem.  Until 1224, his complaints to Henry 
about English demands were phrased so that he built Henry‘s ego, often stating, as 
discussed above, that while Llywelyn trusted the good faith of Henry, he was 
having a problem with Henry‘s council.  Now, any complaint that he lodged 
would be to discuss a disagreement with Henry, not his council.  This concern was 
magnified in January 1227 when Henry, still eight months shy of his 21
st
 birthday, 
effectively reached his majority.
98
   
Llywelyn appears to have grown significantly in the years after 1211.  He 
developed an acute understanding of diplomacy and its necessity within Wales.  
Despite his ongoing lust for Powys, he learned to team up with his fellow Welsh 
rulers in order to secure his safety and extend his power and influence over Wales 
through diplomacy and alliance rather than conquest.  Llywelyn clearly learned to 
exploit John‘s troubles with his barons the same way John had exploited the 
Welsh quarrels.  By uniting, Llywelyn and his Welsh allies managed to prevent 
John from continuing to divide and conquer.  Llywelyn clearly capitalised upon 
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the English animosity.  However, it is unclear whether his continued raids on 
England and support of the rebel barons was due to his interest in furthering his 
desire to expand his control over Wales and the March, or whether he was merely 
getting even with John for the humiliating defeat in 1211. 
  Llywelyn‘s hunger for power, control, and more land was something the 
young prince learned to control after 1211; however, it did not disappear and 
Llywelyn continued to want to claim a position of pre-eminence among the Welsh 
princes as two previous Venedotian Princes, Rhodri Mawr
99
 and Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn had done in the ninth and eleventh centuries.  Llywelyn made some 
headway towards such a claim in the second decade of the thirteenth century; 
however, it was by uniting with the other Welsh princes against the English that 
he managed it.  His first plan, to conquer Wales by force, had not worked; perhaps 
insinuating himself as a friend and ally would.  Then, when Welsh princes left the 
fold, he could then use the support of his remaining allies, as he had against 
Gwenwynwyn, to gain their lands.  Additionally, Llywelyn‘s skilful handling of 
the young Henry indicates that he accurately perceived the political situation 
within England and acted accordingly.  The change in Llywelyn‘s policy in this 
middle period of his rule suggests that the prince learned, mostly the hard way, 
that to be an influential Welsh ruler in the thirteenth century required skilful 
diplomacy, not merely a strong sword arm.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 PROVED WARRIOR AND ELDER STATESMAN: 1228-1238 
 
Although he had not yet earned the epithet ‗Mawr‘, by 1228, Llywelyn‘s 
position as spokeman for Wales was well established.  However, Llywelyn could 
not easily reap the benefits of his successes.  His apparent triumphs co-insided 
with the majority of Henry III and a renewed crown interest in Wales and 
Llywelyn‘s role there-in.  However, it is here, in the middling to latter stages of 
Llywelyn‘s life that the true statesman emerges.  It is in the last decades of 
Llywelyn‘s life that the man Lloyd praised as being ‗a prince who was supreme 
beyond challenge‘ becomes evident.  But this supremancy was neither merely 
proof of his diplomatic skills, nor those of his sword.  Instead, it continues to 
illustrate a growth of character and understanding of the balance it was necessary 
to strike between Llwelyn‘s own amitions and the goals of his fellow Welsh 
rulers, the marchers and the English crown. 
1228 saw the first planned invasion by the newly adult King of England, 
‗Henry and the armed force of England came to Wales and planned to subdue 
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and all the Princes of Wales.‘1  According to Welsh sorces, 
the precipitating event for the invasion was Henry‘s grant of the lordship of 
Montgomery to Hubert de Burgh on the 8
th
 of May 1228.
2
  The expansion of 
                                                 
1‗…y deuth Henry vrenhin a chedernyt Lloegyr y gyt ac ef y Gymry ac aruaethu darestwg 
Llywelyn ap Ioruerth a holl Tywysogyon Kymry idaw.’—Brut: RBH, p. 226. It is perhaps worth 
noting that Walker argues explicitly against this interpretation.  He states that it is ‗unjust‘ to 
blame the war on Hubert and his supposed wish to create a ‗vast marcher lordship‘ for himself.  
Instead, he blames the war on Llywelyn, stating that it was the unsatisfactory nature of recent 
negotiations that was the cause of the war. —Walker, R.F., ‗Hubert de Burgh and Wales, 1218-
1232,‘ English Historical Review, Vol. 88, 1972, pp 465-494, p. 477. 
2
 ‗Sciatis nos concessisse dilecto et dideli nostro H. de Burgo, comiti Kancie, justiciario nostro, 
castrum de Mungumeri cum omnibus pertinenciis suit tap in dominicis, redditibus, serviciis, quam 
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Hubert de Burgh into the Welsh commote of Ceri caused some concern and the 
Welsh amassed around the castle.
3
  Roger of Wendover‘s chronicle provides a 
rather fuller account than those of the Welsh.  He records that in August, the 
English garrison from Montgomery had mounted an expedition into Wales in 
order to protect a road leading to the castle there.
4
  In response, the Welsh 
attacked ‗in great force,‘ causing them to flee into the castle, to which the Welsh 
then laid siege.
5
  King Henry, with Hubert, marched to Montgomery to raise the 
siege; they succeeded in forcing the Welsh back into Wales and reduced a 
Cistercian monastery called ‗Cridia‘ to ashes, in order to erect a castle there 
because the natural setting was ‗impregnable.‘6  However, Wendover noted that 
many in Henry‘s army were secretly supporting Llywelyn, and due to their 
malice, the King ‗was obliged to make a disgraceful peace.‘7  Wendover records 
that Henry agreed to pull down the castle at his own cost and that Llyweln would 
recompensate Henry for the cost of the war at a price of three thousand marks. 
Although the Welsh faced off against the forces of Hubert de Burgh, 
Llywelyn was granted an extension of a truce negotiated between the Venedotian 
Prince, Fulk fitz Warin and Thomas Corbet by Henry on the 15
th
 of August, 
                                                                                                                                     
aliis, custodiendum toto tempore vite sue.’—Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, A.D 1225-
1232, London: Public Record Office, 1903, p. 186. 
3
 ‗Eodem tempore, mense Augusto, milites et servientes de castello Montis-Gomerii, quod in 
confinio Walliae situm est, exierunt cum populo regionis, ut transitum cujusdam viæ non longe a 
castello positum, propter latrines Wallenses, qui in illo loco viatores peremerunt assidue et 
transeuntes spoliaverunt, latius facerent et securum.Venientes siquidem ad locum cum gladiis, 
securibus, fustibus et armis, cœperunt arboures et ligna, veprium densitates et fruteta, succindere, 
ut viam redderent viatoribus spatiosam.  Quod cum Wallensibus compertum fuerat, supervenerunt 
in fortituedine gravi et hostes acriter invadentes compulerunt eos castellum ingredi, hinc inde 
quibusdam peremptis;‘— Roger de Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vols. 4, London, Sumptiubs 
Scocitatis, 1842, vol. 4, p. 172. 
4
 ibid, p. 172. 
5
 ibid, p. 173. 
6
ibid p. 173. 
7
 ibid, p. 173. 
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1228.
8
  This in itself indicates an attempt was being made on both sides to resolve 
the dispute without resorting to warfare.  A safe-conduct granted to Llywelyn‘s 
wife, Joan, to last until the feast of the Nativity, on the 8
th
 of September 1228, 
further illustrates that both sides hoped for successful negotiations.
9
  Llywelyn 
was clearly unwilling to completely break diplomatic ties with the English King 
and used his wife as an ambassador in an attempt to satisfy the concerns of Henry.  
When Henry and Hubert de Burgh rushed to the aid of the besieged castle in the 
end of August,
10
 Llywelyn responded by aiding his Welsh allies.  Negotiations 
had failed him and warfare was inevitable, especially when Hubert de Burgh 
began a new castle in Ceri, threatening Llywelyn‘s hold on Arwystli.11  The 
Welsh chronicles record a major success for the Welsh who opposed Henry, who 
‗went to England sadly.‘12   
The war had been a success for the Welsh allies and a dismal failure for 
the English.  Llywelyn captured William de Braose, the younger,
13
 and held him 
for ransom.  Llywelyn demanded of William money for his release, Builth castle 
to be surrendered to Llywelyn,
14
 and an agreement to marry William‘s daughter 
Isabella to Llywelyn‘s son Dafydd. 15  The following February 1229, the King 
gave his support to the agreement between Llywelyn and William.
16
  Hubert de 
Burgh‘s aptly named failed castle in Ceri, ‗Hubert‘s Folly,‘17 was razed by the 
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 Shirley, Letters, p. 334. 
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 ibid, p. 172-173. 
12
 ‗Ac yna yr aeth y brenin i Loegr yn drist.’—Brenhinedd, p. 226. 
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king, for which Llywelyn paid £2,000
18
, and Llywelyn secured a signal victory.  
He sent the English king packing, erasing the memory of his crushing defeat 17 
years before.  However, the claim that ‗Llywelyn had come through the troubles 
of 1228 with flying colours,‘19 drastically underestimates the problems which 
were still present.  Ill-contentment seethed under the surface of his relationship 
with the English King.  While it did not manifest in the ensuing two years, it 
would take little to aggravate the sores in 1231. 
In the interim, Llywelyn still felt insecure in his standing and the future of 
his familial line.  On the 5
th
 of September 1229, Dafydd ap Llywelyn was granted 
a safe conduct to England to swear homage to the king
20
 and agreed to pay £20 
twice a year, at Michaelmas and Easter, to the king when he inherited his father‘s 
patrimony.
21
   
The following year saw two significant concerns for both the Welsh Prince 
and Henry.  Henry was preoccupied with his Poitevin campaign, which departed 
Portsmouth on the 1
st
 May 1230, with the aim of recapturing Normandy, Anjou 
and Poitou.
22
  Meanwhile, Llywelyn‘s concern centred on his wife and on her 
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infidelity with William de Braose, when on Easter day, 7
th
 of April 1230, he 
discovered her in his bedchamber with William.
23
  Both were swiftly imprisoned 
and William was then hanged, publicly, from a tree at the Manor of Crokein on 
the 2
nd
 of May 1230.
24
  A letter from Nicholas, the Abbot of Vaudey to Ralph, 
Bishop of Chichester, dated post-18
th
 of May 1230, attests to there being ‗more 
than eight hundred persons, called together for the lamentable spectacle, 
especially those who were enemies of William de Braose senior and his sons.‘25  
This excerpt from the letter is telling both how the execution was seen by 
outsiders and who attended.  Nicholas believed that the death of William de 
Braose was connected with the tyrannous and in some cases treacherous rule of 
his forefathers in southern Wales. The ‗enemies of William de Braose, senior‘ had 
memories ranging back fifty-five years, to the treachery of  his grandfather.  In 
1175, Seisyll ap Dyfnwall, his son and other chieftains of Gwent, were slain 
‗through treachery‘ by William de Braose, Lord of Brycheiniog.26  The Welsh saw 
this as irredeemable and the chronicler of Brut added ‗and from that day forth 
none of the Welsh dared place trust in the French.‘27  This mistrust and deep-
rooted dislike of the Braose family may have been what forced Llywelyn‘s hand 
towards the ‗lamentable‘ execution of William de Braose on the 2nd of May 1230.  
J. J. Crump argues persuasively for the interpretation that it was the longstanding 
loathing of the Braose family by native rulers of southern Wales that influenced 
                                                                                                                                     
1216-1245, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, Chapter 5 ‗Diplomacy, War and Finance: The 
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24
 Edwards, CACCW, p. 37. 
25
 Ibid, p. 37. See also Shirley, Historical Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 365-367. 
26
 Brut: RBH, p. 164-165. 
27
 Brut: Pen. 20, p. 71. 
86 
 
Llywelyn toward the public hanging of William at Crokein.
28
  However, officialy, 
Llywelyn hanged William as vengeance for the ‗disgrace and injury‘29 done to the 
Prince on the 2
nd
 of May 1230.   
Hanging was, in the medieval world, a disgraceful way to die, typically 
reserved for criminals from lower classes, rather than nobles.  Kari Ellen Gade 
claims that hanging was ‗a symbol of ultimate degradation.‘30  She points out that 
by the later medieval period, hanging was used to punish thieves and also 
‗criminals guilty of ignominious crimes,‘ in order to serve as a deterrent against 
repeats of the same crime.
31
  The insult of stealing Llywelyn‘s wife and making 
him appear a doddering old fool, may have prompted immediate anger-driven 
vengeance in this publicly disgraceful way.  However hard it is to reconcile the 
cool-headed Llywelyn of latter years with the heedless agrieved husband who 
would throw his plans for Builth to the winds for the opportunity to hang William 
de Braose, this is what appears to have happened. 
Henry was in Reading at Easter, assembling his army for his trip to France 
when Llywelyn found Joan with William de Braose.  However, it did not stop his 
expedition to Poitou
32
 and he arrived in St. Malo in Brittany only three days after 
William‘s body swung from the tree at Crokein.33  Despite his lack of concern for 
William‘s fate, upon hearing of the former‘s imprisonment, Henry did provide 
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provision for his lands and castles.  While at Portsmouth, Henry dictated that all 
the lands and castles of William de Braose, while he was in prison, should be 
transferred to the custody of Peter fitz Herbert and John of Monmouth,
34
 and then 
to William Marshal.
35
  Henry seems less concerned, here, by the actions that 
Llywelyn might take than by the custody of William‘s castles.  This is 
understandable when considering Llywelyn‘s on-going power lust.  If Llywelyn 
confiscated the lands of William de Braose in the south of Wales as forfeit for the 
adulterer‘s crime, he would dramatically increase his power, prestige and 
influence further in Wales.  However, despite his transfer of custody of the Braose 
castles, Henry does not appear to be too concerned with Llywelyn‘s actual trial of 
William.  There are no letters between the English King and Welsh Prince 
discussing Llywelyn‘s execution of William, although there are many between 
Llywelyn and William Marshal, Stephen of Segrave, and Eva de Braose.   
Political resentment smouldered between the English and Welsh in the 
aftermath of William‘s death.  This distrust burst again into a conflagration in 
1231.  Hatred of the de Braose kindred ran deep among the native Welsh and 
Llywelyn had hinted as much when he wrote to Eva de Braose, attempting to save 
the marriage alliance between Dafydd and Eva‘s daughter Isabella.  He wrote: 
‗And know that we could not have prevented the judgement the magnates of our 
land made, knowing the punishment for the dishonour and injury to us.‘36  The 
marriage of Dafydd to Isabella was something Llywelyn had been actively 
                                                 
34
 Patent Rolls 1225-1232, p, 336.  
35
 ibid, p. 339. 
36
 ‗Et sciatus quod nullo modo possemus defendere quad magnates terre nostre non facerent 
iudicium quod decerunt, vindictam de oprobrio et iniuria nostra sapientes.‘—Pryce, Acts, no. 261, 
p. 428. 
88 
 
pursuing.
37
  Although Llywelyn already had familial ties to the de Braose family,
 
38
 Isabella brought with her Builth.  Builth controls the passage from Powys 
Wenwynwyn into Southern Wales across the River Wye.
39
  This marriage, 
therefore, was important to Llywelyn‘s control of Powys, and the divide between 
North and South Wales.  He was not willing to let it slip away from him simply 
because Joan had acted improvidently. 
 The anger at the de Braose clan, from the native Welsh, infused the 
punishment dictated by Llywelyn‘s magnates and illustrates their distrust of the 
Marcher lords.  This is a part of the precipitation for the war of 1231 and resulted 
in two disputes between the Native Welsh, led by Llywelyn, and the de Braose 
family, lead by Eva and backed by William.   
The record of these disputes survives in Llywelyn‘s letter to Stephen 
Segrave.
40
  Initially, Eva de Braose sought an exchange of hostages.  She 
requested that Llywelyn release those de Braose hostages he still held from the 
war of 1228 and the subsequent execution of her husband in May 1230.  In 
exchange, she would return ‗the son of Einion‘—probably the son of Einion ap 
Gwalchmai, court poet, judge, and according to Stephenson, one of the leading 
ministers in the Venedotian government
41—who was being fostered in the de 
Braose household. Llywelyn responded that the boy was not a hostage; he was 
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Eva‘s foster-son.  The implication is clear: treating the boy as a hostage was 
equivalent to Eva treating her own son in the same manner.
42
   
The second difficulty was the position of Madoc Fychan, a tenant of 
William de Braose.  Madoc began to claim that he held his land directly from 
Llywelyn.  He then attacked William Marshall‘s holdings and plundered them, 
taking hostages.  Llywelyn and Bishop Ralph of Chichester met on the 12th of 
June 1230 to discuss William Marshall‘s complaints against Madoc.43  Llywelyn 
promised Segrave that he would ensure Madoc and his supporters made amends 
for their actions at a ‗safe and suitable place,‘ and further promised that if they 
failed to do so, he would dispossess them.
44
   
Madoc‘s actions fed the fire that erupted in May of 1231 when Llywelyn 
and his armies marched through the lands of William de Braose, ravaging them.  
Llywelyn then attacked the lands of other Marcher lords, ‗sparing neither 
churches nor ecclesiastical persons,‘ burning the churches as well as women and 
girls who had fled to them for safety.
45
  The Justiciar responded in kind, capturing 
and killing many of the Welsh force before returning the prisoners to the 
Justiciary to be decapitated.
46
  Roger claims the decapitation was the precipitating 
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event of Llywelyn‘s campaign in South Wales,47 while the Welsh chronicle 
Brenhinedd Y Saesson states that Llywelyn fought in response to Henry‘s 
rebuilding of Painscastle.  Henry and Llywelyn had clearly turned from mutual 
supporters to adversaries.  Henry had Llywelyn excommunicated on the 13
th
 of 
July for his bloody rendering of the churches in May.
48
  Nevertheless, this did not 
deter Llywelyn, and during the summer of 1231 the Welsh burned Montgomery, 
Radnor, Hay, Brecon, Caerleon, Neath and Kidwelly castles as they marched first 
south, then west.
49
  The warfare continued and the successes were awarded to the 
Welsh, who under Llywelyn, used a Cistercian monk to trick the English into 
impetuously crossing the River Severn, near Montgomery, drowning a large 
portion of the English.
50
  While the King managed to refortify Painscastle in stone 
over the summer, he had accomplished little else.  Llywelyn‘s alliance with 
Ranulf, Earl of Chester, might have stood him in good stead here, for while the 
King was rebuilding Painscastle, Ranulf visited him and quarrelled.  Although the 
Chester Annals do not record the source of this quarrel, it is likely to have been 
over Henry‘s war with Llywelyn.  It may have been that Ranulf refused to aid the 
King in fighting Llywelyn, or perhaps he tried to negotiate a truce, and found 
Henry unwilling to compromise.  Either way, he arrived back in Chester by late 
August.
 51
  A truce was agreed between the King and Llywelyn, and Llywelyn 
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wrote to Henry on the 30 November, 1231 to extend the truce until St Andrews 
Day the following year.
52
 
The following year, 1232, saw a renewed attempt at a wary peace on both 
sides.  Llywelyn agreed to pay the king for ‗all excesses by Llywelyn and his men 
against the king and his men‘ and to return to the king all lands taken from him 
during the war.
53
  Henry, again, had concerns other than Llywelyn.  The mounting 
unhappiness of the English barons put pressure on Henry‘s government.  When 
the new Earl of Pembroke, Richard, stood against Henry, the King responded by 
besieging Usk castle.
54
  During this dispute, Llywelyn tried to avoid conflict, 
sending a letter in the end of September 1233, that stated he would keep the 
peace, if Henry could get the Marcher lords to do the same.
55
  However, despite J. 
E. Lloyd‘s claim that ‗Llywelyn watched the conflict as an interested spectator,‘ 
Llywelyn was neither completely peaceful nor neutral in 1233.  He made a pact 
with Richard, Earl of Pembroke, destroyed the castles of Brycheiniog, laid siege 
to Brecon castle, burned Clun, captured Castell Coch, burned Oswestry, and 
captured the castles of Cardiff, Abergavenny, Pencelli, Blaenllyfni, Bwlchydinas, 
and razed all, save Cardiff.  Walker notes that Llywelyn was ‗the most potent ally 
Richard Marshall secured.‘56  He points out that alliance with Llywelyn divided 
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Henry‘s focus, as Llywelyn could attack anywhere in the Marches.57  With the 
help of the Earl of Pembroke, they laid siege to Carmarthen but when 
reinforcements arrived, they abandoned the siege.
58
  Given the dating of the letter 
promising peace, it is likely that Llywelyn did not join the campaign until October 
of 1233.  However, the following year Llywelyn and the Earl of Pembroke 
concluded a peace at Brocton on the 6
th
 of March to last until the 25
th
 of July of 
the same year, including the provision that neither side would build fortifications 
during that time.
59
   
On 15 April 1234, the Earl Richard died in Ireland, and that left Llywelyn 
without his powerful ally in this war.  However, that did not stop the Prince from 
concluding a truce with the King known as the Peace of the Middle, on the 21
st
 of 
June 1234.  It was essentially a ‗status quo‘ agreement, each side would hold what 
they held at the beginning of the war, and the truce would run for two years.  Both 
sides agreed not to build or demolish castles.  Disputes would be handled by the 
Law of the March.
60
  This truce was renewed in 1236,
61
 1237
62
 and 1238,
63
 and 
lasted until Llywelyn‘s death in 1240; therefore, many historians have called it a 
‗peace.‘  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the famous end of Llywelyn‘s 
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reign, in which Lloyd claimed ‗he had won for himself and for his people a secure 
and well-guarded independence‘64 was in fact a series of temporary truces which 
lasted only until Llywelyn‘s death only six years later and was not an overarching 
peace treaty.  The agreed truce would run for two years from the 25
th
 of July and 
each side would hold what they claimed at the beginning of the war of 1233.  
Moreover, they had control of any court cases in those lands and if ‗any wrong 
was committed‘ both parties would provide independent adjudicators to determine 
who was in the right, according to the custom of the March, not English Common 
law or Welsh Native law.  Additionally, the agreement regarding Castles from 
April 1234 would continue to stand.
65
   
From 1218 onwards, Llywelyn was in effect the sole spokesman for 
Wales.  His status as the leader amongst the Welsh rulers was further validated in 
1220 when Llywelyn summoned the other princes of Wales to attack Rhos and 
Pembroke.
66
 The fact that Llywelyn could, himself, summon all the other Welsh 
princes to join in a campaign is reminiscent of traditional over-lordship.   
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 Llywelyn, however, never claimed such a privilege.  He may have created 
a wide variety of de facto powers for himself, but he had learned from his early 
mistakes.  Perhaps it is worth considering Llywelyn‘s relative position amongst 
the other Welsh rulers before 1211 and after he arranged the peace with England 
in 1218.  Essentially, Llywelyn‘s position was aggrandized.  Llywelyn had firm 
control of the entirety of Gwynedd, was in control of Powys Wenwynwyn, and 
held direct control over Cemais, as well as the former English Royal castles of 
Cardigan and Carmarthen.  He was respected and played the part of both 
spokesman and peacemaker for and amongst his fellow Welsh rulers and even had 
a claim to overlordship of these princes.  Importantly however,  Llywelyn never 
claimed this outright;  there remained checks upon his power.  He held Cardigan 
and Carmarthen until his brother-in-law, Henry III, came of age.  Likewise, 
Llywelyn controlled Powys only until Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn came of age.  
His position as spokesman was never codified and he was only peacemaker as 
long as he could create a situation that would be to the advantage of all.  Llywelyn 
could not force his superiority over the other Welsh princes.  He had failed to do 
so before 1211, and never even managed to do so afterward.  Llywelyn‘s 
successes on the battlefield were also dependent upon the strength and support 
lent to him by his fellow Welsh allies.  Llywelyn was savvy enough to understand 
his limitations and his understanding of those limits is perhaps the difference 
between his position pre and post 1211.   
In 1238, ‗all the princes of Wales‘ swore allegiance to Dafydd ap 
Llywelyn at Strata Florida Abbey, on the 19
th
 of October.
67
  Llywelyn did not step 
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down from power until two years later when he assumed the Cistercian habit at 
Aberconwy and subsequently died.
68
  Nonetheless, this marked the final years of 
Llywelyn‘s dealings with Henry.  The Welsh prince had achieved a great deal, 
managing to take his signal defeat to John in 1211 and turn his forty-one year 
reign into a success.  However, regardless of that there remains little evidence to 
suggest that Llywelyn ever completely lost his thirst for power.  Even in the end, 
Llywelyn schemed for a future where his power would continue in the guise of his 
son, and he provided for that future with the swearing allegiance by the other 
Welsh Princes to Dafydd at Strata Florida in 1238.  Sadly, Llywelyn‘s strength 
was insufficient to stretch from beyond the grave and his son lost much of the 
prestige Llywelyn had gained.  Yet, it is worth remembering that Llywelyn never 
did secure a lasting peace with the King of England, merely a series of truces that 
were never meant to outlast 1240.   
Llywelyn‘s military successes reinforced his status as the foremost native 
Welsh ruler.  Llywelyn never went so far as to outright claim for himself the 
status of overlord of the Welsh with the title ‗Prince of Wales‘.  He contented 
himself with an indirect solution.  By 1230, Llywelyn adopted the style of 
referring to himself in his charters as: ‗L. princeps Ab(er)frau, dominus 
Snaudon‘69—Llywelyn, prince of Aberffraw and Lord of Snowdon.  These new 
titles are an attempt to demonstrate his dominant status among the native Welsh. 
The first instance this title appears in use by Llywelyn is in a charter to the 
Hospitallers of St. John at Dolgynwal, in North Wales.  In this charter, Llywelyn 
granted the Hospitallers ‗the whole of the church of Ellesmere with all its 
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appurtenances‘ for their use towards the poor.70  What is significant here is who 
gave this gift to the Hospitallers at Dolgynwal: Llywelyn, prince of Aberffraw, 
Lord of Snowdon.
71
  The charter is dated the 18th of November, 1225.
72
 Pryce, in 
his notes on this charter, argues that there is some question as to the authenticity 
of this charter given the two divergent facts: firstly that the style, ‗Prince of 
Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon‘, appears in no other specifically datable documents 
until May of 1230.  In the second instance, the dating clause uses Henry III‘s 
regnal year and describes Henry as ‗iunior’.  Pryce points out that while Llywelyn 
has dated by Henry‘s regnal year in the past, it is a rarity, and he further expresses 
concerns about the reference to Henry‘s minority at the time, pointing out that it 
could be a later interpolation.
73
  Pryce concludes that the authenticity of the 
charter is inconclusive.  As he states, there is no evidence that Llywelyn did not 
adopt the style ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon‘ as early as 1225; the next 
extant document from Llywelyn that is unmistakably dated is his letter patent 
about Ednyfed Fychan‘s purchase of Dinierth, written at ‗Ystrad, the First of May, 
in the year 1230.‘74  This leaves a historian with several possible conclusions 
about the titular style in the Dolgynwal grant of 1225.  It may be a later forgery, 
written, or re-fashioned and back-dated, to re-create either a lost document or to 
justify the Hospitallers of Dolgynwal‘s rights to the church of Ellesmere.  This 
would suggest either that the scibe copied from a later charter, that no longer 
survives, that contained Llywelyn‘s elevated title, thereby backdating its use, or 
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that Llywelyn‘s titles of ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon‘ were so 
entrenched in the psyche of the drafting, or re-drafting, of the document that he 
merely included them as a matter of course.  If so, then these later titles had, by 
whenever this was re-drafted, eclipsed Llywelyn‘s previous style of Prince of 
North Wales.  It may be, as Stephenson suggested, a misdated document—dating 
perhaps to 1235—and the scribe left out one of the ‗x‘s‘ but then, what of the 
‗iunoris‘?75 By 1235, Henry had reached his majority and was ruling in his own 
right.  Or perhaps it is exactly what it seems.
76
  If this is so, then perhaps 
Llywelyn is introducing his use of the new self-style ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord 
of Snowdon‘ to a smaller audience first in order to assess its impact before using 
it at a wider audience that might have included other native Welsh rulers and the 
English government, both of whom might not hesitate to clamp down on the self-
aggrandisement the title is meant to suggest.  
There is a problem with accepting 1225 at face value.  If the grant to the 
Hospitallers of Dolgynwal is legitimate, then this could theoretically date 
Llywelyn‘s grant of the church of Nefyn, surrounding land, and nearby pastures to 
Haugmond Abbey
77
 to at least as early as 1226 when, one of the witnesses,  
Gruffudd ap Rhodri also appears as a witness to a grant by Llywelyn‘s eldest son, 
Gruffudd, to Strata Marcella.
78
  But, when Gruffudd ap Llywelyn‘s grant to Strata 
Marcella is looked at in more detail, it is clear that even he is referring to his 
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father as ‗Llewelyn, Prince of North Wales‘ in 1226.79  Although the pair had 
fallen out in 1221,
80
 they had reconciled, and Gruffudd was acting for Llywelyn 
on martial fronts in 1223.
81
   Surely, the son would support his father‘s claim to 
further-reaching powers in Wales?  Perhaps it is best to discount the 1225 grant to 
the Hospitallers as an outlier, and accept 1230 as the date Llywelyn introduces his 
new self-styling as Pryce does. He argues that because no charters of Llywelyn 
date from the five years between 1225 and then Llywelyn‘s grant of the church of 
Nefyn, surrounding land, and nearby pastures to Haugmond Abbey
82
 must date to 
1230-1232.  Pryce uses Llywelyn‘s titular style to suggest the earliest possible 
date for the charter to 1230, and suggests the end of the career of Richard ap 
Cadwaldr—whom Stephenson suggests may be a cousin of Llywelyn‘s83—as 
rhaglaw for an end date of 1232.
84
  
Whether Llywelyn adopted the title in 1225 or in 1230, its use has been 
viewed by scholars of the period as significant.  Lloyd states that by 1230, when 
Llywelyn began to style himself ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon‘, 
Llywelyn was aware of the scope of his successes militarily and diplomatically 
both within Wales and externally but that he ‗had at the time no adventurous 
designs and wished only to reap the fruits of his victory.‘85  He points to the 
adoption of the title ‗Prince of Aberffraw‘ to identify himself as the holder of one 
of the traditional three ‗principal seats‘ held by the rulers of the three historic 
kingdoms of Wales, Dinefwr (Dyfed or Deheubarth), Mathrafal (Powys) and 
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Aberffraw (Gwynedd) and that Aberffraw claimed pre-eminence over the rulers of 
Dinefwr and Mathrafal.
86
  He further suggests that ‗Lord of Snowdon‘ was added 
to impress the English, who might not have been conversant with Welsh 
traditions.
87
  Davies also points to the fact that the three major principalities in 
Wales had recognised principal seats to suggest that Llywelyn is making use of 
‗historical and sentimental connections‘.88  And Pryce claims that the new title 
both confirmed his status as ruler of Gwynedd and promoted his claim to 
overlordship of the whole of native Wales.
89
  
There are a few problems with this blind acceptance of the enhanced status 
Llywelyn‘s new title is presumed to confer.  The first has to do with the texts used 
in support of Aberffraw‘s pre-eminence as a seat for rule in Wales.  The 
documents most commonly used in support of this are from the Venedotian 
version of the Welsh Laws of Hywel Dda.  This version cites the ‗King of 
Aberffraw‘ only twice.  Both occur when discussing the sarhaed of the King of 
Aberffraw: ‗the sarhaed of the king of Aberffraw is paid thus: ... No gold is paid 
except to the King of Aberffraw.‘90  Firstly, there is no explicit mention that the 
King of Aberffraw is the pre-eminent ruler in Wales.  Secondly, all the individual 
manuscripts from which this law text is compiled date from the 13
th
 century or 
later.
91
  Most were even identified as part of the ‗Llyfr Iorwerth‘ by Wiliam 
because they contain references to the elevated status of the King of Aberffraw, or 
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refer to Iorwerth ap Madog as a respected jurist, and or the compiler of these 
codes.
92
 This, by nature makes the argument that Llywelyn drew upon the 
legendary elevated status of the king of Aberffraw when formulating his new title 
‗Prince of Aberffraw‘ somewhat circular.  The evidence supporting the elevated 
position of the King of Aberffraw over that of the other native Welsh rulers dates 
from around the same time as Llywelyn adopted the title, and worse, it is 
identified as such because it refers to the elevated status of Aberffraw.  Even more 
worrying, although Stephenson states that Iorwerth ap Madog cannot be identified 
as part of the court of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, he does not dispute his existence in 
Gwynedd in the early thirteenth century.
93
  If he was a Venedotian jurist around 
the time of Llywelyn‘s rule, then he would have been well placed to help create 
the myth of the pre-eminence of Aberffraw.  Thus, when Turvey repeatedly refers 
to the pre-eminence of Aberffraw to identify the chief ruler of Gwynedd during 
the fratricidal wars of Owain Gwynedd‘s descendants between 1170 and 1201, he 
may in fact be refering to a myth created by Llywelyn himself.
94
   
There are two further places where evidence of the ruler of Aberffraw as 
the overlord can be found.  First, Humfrey Llwyd notes in his Chronica Walliae, 
that in 1202 ‗Lhewelyn ap Ierwerth Prince of Northwales, calling to memorye his 
estate and title and how all the princes of Wales, by the ordinance of Rodrike the 
Great and after by the laws of Howell Dha, ought of right to acknowledge the 
Prince of Kinge of Aberfrawe and Northwales as their leidge lorde.‘95  But this 
gathering, with this claim, appears in no other medieval or late-medieval text; 
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Brut has no record of such a meeting, and although the earliest manuscripts of 
Brut date from the fourteenth century, they can surely be used to refute the 
sixteenth century Llwyd.
96
   So this reference ought to be discounted a method of 
substantiating a pre-Llywelyn ab Iorwerth claim to the overlordship of the ruler of 
Aberffraw.  Llywarch ap Llywelyn points to Llywelyn as the ruler of Aberffraw in 
one of his odes to the prince.
97
  But again, Llywarch was contemporary with 
Llywelyn, so it is difficult to categorically state that the rulers of Aberffraw before 
1230 held any sort of mythological status in the Welsh psyche with claim to the 
overlordship of Wales.
98
  
These concerns leave the scholar with two options: either to take the 
claims made by Llyfr Iorwerth at face value and assume that Llywelyn was in fact 
claiming some sort of legendary right to rule Wales as overlord, or to look at the 
proliferation of the references to a ruler at Aberffraw in a pre-eminent position as 
evidence of a propaganda campaign to establish Llywelyn as the foremost 
amongst the Welsh rulers.  It is possible that the references to the elevation of the 
ruler of Aberffraw in the poetry and law codes associated with Llywelyn‘s court 
and/or the period of his rule are the result of Llywelyn‘s attempt to create a 
position of supremacy synonymous with the ruler of Gywnedd.  This would mean 
that these references to Aberffraw are thirteenth century propaganda, designed to 
enhance the status of the ruler of Gwynedd and to reflect the state to which 
Llywelyn‘s own status in relation to the other rulers in Wales had grown since 
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1201 when he first was acknowledged as sole ruler in Gwynedd.  If this is the case 
and it was a propaganda campaign then why Aberffraw and Snowdon?  Lloyd 
suggested that Snowdon was added ‗for greater effect‘ because Aberffraw 
conveyed no suggestion of legendary greatness to the English.
99
  Lloyd could be 
correct; Snowdon is certainly the highest peak in Wales, and would therefore be 
impressive to the English.  But perhaps there is more to this, as Aberffraw stands 
midway along the south-western coast on Anglesey, and from there, one can make 
out Snowdown, and her neighbour Garnedd Ugain on mainland.  If the human eye 
can link these two, then perhaps the geography indicates something more 
important in Llywelyn‘s choice of title.  Low-lying Anglesey was the bread-
basket for Gwyendd and the mountains of Snowdon were the fortress that 
protected her.  Together, these two parts of Gwynedd made up the hard won land 
of Llywelyn‘s early campaigns to rule which he had maintained rule over since 
1200.  Furthermore, Snowdon provides the name of a specific place, highest on 
the mainland, from which Llewelyn could theoretically rule ‗all that he surveyed.‘  
Perhaps this was what Llywelyn was stressing, as lord of the highest point, he was 
the highest ruler in Wales.  Or perhaps it is merely as Pryce suggested, that 
Snowdon is meant to represent Llywelyn‘s control of Gwynedd while Aberffraw 
focuses upon his aspirations to a ‗Wales-wide‘ authority.100  It is impossible to 
know for sure. 
The only thing the documents can tell us, is that by May 1230, Llywelyn 
was calling himself ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon‘ and that by the 
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following year, the English chancery had also adopted these titles for Llywelyn.
101
  
In fact, in a sealed royal letter from Henry dated St Andrews day (30
th
 of 
November) 1231 extending the truce between England and her Welsh allies 
against Llywelyn and his allies, Henry specifically refers to Llywelyn as ‗L. 
Principem de Abbefrau et dominum de Snaudon‘ in the central text of the letter.102  
If Henry is making concessions to Llywelyn‘s new title whilst extending a truce 
between himself and Llywleyn, it suggests that Llywelyn‘s self-aggrandising 
claims by way of these titles were either not something which worried Henry, or 
that he had little to no knowledge of what they are presumed to have implied.  
Considering Henry‘s close ties with Llywelyn‘s wife Joan and other Welsh 
leaders, the latter is unlikely unless the mythological political situation with 
Aberffraw at the head of the Welsh was a propaganda product of Llywelyn‘s 
court. 
There is no way to definitively tell whether the idea that the ruler of 
Aberffraw held legendary status as the foremost of the native Welsh rulers was 
part of a propaganda campaign created in the thirteenth century by Llywelyn.  
However, whether it was or not, it has ultimately proved to be a successful re-
style on the part of Llywelyn.  Most historians take as read the idea that these new 
titles are illustrative of Llywelyn‘s successes and his claim to overlordship within 
Wales.   Today, the Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon has the pre-eminent 
place amongst the Welsh rulers in the eyes of medieval historians.  
Llywelyn had achieved a great deal in the decade between 1228 and 1238.  
He had gained titular recognition of his status as the Welsh prince above other 
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 ‗L. Principis de Abbefrau ed domini de Snaudonia.‘—Patent Rolls, 1225-1232, p, 436. 
102
 Pryce, Acts, no. 266, pp. 434-5. 
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Welsh princes; he had gained recognition of the succession of his younger son, 
not only to his own patrimony, but to his position as first amongst the Welsh; and 
he had managed to maintain a tricky balance of truce with England.  These 
triumphs are what lead to the epithet ‗Mawr‘.  They are why historians have given 
Llywelyn so much credit.  And yet, as we have seen, they are not quite what they 
have been claimed to have been.  Throughout, there have been qualifications to 
each ‗success‘.  The ‗peace with England‘ was merely a succession of truces, 
Llywelyn wasn‘t named ‗Prince of all Wales‘ but ‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of 
Snowdon‘, and Dafydd‘s hold on the patrimony and claim to the homage of the 
other Welsh princes was far more of a pipedream than a reality.  The disjointure 
of Llywelyn‘s successes will be discussed in the succeeding chapter, but here it is 
enough to say that Llwyelyn had accomplished great things for himself.  Just 
perhaps not as grand as he had hoped.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 DÉNOUEMENT 
Llywelyn‘s final years were not merely the culmination of the resounding 
successes of the preceding two and a half decades.  If anything, the last three 
years of Llywelyn‘s life suggest a gradual weakening of the strength and 
capabilities of the Venedotian hegemony apparently in step with the weakening of 
Llywelyn‘s person and the failing of his health. 
In 1237 Llywelyn suffered a paralytic stroke1 and it appears, from this 
point on, the strength of his position both within Wales, and amongst his allies, 
declines.  In fact, 1237 was a very bad year for Llywelyn.  Joan died in February2 
and his son-in-law, John the Scot, earl of Chester, also died without issue.  This 
meant that John‘s land escheated back to the Crown, losing Llywelyn both a 
powerful magnate as ally and with him, the protection of his northeast boundaries.  
Matthew Paris claims that Llywelyn even considered putting his lands under 
Royal protection at this point, offering military service in exchange for peace.3  
Turvey states that both proposals ‗undermine[d] Llywelyn‘s quest for greater 
autonomy.‘4  Although Paris‘s work contains the only record of these offers, it 
seems that the events of 1237 significantly weakened Llywelyn‘s position.  His 
stroke would have probably limited his ability to effectively lead a military force, 
and might even have affected his ability to negotiate with the Marcher lords, the 
Crown and his fellow Welsh.  It is entirely possible that the stroke made it clear to 
Llywelyn that his life was nearing its conclusion and as a result, he redirected his 
                                                 
1
 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, vol. III, p. 385.   
2
 See below, Ch 7.  See also Brut: RBH, p. 234-235. 
3
 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, vol. III, p. 385.   
4
 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, p. 133. 
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thoughts to how to maintain his current position, and once again safe-guard 
Dafydd‘s inheritance. 
In 1238, ‗all the princes of Wales‘ swore allegiance to Dafydd ap 
Llywelyn at Strata Florida Abbey, on the nineteenth of October.
5
  They had 
already recognised Dafydd as Llywelyn‘s heir in 1226, but now they were 
expressly swearing fealty to Dafydd, not only as heir to Gwynedd, but also to 
Llywelyn‘s position within Wales.  Llywelyn clearly intended for his supremacy 
within Wales to continue after his death.  Interestingly, not only did the Welsh 
princes meet at Strata Florida in October for just that purpose, but no record 
suggests that the attendees had any quarrel with such a proposition.  Llywelyn‘s 
position remained stable and secure enough by 1238, that he could demand his 
fellow princes to swear fealty to his son, and they would do so.  
 However, a qualification to this must be made.  Llywelyn initially wanted 
the native Welsh princes to do homage to Dafydd.  However, when Henry heard 
of Llywelyn‘s plans, he immediately took exception to them. Letters were 
dispatched in March to Llywelyn, Dafydd and the Welsh lords forbidding the 
homages, stating unequivocally that homage was due only to him. Henry even 
summoned the Marcher lords to a meeting to discuss the situation.
6
  It is clear that 
Henry was willing to allow no further aggrandisement of Llywelyn‘s power, nor a 
transfer of that power into the next generation.  Although Lloyd dismissed, 
without mention, the Crown‘s response to Llywelyn‘s plans,7 it is clear that even 
in 1238 there were limitations to Llywelyn‘s hegemony in Wales, and the powers 
                                                 
5
 ‗Y ulwyudn racwyneb, trannoeth wedy Gwyl Luc Evegylywr, y tygawd holl tywyssogyon Kymry 
ffydlonder y Dauid ap Llywelin ap Iorwerth yn Ystrat Flur.’—Brut: RBH, pp. 234-235. 
6
 Close Rolls 1237-1242, pp. 123-25, Patent Rolls 1232-1247, pp. 212, 215, 221, 225, 235, 237. 
7
 Lloyd, History of Wales, pp. 692-693, 
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which he had at his disposal.  Davies notes that Llywelyn‘s actions in 1237-8 and 
the Crown‘s response suggest that Llywelyn was ‗generally apprehensive about 
the future.‘8  Henry had no intention of allowing his half-nephew to retain the 
power and level of independence that Llywelyn had taken. 
Although Turvey echoed Carr in stating that Llywelyn intended to use this 
assembly to ‗effectively abdicate and publically invest his son with his princely 
powers,‘9 Llywelyn did not step down from power until two years later when he 
assumed the Cistercian habit at Aberconwy and subsequently died.
10
  Llywelyn‘s 
close relationship with his fellow Welsh rulers remained until his death in 1240.  
His role as peacemaker and arbitrator for his fellow Welsh princes did not end 
with their allegiance to Dafydd.  Later in the same year, Llywelyn proved he 
retained the power and control over his fellow Welsh princes by dispossessing 
Maredudd ap Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor after he had dispossessed his brother, 
Gruffudd ap Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor.
11
   
Nonetheless, 1238 marked the final years of Llywelyn‘s supremacy.  The 
Welsh prince had achieved a great deal, managing to take his signal military 
defeat to John in 1211 and turn his forty-one year reign into a success.  However, 
there remains little evidence to suggest that Llywelyn ever completely lost his 
hunger for power.  Even in the end, Llywelyn schemed for a future where his 
influence would continue in the guise of his son and he provided for that future 
with the allegiance of the Welsh in 1238.   
                                                 
8
 Davies, Age of Conquest, p. 250. 
9
 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great,134.  And Carr, A. D, ‗Llywelyn ab Iorwerth,‘ Dictionary of 
National Biography, vol.  24, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 180-185, 184 and 
Online.   
10
 Brut: RBH, pp. 236-237.   
11
ibid, pp. 234-235. 
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 Llywelyn was ultimately successful in gaining control of native Wales, 
but his early route—through outright conquest had to be scrapped in favour of 
acting as spokesman for his fellow Welsh rulers.  It is not enough to simply 
applaud Llywelyn‘s successes by his death in 1240, it must be understood that 
they only existed by force of his strong personality and the reputation he earned 
after 1211 as acting in the best interests of all his fellow Welsh princes.  Llywelyn 
was the spin-doctor of thirteenth century Wales; he re-created his own persona 
between 1211 and 1218, from a land-hungry warlord into a arbitrator, mediator, 
spokesman, and the fighter for the native Welsh.  Or at least, that was how he 
portrayed himself to the Welsh.  Sadly, Llywelyn‘s strength was insufficient to be 
felt from beyond the grave and his son lost much of the recognition Llywelyn had 
gained.  Yet, it is worth remembering that Llywelyn never did secure a lasting 
peace with the King of England, merely a series of truces that were never meant to 
last.   
In 1240, Llywelyn, having secured what he hoped would be a lasting 
succession for the Venedotian leadership, took holy orders and joined the 
Cistercian monks at Aberconwy.  Shortly thereafter, he passed away.  Gwynedd 
however, continued under the leadership of Dafydd, as Llywelyn intended.  What 
is significant is that the unity of the Welsh princes to speak in one voice—the 
voice of the ruler of Gwynedd—disappeared almost immediately upon 
Llywelyn‘s death.  
Within months of Llywelyn‘s death, Dafydd had both conceded and lost 
most of what Llywelyn had achieved.  On the 15
th
 of May, 1240 Dafydd did 
homage to Henry for Gwynedd, but in so doing, lost quite a bit of the authority 
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Llywleyn had claimed.  Dafydd was accorded neither the title ‗Prince of 
Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon,‘ nor ‗Prince of North Wales‘ that his father hand 
held. In fact, Dafydd is named only as ‗David, son of Llywelyn who was Prince of 
North Wales.‘12  Moreover, he conceded his rights to the homages of the Welsh 
‗barons‘13 and submitted the lands previously acquired by Llywelyn from the 
Marchers and Welsh princes to the arbitration of a committee composed of the 
papal legate, Otto, the Bishops of Worcester and Norwich, Richard, Earl of 
Cornwall, John of Monmouth, Ednyfed Fychan and Einion Fychan.
14
  It is 
interesting to note that the document expressly states five arbitrators to be on 
Henry‘s side and only the last two are Dafydd‘s supporters.  This perhaps alludes 
to the fact that Henry had no intention of allowing Dafydd to retain the hegemony 
his father had claimed in native Wales.  As Gwyn Williams notes, within a month 
of Llywelyn‘s death, the Crown had regained what they ‗had sought so long in 
vain from Llywelyn.‘15 
From this it is clear that Llywelyn‘s successes were ephemeral.  Without 
his strong personality, the authority he had created disappeared as water through a 
sieve.  Davies argued that ‗hindsight should not be summoned to belittle 
Llywelyn‘s achievement.‘16  However, to ignore the aftermath of Llywelyn‘s 
death is to ignore the reality of the limitations on Llywelyn‘s successes.  Llywelyn 
may have achieved a truce with England, he may have laid claim to much of the 
Welsh marches, and he may have been able to demand the fealty of the native 
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 Pryce, Acts, no. 291, p. 458. 
13
 ibid, no. 291, p. 459. 
14
 ibid, no. 291, p. 458. 
15
 Williams, Gwyn  A., ‗The Succession to Gwynedd, 1238-47‘ Bulletin of the Board of Celtic 
Studies, Vol. XX, 1964, pp. 393-413, p. 397. 
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 Davies, Age of Conquest, p. 250. 
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Welsh princes, not only for himself, but for his son.  Unfortunately, he could 
make none of these last.  The fact that all Llywelyn‘s accomplishments after he 
regained the Perfeddwlad were either wholly negated in May of 1240 or were 
subject to arbitration by a committee predisposed to limit Dafydd‘s power 
illustrates that the strength of the Venedotian hegemony was entirely reliant on the 
strength of a single individual Llywelyn.  While this could be interpreted as 
evidence of Llywelyn‘s successes, it is worth considering the fact that Llywelyn 
had put significant time and effort into establishing Dafydd as his successor.  Not 
only did Llywelyn intend for Dafydd to hold Gwynedd, but also he wanted 
Dafydd to succeed to all the authority Llywelyn had earned in his lifetime.  
Dafydd did not; in fact, he was forced to concede most of it in the wake of his 
father‘s death.  It would be difficult for Llywelyn to be blamed for these losses if 
they had not come so swiftly after his death.  That Llywelyn‘s hegemony couldn‘t 
survive a month after his death, points to the precarious nature of Llywelyn‘s 
‗success‘ and illustrates the extent to which the Crown, the Marchers and the 
native Welsh only acknowledged Llywelyn‘s authority on the basis of the force of 
his person, and his military strength alone.   
Williams argued that Dafydd only made the concessions in 1240 because 
he was more concerned about holding Gwynedd in the face of Gruffudd‘s 
expansion.
17
  Williams preferred Matthew Paris‘s date of the imprisonment of 
Gruffudd in 1241
18
 to Brut‘s 123919 because it suggested that, with Gruffudd also 
claiming rights to Gwynedd, Dafydd was willing to concede so much of his 
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 Williams, ‗Succession to Gwynedd,‘ p. 406. 
18
 Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, vol. 4, pp. 47-48. 
19
 Brut: RBH, 234-235 and Brut: Pen, p. 197. 
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father‘s wider authority for recognition of his rights in Gwynedd.20  However, this 
just paints a bleaker picture of Llywelyn‘s failures.  If Gruffudd was free, and 
challenging Dafydd‘s authority immediately after Llywelyn‘s death, then 
Llywelyn‘s attempt to promote Dafydd as his heir was a failure.  That Henry 
could use Gruffudd to effectively checkmate Dafydd belies the entire recognition 
process Llywelyn had undergone in the 1220s to assure Dafydd‘s status in Wales.  
Llywelyn had devoted a great deal of energy to assuring Dafydd succeeded to his 
entire combined authority.   
This is not to suggest that Llywelyn did not create a wider princely 
hegemony over native Wales, or expand his domains at the expense of the 
Marcher lords, nor does it negate his brilliant military campaigns.  However, it 
really is necessary to acknowledge that these were transient successes and that 
despite his desires to pass along all that he had won, he was unable to do so.  For 
Llywelyn, the adage was not ‗you can‘t take it with you,‘ but rather, ‗you can‘t 
pass it on‘! 
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 Williams, ‗Succession to Gwynedd,‘ p. 406. 
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RELATIONSHIPS AND THEMES 
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CHAPTER 5  
‗CONVENTIONALLY PIOUS‘ 
 
Llywelyn's patronage of the Welsh Church was little different from his 
predecessors‘.  His donations to the abbeys of Basingwerk, Haughmond, Cymer, 
Strata Marcella, the priories of Beddgelert and Ynys Lannog, and the Hospitallers 
of Dolgynwal seem neither small nor excessive in comparison to those gifts of 
other Welsh princes.  Only the two charter grants to Aberconwy abbey stand out. 
The original foundation of the monastery that was to become Aberconwy 
was situated at Rhydynog Felyn, near modern-day Caernarfon; it was founded as 
a daughter house of the Cistercian Abbey at Strata Florida (Ystrad Ffleur) in July, 
1186.
1
  However, by the time Gerald of Wales re-wrote his Journey through 
Wales in 1197, the monks had moved to the mouth of the Conwy river, over-
looked by Degannwy castle.
2
  Exactly when is uncertain.   
The extensive grant from Llywelyn to the monks at Aberconwy is 
profoundly detailed in its direction, topographical information and rights and 
privileges.  In fact, Pryce, in his notes on the charter, states that 'this is by far the 
longest charter in favour of a religious house extant in the name of a twelfth- or 
thirteenth-century Welsh ruler.'
3
  When read, it strikes one almost as a foundation 
gift, rather than an augmentation to an already existing abbey.  For example, the 
grant of Bodgedwydd was recorded in remarkable detail: the land of Bodgedwydd 
ascends from the island in Llyn Coron, through the middle of Clawdd Iago to 
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Brut: RBH, pp. 168-169, and Gresham, Colin A. 'The Aberconwy Charter.' Archawologia 
Cambrensis. vol. 44, December, 1939, p. 123. 
2
 Gerald of Wales, Journey through Wales, p. 195, note 389. 
3
Pryce, Acts, no. 218, p. 357. 
 114 
 
Caerneddy Iorwerth, it then turns towards Aberffraw by a stone to Waun Wern, 
past another stone boundary by Murdduen Cyfnerth, turning towards Hennlys to 
Cors Henllys... and so on.
4
  But Insley had another opinion; in his 'Fact and 
Fiction in Thirteenth-Century Gwynedd: The Aberconwy Charters' he argued that 
the combined two charters—the longer first, and the shorter second—could not 
have been granted when (1199) and in the manner they are recorded (in its 
entirety, as a single grant).  Instead, he suggests the Aberconwy charter is a 
possible amalgamation of previous grants, and those Llywelyn granted in his 
lifetime.  Insley, further suggests that the ‗Aberconwy  Charters‘ date  instead 
from the post-conquest era circa 1283; and compares this charter to Edward I's 
1284 charter to the monks of Aberconwy.  He suggests that these 1199 charter 
were used as a 'bargaining tool' for the soon-to-be dispossessed monks.
5
    If 
Insley is correct, then perhaps it is worth discounting the Aberconwy charters as 
forgeries and looking at Llywelyn's grants to other religious houses instead, for 
insight into his relationship with the Church.  
The majority of Llywelyn‘s grants to religious houses are short, simple 
documents.  In fact, many of these date from the early days of his presence in 
Gwynedd.  These early gifts are less religiously minded gifts, than grants that 
                                                 
4
'Dedi etiam et confirmavio eisdem Bodgedwyd per hos videlicet terminos: ascendendo de quadam 
parva insula existente in Llyn(n) Coron per medium Claud Yago usque Carned Yago usque 
Carned  Yorwerth, hinc divertendo versus Aberfraw per quoddam claud lapidibus signatum 
usque Weun Wenn, hinc per claud quoddam lapidibus signatum usques Murdymnen Kefnerth, 
hinc directe versus Henllys usque Korsenllys hinc divertendo ad desteram per medium alvei 
usques Rytdu, hinc per medium illius aovei usques aber Gouer Garenen prout decendit in 
Korscallellyn, hinc acendendo per Gouergarenen iuxta quoddam claud lapidibus signatum usque 
Wuen Las, hinc per medium Wen Las usques Wen Vaur, hinc ascendendo per alveum usques 
Fynnony Meyirch, hinc per quoddam claud lapidibus signatum usque ad latus Brodwrdyn, hing 
per ductum lapidum usque Cerric Poetheon, hinc per quoddam claud divertens versus 
Trerfdraeth, usque ad latus Trefdrateh, hinc per medium alvei extentis in confino Trefdraeth per 
pedium Kors y Gicvran usque Pylleu Haloc et ab hinc per alveum usque ad predicam insulam.' -
Pryce, Acts, no. 218, pp. 353-354. 
5
Insley, Charles, 'Fact and Fiction in the Thirteenth-Century Gwynedd: The Aberconwy Charter,' 
Studia Celtica, vol. 33, 1999, pp. 247-248. 
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merely confirm those rights previously granted to the religious houses by previous 
princes, this time in Llywelyn‘s name.  Effectively, Llywelyn was confirming that 
his rule would provide continuity and security to the religious houses in 
Gwynedd.  In fact, in a grant to Basingwerk Abbey, Llywelyn specifically 
confirmed all the gifts of his predecessors.
6
  Similarly, he re-grants to Haughmond 
Abbey for the salvation of his soul, and that of his father and uncle Dafydd ab 
Owain, the land of Stockett which Dafydd had granted earlier.
7
  These two 
charters seem to imply the need to re-grant the gifts of previous rulers in order to 
ensure continuity.  But Llywelyn goes further, in a grant to Cymer Abbey in 1209, 
he explains that one of his jobs is to protect the religious orders, and he has 
confirmed in writing what has been previously gifted to the Cistercian Monks as 
Cymer so that these donations cannot be removed from the monks in the future.
8
  
It appears that it was the monks, themselves, who requested that Llywelyn re-
issue a charter confirming all the previous grants and ensuring that they would be 
                                                 
6
 ‗ego Lewelinus concede et confirm Deo et Sancte marie et monasterio de Basingwerk’ 
monachisque ibidem Deo servientibus omnes donations quas antecessores mei prefacto 
monasterio pro suisi animabus contulerunt, liberas et quietas ab omni sertitio terreno et 
exactione seculari.‘—Pryce, Acts, no. 213, p. 345.  
7
 ‗donationem quam prefatus David filius Owini avunculus noster sisdem cannonicuis fecit et 
carta sua confirmavit de tota terra de Stokesta cum omnibus libertatibus et pertinentiis, in bosco 
et plano, in pratis et pastuis in aquis et viviariis in stagnis et piscariis, in moris, viis in semitis et 
in omnibuis aliis rebus et locis integer, libere et quiete in perpetuum ab omni exactione et 
servitio seculari sicut carta predicit David filii Owini testator.’—ibid, no. 225, p. 375. 
8
 ‗Cum cuntis quantum in nobis est pacis beneficium conservare tenemur, his maxime quos 
connendat ordo religionis, debemus solicite providere ne pacis defectu lonsetentur iniuste.  Quo 
circa dilectorum fratrum nostrorum abbatis et monachorum Cisterciensis ordinis Bangor(ensis) 
diocesis apud Kemmer Deo et gloriose Virgini Marie devote servientium atque sub regula Sancti 
Bened(ic)ti nostril patroni regulariter viventium iustas petitiones exaudientes, et oroum precibus 
inclinates utilitatibus eorundem diligenter providere volentes quicquid vel a nobis vela a aliis seu 
a conprincipibus nostir eisdem collatum acceptimus nostor sigillo duximus confirmare ne quod 
iuste collatum fuerit iniusta posit infuturum premutari presumption.  Eaproptier terrarium 
eisdem monachis collatarum nomina que nobis et ‘ab’ aliis illis fratribus prinicpibus date sunt 
huic scriptio liquid duximus commendare cum integris terminis et pertinentiis suit prot melius et 
certius et manifestius continentur et kartis et donationibus deorum principum Mareduc silicet et 
Griffud filiorum Kenan et Howeli filii Griffini et ailorum, et prout flienus et expressius omnes 
terras dictis monachis ac liberates dicti prinipes contulerunt et donaverunt.‘— ibid, no. 229, p. 
380. 
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respected and upheld in the future.  With the exception of the two, possibly 
forged, Aberconwy charters, Cymer‘s charter seems to be the most extensive of 
all of Llywelyn‘s grants to religious houses.  But then, it is a complete 
acknowledgement of every grant made up to Llywelyn‘s time to provide a legal 
basis for the holdings of the Abbey.   
Of the sixteen charters, not including the two grants to Aberconwy, that 
survive, either in mention or in full, as gifts of Llywelyn to religious houses, only 
four can be reliably dated to after 1211. Three of these give the specific dates of 
their confirmation
9
 and the fourth can be dated primarily by the use of the title 
Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon.
10
  This begs the question: why do only 
one-quarter of the charters granted to religious houses by Llywelyn date from the 
height of his rule?    The answer is complex; six of the sixteen cannot be precisely 
dated, except to sometime during Llywelyn‘s rule. It is possible to gain some 
insight by considering what could not have been granted in a specific period.  For 
example, it would have been difficult for Llywelyn to grant Mostyn to 
Basingwerk Abbey between 1211 and 1212 because he was no longer in control 
in the Perfeddwlad.  The charter itself, granting Mostyn no longer exists, and 
without the charter all we know is that Llywelyn made the grant at some point 
                                                 
9
 In chronological order: To Ynys Llanog Priory, 15 October 1221 ‗Hinc est quod vestere ducimus 
notificare universitiatinos pietatis intuit et pro anime nostra et animarum parentum nostrorum 
salute concessee et in puram et perpetuam elemonisam contuilisse totam villam de 
Begni(n)g...delictis fratriubus nostris canonicis de Insula Glannauch.  Actum, apus Kaerninarun 
anno gratie m
o
 cc
o
 xx
o
 primo idus octobris.‘; To the Hospitallers of Dolgynwal, 18 November 
1225 ‗Verstra noscat universitas nos pietatis intuit et pro salute anime nostre concessisse et 
contulisse domui Hospitalis Ierosal(em) de Dolgenwal et fratriub Deo Ioh(ann)i...Datum apud 
Ruthi(n) in octabis Sancti Martini anno regni Henr(ici) iunioris regis Angli(ie) x
mo.‘; To Ynys 
Lannog Priory again, 10 April 1237 ‗Noverit universitas vestra nos pro salute anime nostre 
antecessorum nostrorum dedisse et concessisse et hac presenti carta nostra confirmasse priori et 
canonicis de Insula Glannauc,...Datum apud Rosuer quarto id’ aprilis anno gratie millesimo 
ducentesimo xxx septimo.‘—ibid, nos. 250, 258, & 272, pp. 411, 422-423, 442. 
10
 ibid, no. 258, pp. 422-3. 
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during his rule.
11
  If just over one-third of the texts cannot be dated precisely, then 
the number of datable grants emanating from the height of Llywelyn‘s rule is less 
surprising.  Three-fifths of the remaining documents are known to date from the 
first seventeen years that Llywelyn was—even nominally—in power in Gwynedd.  
The remaining four date from the final nineteen years of his reign.  This leaves a 
ten year gap in grants to religious houses between 1211
12
 and 1221.  These gaps 
are arbitrary; any of the six undated charters could fill them, and could even out 
the stress on donations in the part of Llywelyn‘s reign.   
Overall, what do these grants tell us?  Of the sixteen, five were granted to 
Basingwerk Abbey
13
 in Tegeingl.  Haughmond Abbey,
14
 near Shrewsbury in 
Shropshire received the next largest number of charters, four.  Strata Marcella, in 
the eponymous Ystrad Marchell,
15
 Powys, received two grants, as did Ynys 
Lannog Priory on Anglesey.
 16
  The remaining single donations went to 
Beddgelert Priory
17
, Cymer Abbey
18
, and the Hospitallers of Dolgynwal
19
.  
Aberconwy Abbey is noticeably absent, but then, as noted above they may have 
lost their previous charters and forged ‗new‘ ones at a later date.  In comparison, 
Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd granted three specific charters to Haughmond 
Abbey,
20
 and a letter to the parishioners of Nefyn for the benefit of Haughmond 
                                                 
11
 ibid, no. 231, p. 345. 
12
 Using the outside dates of the latest of Llywelyn‘s early grants.  Cf ibid, 375 & 376 for 
discussion of these dates.  
13
 ibid, nos. 213, 214, 215, 216 & 217, pp. 344-345, 345, 345, 346, 374. 
14
 ibid, nos. 225, 226, 227 & 258,  pp, 374-375, 376, 377, 422-423. 
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Abbey.
21
  His wife, Emma of Anjou, made a further two grants to Haughmond, as 
did his son Owain ap Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd.
22
  Previous to that, Owain 
Gwynedd‘s brother Cadwaladr also granted the church at Nefyn to Haughmond23 
and both the sons of Cynan ab Owain Gwynedd also gave gifts to the Augustinian 
canons there.
24
  This makes Haughmond Abbey  highly subscribed and supported 
by the house of Owain Gwyneedd, even if no surviving charters from the latter 
exist.  The sons of Cynan were the only ones who gave or, at least, whose grants 
to other religious houses survive.  Gruffudd ap Cynan made a gift to Aberconwy 
Abbey
25
 and his brother Maredudd granted lands to Cymer Abbey.
26
  So why was 
Llywelyn so much more even-handed with his distributions than his kin?  Perhaps 
the answer could lie in the fact that Llywelyn maintained rule in Gwynedd for so 
much longer.  But then, his grandfather, Owain Gwynedd, ruled Gwynedd for 
thirty-three years and the only surviving grant to a religious house from this 
period was that made by Cadwaladr.  Did Owain Gwynedd not make any gifts to 
monastic orders during his reign?  Did the Welsh monks and canons discard 
earlier grants after receiving those from a more recent or perceived more 
important ruler, like Llywelyn?  The monks at Cymer certainly requested such a 
document in 1209, but then the grant of Maredudd ap Cynan survived at least 
until Roger Mortimer‘s inquisition in 1316.27  Did these documents, like so many 
others, simply fail to survive the monastic purges of Henry VIII in the sixteenth 
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century?    If so, what does this tell us of those grants that do survive from 
Llywelyn‘s rule?   
Perhaps it is worth casting the net more widely.  The Lord Rhys, who ruled 
in South Wales from 1155 to 1197 made at least five grants to religious houses in 
southern Wales.  These focused on Slebech Commandery
28
 in Pembrokeshire, 
Strata Florida Abbey
29
 near Tregaron in Ceredigion and, interestingly, Chertsey 
Abbey
30
 in Surrey.  He further confirmed two grants to Talley Abbey
31
 near 
Llandeilo in Carmarthenshire, and Whitland Abbey,
32
 also in Carmarthenshire, the 
mother house of Strata Florida.  While all but one of these grants and 
confirmations are to religious houses within South Wales and Rhys‘s sphere of 
influence, this at least shows some similarity of gift-giving both in scope and in 
numbers.  Rhys‘s son Maelgwn made around six grants to Strata Florida33 in his 
lifetime, plus a further one each to Whitland
34
 and Cwm-hir
35
 in Powys.  Rhys‘s 
sons Gruffudd and Hywel Sais each made at least one grant before they died in 
1201 and 1204 respectively.  Gruffudd gave lands to Strata Florida
36
, and Hywel 
gave land to Whitland abbey
37
, and further land to the Church of Llanfihangel
38
.  
Rhys Gryg also made three known grants to Strata Florida
39
, and a further fourth 
grant to Talley Abbey
40.  Gruffudd‘s sons Rhys Ieuanc and Owain both patronised 
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Slebech Commandery
41
, like their grandfather.  In addition, Rhys Ieuanc also 
made a grant to Strata Florida
42
 while Owain gave a further grant to Strata 
Marcella
43.  Similarly, Hwyel Sais‘s son granted land of Elwyn to Whitland 
Abbey
44
 before his death in 1240.  Compared to Llywelyn‘s sixteen known grants, 
as individuals each of these leading men of Deheubarth seem at first glance to 
have granted few lands or privileges to religious houses.  However, the sons and 
grandsons of Lord Rhys together produced at least as many grants as Llywelyn 
did before his death in 1240.  Furthermore, they seem to repeatedly patronise the 
same establishments, Slebech, Whitland and Strata Florida showing up the most 
often, suggesting a family tradition of patronage to these religious houses.   
When Powys is taken into consideration, the story becomes even clearer.  
Llywelyn‘s rival, Gwenwynwyn, granted lands or privileges to Strata Marcella 
abbey on  no less than sixteen separate occasions, with a further nine documents 
attesting to the sale of lands to the Abbey and a final four confirmations or 
notifications of grants by others to the same abbey.  Gwenwynwyn also made a 
grant to St Michaels Church of Trefeglwys and Haughmond Abbey, of land and 
that which could be gleaned from it,
45
 and also a final grant to Cwm-hir Abbey.
46
  
This makes a total of twenty gifts to Strata Marcella, and twenty two grants in 
total.  The documents attesting to the sale of land to Strata Marcella are a bit more 
problematic to consider.  It is unclear whether Gwenwynwyn was attempting to 
raise money, or merely to discharge responsibility for the land in question.  
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What can be gleaned from this comparison?  Firstly, it becomes apparent 
that individual rulers focused their patronage on a few select religious houses that 
fell within their sphere of influence.  Rhys and his descendants focused on 
Slebech Commandery, Strata Florida, and Whitland Abbey, although other houses 
received benefactions as well.  Gwenwynwyn almost exclusively patronised Strata 
Marcella.  Llywelyn‘s focus seems to have been upon Basingwerk and 
Haughmond abbeys.  Secondly is that these grants do, to a limited extent, depict 
the holdings of the Welsh princes at the time.  At least one of Llywelyn‘s grants to 
Strata Marcella is precisely dated to 25 November
47
 in the year 1209, when 
Gwenwynwyn was imprisoned by John and Llywelyn had laid claim to Southern 
Powys.   Although there is debate amongst scholars as to the location of the gifted 
land ‗Banhadlogllwydion‘ it is likely to be in Dyffryn Clwyd.  While Llywelyn 
was clearly not granting lands out with his patrimony here, the fact that he is 
patronising abbeys outside Gwynedd suggests that he probably saw an advantage 
in making gifts to an abbey, in potentially hostile lands.  Similarly, Llywelyn‘s 
gift of Ellesmere Church to the Hospitallers of Dolgynwal seems odd, except that 
the whole of Ellesmere had been given to Llywelyn by John as a dowry for Joan 
and the preceptory for Dolgynwal was on the banks of the Conwy river, in the 
heart of Llywelyn‘s lands.   
Secondly, the grants differ little from Llywelyn‘s own.  Of his grants to 
religious houses, fourteen in total of the sixteen specify land that is given to the 
religious house.
48
 This is commensurate with those grants of other leaders.  Five 
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mention pasture, either as separate from land or as part of the rights of the land.
49
  
Four mention churches, with all their rights.
50
  Two mention mills,
51
 another 
osiers
52
 and a third a quittance from pannage
53— the right to keep pigs in 
woodland—for 60 pigs.  Another four mention exclusion from ‗exactions‘.54  The 
Cymer Abbey
55
 charter goes further, citing the monks‘ rights to their own 
shipping, wreckage, to dig up any treasures and freedom from secular tribute.
56
  
Llywelyn spells out, in specifics, the terms by which the monks hold the land and 
what rights they retain within it, but he also makes promises about his own actions 
as prince with regards to the Church and the monks at Cymer.  He promises to 
respect papal privileges and uphold those granted to the monks, and to both 
exercise secular justice on behalf of the monks and enforce ecclesiastical censure 
on those who harm the monks.
57
  Llywelyn is granting not only autonomy for the 
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monks at Cymer, but a promise not to allow other lords to interrupt their peace.  
Aside from similar clauses in the two Aberconwy charters, this is the only grant to 
a religious house where such a promise occurs.  However, Cymer is not the only 
abbey to which Llywelyn made such grants. 
Others have interpreted Llywelyn‘s patronage of the Welsh Monastic 
houses as something more special than has been concluded here.  ‗Llywelyn 
showed himself the enlightened friend of reform‘ wrote Lloyd in his History of 
Wales.
58
   He cites Llywelyn‘s grant to Ynnys Llannog59 as evidence that 
Llywelyn supported the ‗old Welsh pattern‘ of grouped anchorites as much as he 
supported the Cistercians at Cymer and Aberconwy and claims those grants as 
evidence of support of monastic reform.  However, Turvey is more blasé; he 
refers to Llywelyn as ‗conventionally pious‘.60  Turvey points to the fact that no 
Welsh chronicler named Llywelyn as extravagantly religious or extolled his great 
piety as evidence of Llywelyn‘s mediocre devoutness.  However, Turvey echoes 
Lloyd in his conclusion that Llywelyn supported monastic reform.
61
  He points to 
Llywleyn‘s patronage of the Cistercians at Cymer and Aberconwy as evidence of 
Llywelyn‘s interest in monastic reform and stated that ‗Llywelyn transferred of 
foundations at Aberdaron, Bardsey, Beddgelert and Penmon to the Augustinians,‘ 
suggesting that he preferred these to traditional native Welsh establishments.
62
  
Turvey is slightly off in his interpretation here, while it is possible that Llywelyn 
                                                                                                                                     
septa monasterii fundendo vel etiam gangriarum aut lorcourm, aut hominem tenendo aut furtum 
aut rapinam seu hominem verberando sive aliquam irreverentiam exercendo, himinem spoliando 
vel aliud quid contra apostolic scripta et indulta faciendo, quantumlibit nobis caros et vinicos 
secularem iustitam penarie exercibimus et ecclesiasticamcensuram in eos latam patinenter et 
libenter sustinebimus.‘— ibid, no. 229, pp. 378-384. 
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supported the decisions of these houses to adopt the Augustinian rule, there is no 
evidence that Llywelyn actually was responsible for the change, let alone 
physically transferred the foundations.  Perhaps there is something in this, in so 
far as of the surviving grants by Llywelyn to religious houses, all but the grants to 
Basingwerk, Beddgelert and Ynys Llannog, go to the reformed houses of the 
Cistercians, Augustinians, Hospitallers and Basingwerk, Beddgelert and Ynys 
Llannog all adopted the Augustinian rule before or during the time Llywelyn ruled 
Gwynedd.  But then, the twelfth century saw the tail end of the monastic reforms 
with the establishment of the Cistercian order which flourished at Aberconwy and 
Cymer.  What is interesting is that of the nineteen or so known native monastic 
foundations; just under half are known to have adopted a recognised rule in the 
twelfth or thirteenth century.  Of those that changed, five came from lands over 
which Llywelyn ruled, two on Anglesey and three in Gwynedd Is-Conwy.  
Bardsey, Beddgelert and St. Tudwal‘s all adopted Augustinian rule, as did 
Penmon and Ynys Llannog on Anglesey.  This seems to suggest that Llywelyn 
supported the adoption of the Augustinian rule by existing Welsh monasteries.  
However, there are no surviving grants made by Llywelyn to Bardsey, St. 
Tudwals, or Penmon.  Moreover, Caergybi, Llanfechell, and Llangaffo on 
Anglesey, as well as Aberdaron and Clynnog retained their traditional clasau until 
dissolved or absorbed into other foundations.  In fact, many of the known 
religious houses in Gwynedd either were not patronised by Llywelyn, or such 
charters that he granted did not survive.  This may stem from a different approach 
to donations.  It may be that reformed orders actively sought written charters and 
preserved them in their records, while the older, unreformed, clas may not have 
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been quite as diligent in requiring written record of the donations.  As there is no 
foundation charter by Llywelyn for the Franciscan Friary at Llanfaes, which Brut 
tells us he founded upon Joan‘s death in her memory, it may be that Llywelyn in 
fact patronised more of the welsh monastic houses than survive.
63
  Following on 
from that, it is difficult to say that Llywelyn was a friend to reform, so much as he 
patronised those houses that fell within his sphere of influence.  
The evidence, therefore, has shown that as a benefactor of Welsh religious 
houses, Llywelyn is no different than his forbears or his fellow Welsh rulers.  He 
made grants to religious houses that had been patronised by his family in the past; 
he made grants to religious houses that fell within the territories he controlled.    
He showed little or no favouritism of one type to monastic foundation over 
another, equally supporting Augustinians, Cistercians and clasau.   
In 1209, Llywelyn arbitrated a dispute between the Abbot of Dore in 
Herefordshire and Strata Florida.  The arbitration reads like a range war between 
cowboys of the Old West.
64
  The Abbot of Dore remitted the damages inflicted by 
Strata Florida and the monks of Strata Florida promised not to seize Dore‘s 
property, lands, pastures or woods held by Dore in the Cantref of Selyf.
65
  This 
would seem to suggest that as prince, the Church looked to Llywelyn to mediate 
disputes, just as the Welsh magnates did.  However, Huw Pryce states that in 
general, legal disputes between abbeys were usually addressed by abbots 
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commissioned by the General Chapter.
66
  It also suggests that the church officials 
saw Llywelyn as a fair arbitrator and respected his ruling.  
This relationship also worked the other way.  During Henry‘s minority, 
when Llywelyn was having trouble with William Marshall‘s men in Pembroke, 
Llywelyn turned wrote to Pandulf, the papal legate, for support.  Llywelyn 
complains of dishonour, of being attacked during truce and of the summoning of 
Irish mercenaries, forcing Llywelyn to withdraw.
67
  The text reeks of the hard-
done by.  Llywelyn claims to be doing his best to follow the counsels of Pandulf, 
but feels Pandulf is not doing enough to stop William Marshall‘s men, and that 
even if Pandulf tries, Llywelyn does not believe Pandulf will be able to stop 
them.
68
  Here, Llywelyn appears to be providing advance justification for war 
against William Marshall.  While ostensibly, Llywelyn is asking Pandulf to stop 
William Marshall‘s men—and by extension, William Marshall—Llywelyn really 
intends to stop the men of Pembroke himself, although he couches this in the 
reasoning that he does not believe William Marshall‘s men will obey Pandulf.  
Llywelyn is in fact, using Pandulf and his authority to regain a measure of control 
over Pembroke. 
Llywelyn‘s relationship with the wider Church and its hierarchy is in one 
sense more ambiguous, and in another less so, than his patronage to those 
monastic houses.  Llywelyn, when considering the Welsh Church, seems to have 
the whole of Wales in his concerns and the idea of an identity of a ‗Welsh 
Church‘ appears most clearly.  It is from this preference for a Welsh Church 
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independent of English control that the historian could interpret Llywelyn to have 
been the nationalist hero with a clear ‗Welsh‘ identity.  
Llywelyn was, in his early career, a supporter of Gerald of Wales and the 
independence of the Welsh church from English governance.  It is here, in letters 
referring to the ‗souls of the Welsh‘, that Llywelyn speaks on behalf of the whole 
of Wales, albeit jointly with his fellow princes.  Llywelyn and his fellow princes 
refer to the ‗Welsh Church‘ as a distinct unit.69  The joint letter informs Innocent 
III of the abuses suffered by the Welsh at the hands of the English appointees.  
The English bishops are ignorant of ‗our‘ language, and can neither preach nor 
hear confessions without an interpreter.
70
  The princes jointly complain further, 
that the bishops preferred by England prize ‗neither our land nor our[selves]‘ but 
instead of seeking the profit of souls by persecuting bodies and seizing what they 
can take from Wales back to England and then excommunicating the Welsh from 
there.
71
  The princes go on to complain that these actions on the part of the 
English bishops have resulted in poor cathedral churches in Wales.
72
  The Welsh 
princes seize upon two further complaints, one being the way in which the English 
bishops are elected,
 73
 and the second being their loyalties to the English king over 
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faciunt, clericos nostros in Angliam vocando, et ibi in cameric regum quemcumque et 
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the Welsh people whom they serve.
74
 Llywelyn, Gwenwynwyn, Madog, 
Gruffudd, Maelgwn, Rhys and Maredudd sought redress of these wrongs in the 
person of Gerald of Wales who had been elected by the canons of St. David‘s75 
without the approval of Hubert Walter, Archbishop of Canterbury.  This letter was 
clearly written with the initial aim of getting papal consent to the election of 
Gerald as Bishop of St. David‘s, by pointing out the benefits of a Welsh prelate 
over an English one.  However, the concluding remarks are broader in their scope.  
The Welsh princes, in their letter, hearken back to an illusory ancient time when 
‗St. David‘s was the primatial see of Wales and the ancient metropolitan, subject 
only to the Holy Church of Rome.‘76 
In his typically uncomplicated interpretation, Lloyd viewed Llywelyn‘s 
reign as ‗a quiet period of rest‘ for the Welsh Church.77  He pointed to the election 
of Iorwerth, Abbot of Talley to the bishopric of St. David‘s and the confirmation 
by Archbishop Langton of Cadwgan, Abbot of Whitland, to the see of Bangor in 
1215, ‗no doubt in concordance with Llywelyn‘ as evidence that the security of an 
independent Welsh church was based upon the stable rule of Llywelyn.
78
  It is 
                                                                                                                                     
quamtumlibet vvilem in partibus suis abiectum sibi eligere pastroem combellendo.‘-- ibid, no. 220, 
pp. 368-371. 
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Lloyd‘s contention, as always, that these appointments would not have succeeded 
without the support of Llywelyn alone.  This support Lloyd assumes; there is no 
documentary evidence that explicitly states Llywelyn‘s support for Iorwerth.   
Turvey looked upon the struggle of the Welsh Prelates in terms of a wider 
struggle for Welsh independence stating that the English Archbishops of 
Canterbury and the English Crown worked in tandem to ‗assume the spiritual 
overlordship of the native bishoprics‘.79  To an extent, this can be concluded from 
the joint letter to Innocent III in 1199/1201.  Turvey, however, ignores this initial 
letter in his argument and instead looks to a letter patent of St. David‘s Cathedral 
Chapter proclaiming Llywelyn‘s support of Gerald and his anger with any cleric 
that failed to support the latter.
80
  Turvey ignores that this second letter only exists 
in a copied form in Gerald of Wales‘s own De iure et statu Menevensis ecclesiae, 
and as such owes its existence only to Gerald‘s interest in recording that which 
strengthened his case for his claim to the prelacy of St. David‘s.  However, Davies 
has downgraded the role of the Welsh princes in his synopsis of the struggle for 
the primacy of St. David‘s.  Although he acknowledges the role of native Welsh 
rulers, he specifically stated that ‗it was not from the Welsh princes but rather 
from the churchmen of St. David‘s ... that the most vigorous opposition [to 
English intrusion in the Welsh Church] was forthcoming.‘81  This synopsis is 
more in keeping with the evidence.  The joint letter from the Welsh Princes to 
Innocent was accompanied by Gerald of Wales who spear-headed the campaign 
for the independence of the Welsh Church and the elevation of St. David‘s.  It is 
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 Turvey, Llyweyn the Great, p. 122. 
80
 ibid, p. 122 and in Pryce, Acts, no 222, p. 374 and again in Gerald of Wales Girladus 
Cambrensis Opera, vol. 1, p. 13.   
81
 Davies, Age of Conquest, p. 190. 
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Gerald‘s writings that chronicle the internal ecclesiastical struggles of the Welsh 
Church and those actions taken by the English to elevate the Welsh.  In fact, the 
letter exists only in Gerald‘s De iure et statu Menevenis ecclesiae as does the 
letter patent.   
 Llywelyn also used papal authority to his own advantage.  In a letter to 
Honorius III in the spring of 1222, Llywelyn ‗complained‘ of the Welsh custom of 
recognising both legitimate and illegitimate offspring as potential heirs.  Although 
the original letter does not survive, the response from Honorius does.  Honorius 
writes to confirm what Henry III, Stephen Langton, and Pandulf have already 
agreed with Llywelyn: that Dafydd will be recognised as Llywelyn‘s heir, to the 
exclusion of Gruffudd.
82
  What is important here is that Llywelyn carefully used 
the hierarchy of the Church and its ultimate authority, to support his nomination 
of Dafydd as edling.  Llywelyn originally sought confirmation of his decision 
from not only the English King, but also the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Papal 
Legate, and finally the Pope, himself.  His use of the Church‘s authority is 
masterful.  Not only did Henry support Llywelyn‘s decision to name Dafydd as 
heir over his older brother Gruffudd, but Llywelyn managed to get the decision 
recognised by the Church.  If challenged in the future by a fellow ruler, Gruffudd 
himself, or even Henry given a change of mind, Llywelyn need merely point to 
the Pope as the authority on which the decision stands. 
Despite the sometimes murky nature of the surviving evidence, it is clear 
that Llywelyn‘s relationship with the Church and its hierarchy was complex.  On 
the one hand, he supported the growth of monastic institutions in those lands 
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which he controlled, reliably augmenting their foundations.  On the other, 
Llywelyn used the Church to his advantage, when it suited him.  He supported 
Welsh bishops and the independence of the Welsh Church, when so moved, and 
requested the help of the wider Church when necessary.  In fact, when comparing 
both letters addressed to the Papacy, it appears that in both cases he was 
requesting that which would make him stronger – an independent Welsh prelacy 
in St. David‘s and a clear line of inheritance, which would eliminate fratricidal 
warfare.  Overall, from the evidence available to us, it appears that the Church 
was a tool to Llywelyn, like a good sword or John‘s rebellious rebels, something 
he could use to his advantage and to the advantage of Gwynedd as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 RULING GWYNEDD 
 
 With the help of his cousins and uncle Rhodri, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth conquered a 
share of what he perceived to be his inheritance, Gwynedd, in 1195 and spent the 
next several years incorporating the rest of North Wales into his patrimony, ruling 
Gwynedd until his death in 1240.  The governmental structures and officers he 
used in order to administer his lands are not easy to discern.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to discover how Llywelyn maintained control over the core of his 
dominion as well as considering his methods of control over the wider native 
Wales.  Llywelyn could not have maintained his rule of Gwynedd for over forty 
years without the aid of councillors and officers in charge of both his central and 
local government.  Who these men where, what their jobs were and how they 
were described in the law codes will be compared with their portrayal in the 
sources.  Any changes in approach evident over the course of Llywelyn‘s rule are 
likely to be coping mechanisms put into place due to the experience he gained 
throughout his lifetime. 
 When seeking to determine who the men supporting Llywelyn‘s regime were, and 
what structures aided their work, a detailed analysis is needed.  It requires careful 
study of document witnesses, comparison of various forms of law codes and 
poetry to discover who supported Llywelyn and in what capacity they did so.  
Luckily, this work has already been completed in a thorough analysis of the 
governmental structures and supporting officials of Gwynedd in the thirteenth 
century by David Stephenson in 1984.  Just as it would be remiss to consider 
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Llywelyn‘s life without looking into his internal rule of Gwynedd, it would be 
negligent to examine  Llywelyn‘s government without looking in detail at the 
work Stephenson has already completed, and where possible, expanding upon it.   
 Llywelyn ab Iorwerth began his rule of Gwynedd in 1195, sharing the principality 
with two of his cousins, Maredudd and Gruffudd ap Cynan and his uncle Dafydd 
ab Owain Gwynedd.  It appears as if Llywelyn ruled Gwynedd Is Conwy 
(Gwynedd below [east of] the Conwy [river]), while his cousins ruled the more 
plentiful Gwynedd Uwch Conwy; Gruffudd controlled Anglesey, Arfon, 
Arllechwedd, Lleyn, and Maredudd controlled Merionydd and other lands to the 
north-west.
1
  Llywelyn inherited a government system that remains to this day 
shrouded in the cloak of the Welsh law codes.  There are few sources from 
elsewhere that can shed any light upon the structure of internal government of the 
Wales which precedes the Edwardian Conquest in 1284.  However, David 
Stephenson managed to provide a description of the method of Government in 
Gwynedd in the thirteenth century, focusing primarily upon Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd, but also including some description of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s 
government.
2
  He used evidence from both legal texts and acta of the princes of 
Gwynedd in order to do this.
3
 
The important magnates were men from his council, made up of both the 
clergy and the barons of Gwynedd; however, this large council did not make the 
                                                 
1
 Lloyd, A History of Wales p.  589.  Also, Davies notes that Llywelyn was not content to share in 
the patrimony and captured then exiled his uncle Dafydd in 1197 and  his cousin Maredudd in 
1201, from whom he took Llyn and Eifionydd.  Davies, The Age of Conquest: p. 239.  Please see 
Chapter 1 for a more thorough accounting of how Llywelyn‘s consolidated his rule in Gwynedd. 
2
 Stephenson, Governance. 
3
 ibid, pp. xxxvi-xlii. 
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everyday decisions, rather Llywelyn utilised a smaller, ‗working council‘4.  
Kathryn Hurlock argues that this movement towards Venedotian rulers seeking 
advice and counsel of a defined group of councillors, whom she calls a 
‗ministerial elite‘5, was essentially a ‗pan-European‘ phenomenon of thirteenth 
century, and not unique to Gwynedd.
6
   She is not alone in this interpretation; 
Pryce points out that the evolution of a working group of officials in charge of 
administration and its arrangements was part of an increasing trend towards 
emulation of European and Anglo-Norman modes of government.
7
   
The members of Llywelyn‘s working council included two titled officials 
the distain,
8
 and the gwas ystafell a thrysorier:
 9
 ynad llys
10
 and bardd teulu
11
 
joined into one person, and a variety of other officials used on jobs for specific 
talents but with no particular title or function.
12
  Hurlock points out that this is a 
change from the more traditional form of counsel and criticism provided in the 
Welsh Courts from pencerdd and bard teulu in the formal court poetry.
13
  The 
pencerdd was responsible for delivering two poems to the court: praising God and 
their lord, and the bardd teulu to deliver a third praising the teulu.  The existence 
of further poetry from these poets criticising the Welsh Princes and providing 
advice, Hurlock uses to point to this poetry as a way to deliver such advice.
14
  But 
                                                 
4
 ibid, p. 9. 
5
 Hurlock, Katherine, ‗Counselling the Prince, Advice and Counsel in Thirteenth-Century Welsh 
Society‘, History, 94, 2009, p. 28. 
6
 ibid, p. 21. 
7
 Pryce, Huw, ‗Welsh Rulers and European Change, c. 1100-1282,‘ in Huw Pryce and John Watts, 
eds., Power and Identity in the Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Rees Davies, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, pp. 37-51, p.41. 
8
 distain (MW), senescallus (LT), steward (E). 
9
 gwas ystafell (MW), camerarius (LT), chamberlain (E).  Thrysorier (MW), treasurer (E). 
10
 ynad llys, (MW), judge of the court (E). 
11
 bardd teulu (MW), poet of the warband/poet of the household (E). 
12
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 24.  
13
 Hurlock, ‗Counselling the Prince‘, p. 23. 
14
 ibid, p. 24. 
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this is a slightly simplified argument; many of the men providing counsel and 
helping Llywelyn to rule at his court had positions carefully described and 
delineated in the Welsh lawcodes. 
The distain was Llywelyn‘s closest advisor for most of his rule, and the 
office was held by two men during Llywelyn‘s reign 15 Gwyn ab Ednywain and 
Ednyfed Fychan.
16
  In the Llyfr Iorwerth law-code book the distain‘s job was 
listed as sharing out the food and the drink, sharing out the supper money, and 
taking oaths in the place of the king when he was absent.
17
  However, evidence 
suggests that the distain worked closely with the Venedotian ruler, witnessing 
charters, consulting on judicial matters, and proceeding on diplomatic missions.
18
  
For instance, Gwyn ab Ednywain appeared in seven charters of Llywelyn between 
1196/1199 and 1209.
19
  He is named as Llywelyn‘s distain in the witness list of 
Llywelyn‘s grant to Cymer Abbey in 1209 as ‗Gwyn son of Edneweyn our 
seneschal.‘20  It is interesting to note that the role of seneschal was developing 
elsewhere, in his discussion of the government of the Angevin empire, John 
Gillingham notes that Philip Augustus was advised to copy the Henry II‘s style of 
government.
21
  Again, this points to a pan-European development of 
governmental offices in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of with Gwynedd was 
a part. 
                                                 
15
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 14. 
16
 Ednyfed ap Cynfrig ab Iorwerth,* ‗Bychan,’ ‗the small one.‘  * ibid, p. 102. 
17
 ‗E dysteyn a dely medu en wastat e bwyt en y kegyn a’r llyn en y uedgell‘ (It is right for the 
distain to make equal the food in the kitchen and the drink in the mead-cellar)…‗E dysteyn a dely 
tygu tros e brenhyn ac a dele rannu aryant e kvynnos.‘ (It is right for the distain to swear for the 
King and to share out the supper money.)—Llyfr Iorwerth, §8, pp. 6-7. 
18
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 12. 
19
 Pryce, Acts, nos. 216, 218, 219, 225, 226, 229 & 231, pp. 346, 351-357, 365-367, 374-375, 376, 
380-382, 385. 
20
 ‗Gwyn filius Edneweyn seneschallus noster‘— ibid, no. 229, p. 382. 
21
 John Gillingham, The Angevin Empire, London, Arnold Publishing, 1984, pp. 67-85, p. 80. 
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Ednyfed Fychan first appears as the ‗seneschal‘ of Llywelyn in a letter 
patent from the ruler of Gwynedd to Ralph Mortimer dated sometime between 
June 1230 and Llywelyn‘s death in 1240.22  Hurlock argues his importance to 
Llywelyn‘s court by pointing to his role as both witness to charters and envoy on 
Llywelyn‘s behalf to Henry III.23  Ednyfed appears to have replaced Gwyn ab 
Ednywain long before this period, as Ednyfed fails to appear in any role in the 
earlier charters when Gwyn served Llywelyn, but appears regularly as a witness in 
charters and letters after 1218.  Stephenson suggests the date of 1216 for the 
replacement of Gwyn with Ednyfed.
24
  Further charter evidence illustrates 
Ednyfed‘s position as trusted official; Ednyfed continued on with his post as 
distain after Llywelyn‘s death, serving as a witness for Dafydd ab Llywelyn on 
his grant and confirmation to Basingwerk Abbey on 25 July 1240.
25
  Ednyfed 
appears as a witness in five of Llywelyn‘s charters and letters,26 and elsewhere in 
six other documents.
27
  In three
28
 of these eleven documents he is named as 
distain for Llywelyn.  Ednyfed Fychan first appears in a letter patent of Llywelyn; 
he is to be absolved of his fealty and homage to Llywelyn in order to allow him to 
aid the English king and his heirs in the event of breaches of the terms of 
Llywelyn‘s hold on Carmarthen and Cardigan castles.  If Llywelyn, or his heirs, 
failed to turn the castles over to Henry upon his reaching the age of majority the 
                                                 
22
 ‗Hiis testibus: … Idneuet Vechan seneschallo nostro…‘ ‗With these witnesses … Ednyfed 
Fychan our seneschal…‘— ibid, no. 263, pp. 423-424. 
23
 Hurlock, ‗Counselling the Prince,‘ p. 22. 
24
 Stephenson, Governance, p 14. 
25
 ‗Hiis testibus: … Edeneweth Vakan … Dat’ apud Colshull anno domini m° cc° quadrangesimo 
in die Sancti Iacobi abostoli.‘ ‗With these witnesses … Ednyfed Fychan … Dated at Coleshill in 
the year of our lord 1240 on the day of Saint Jacob the apostle.‘—Pryce, Acts, no. 292, pp. 460-
461. 
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 Pryce, Acts, nos. 252, 256, 258 & 259, pp. 414, 419, 423, 424. 
27
 ibid, nos. 242, 260, 263, 266, 267 & 274, pp. 400, 425-426, 431-432, 434-435, 436, 443-444. 
28
 ibid, nos. 259, 260 & 267, pp. 424, 425-426, 436. 
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fealty of Ednyfed and the others named would be granted to the king and their 
fealty could not be returned to Llywelyn until he made restitution of the castles.
29
 
The naming of a man who is later noted to be Llywelyn‘s distain, suggests two 
possibilities.  One possibility is that the council insisted on named men, selected 
from those officials high in Llywelyn‘s confidence, men whose allegiance 
Llywelyn would be loathe to lose, in order to enforce their codes.  Alternatively, 
Llywelyn named these men because he did not, in fact, fear that they would truly 
support Henry‘s cause over his, and that this letter patent transferring Ednyfed‘s 
fealty was a performance, rather than a reality.  In March 1218 when this letter 
was issued at Worcester, Henry III‘s minority government had little influence in 
Wales, and Llywelyn already had control over both castles.
30
  The agreement was 
nominal, and Ednyfed Fychan‘s name in this charter suggests that he was 
considered a leading man of Llywelyn‘s council by the English and one whose 
fealty the Vendotian ruler would loathe to lose.   
 Where the distain was in charge of household finances such as the supper-money 
according to Llyfr Iorwerth,
31
 the gwas ystafell is given the role of the keeping the 
king‘s treasure, and therefore could also be considered the treasurer.32    
Stephenson argues that there is no real evidence for the creation of a new 
department within the governmental structure of Gwynedd; a department with a 
treasurer, or the gwas ystafell, as the head of the office.
33
  However, there is 
                                                 
29
 ‗Ad hec consessimus quod Etneueth’ Bachan, Eygno(n) filius Walcm’, Eygno(n) filius Ririt, 
Heylin(us) filius Reirit hominess nostri recedant et omnino sint absoluti ab homagio et fidelitate 
nostra et domino regi et heridibus suis adhereant et eis pro posse suo sint in auxilium, ut ea que a 
nobis observata non fuerint plenary emendentur.‘ — ibid, no. 242, p. 400. 
30
 Lloyd, History of Wales, Vol. 2, p. 652. 
31
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 24. 
32
 ‗Ef byeu cadv tryzor e brenhun y am y fyoleu a’e kyrn a’e uodrvyeu.‘ ‗He is to keep the treasure 
of the king concerning the cups and the horns and the rings.‘—Llyfr Iorwerth, §12, p. 10. 
33
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 22. 
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evidence for an individual treasurer.  In a grant to the Hospitallers of Dolgynwal, 
dated at Ruthin on the 18
th
 of November 1225, Owain is named in the witness list 
as Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s camerarius.34  This is the only mention of an Owain as 
a ‗camerarius’ in Llywelyn‘s acta.  However, an Owain appears as early as 1209 
in the witness list to Llywelyn‘s charter to Cymer Abbey.35  It is always possible 
that the same Owain served Llywelyn as his gwas ystafell for the intervening 
sixteen years between the two charters.   
 The emergence of a post resembling that of a treasurer is not something that was 
unique to Gwynedd.  There is some evidence for the great magnates of the Anglo-
Norman world, copying the English crown and its financial offices.  Crouch 
points out that the earls of Leicester, Chester and Gloucester held ‗elaborate 
annual sessions before their chief men...called ―exchequers‖‘ and that William 
Marshal himself had a ‗chamber‘ responsible for the collection of money and the 
issuance of receipts.
36
  This centralisation of fiscal control can be seen earlier with 
evolving powers of the royal chamber and exchequer in England throughout the 
twelfth-century.
37
  It would be misleading to suggest that Llywelyn was directly 
copying either the financial structures of these magnates, or those of the crown, 
but the emergence in Gwynedd of a financial officer holding the title of 
                                                 
34
 ‗Hiis testibus: … Owen camerario nostro…Datam apud Ruthi(n) in octabis Sancti Martini anno 
regni Henri(ici) iunioris Regis Angl(ie) x
mo.‘ ‗With these witnesses: … Owain our chamberlain, 
dated at Ruthin on Saint Martin‘s day in the eighty year of Henry King of England.‘—Pryce, Acts, 
no. 256, p. 419. 
35
 ‗Ywen et multis aliis ydoneis et fidelibus.‘ ‗Owain and many other capable and faithful 
persons.‘— ibid, no. 299, p. 382. 
36
 Crouch, David, William Marshal: Knighthood, War and Chivalry, 1147-1219, London, 
Longman, 2002, pp. 147, 176. 
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 For a full discussion of these changes, see Gillingham, Angevin Empire, pp. 67-85 and Tout, T. 
F, Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England: the Wardrobe, the Chamber and 
the Small Seals, Vol. 1, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1920, pp. 177-205. 
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‗camerius’ suggests that Llywelyn‘s Venedotian government was not as divorced 
from wider Anglo-Norman developments.  
 The positions of bardd teulu and ynad llys (court poet and court judge) were held 
by one man under Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s rule of Gwynedd, Einion ap 
Gwalchmai.  This appears to be the first instance of a son following his father in a 
post in the Venedotian government; the poet Gwalchmai served Llywelyn ab 
Iorwerth‘s grandfather Owain Gwynedd.38  Einion was rewarded with 
privileges—mostly in the form of land free of the renders due the prince—on land 
in Cafflogion and Trefddisdeiniad in Malltraeth, render free and rent free land in 
Dindaethwy and land in Lledwyganllwys in Malltraeth with renders still due the 
prince.
39
  Einion, like Ednyfed Fychan, appears in Llywelyn‘s letter patent 
regarding the castles of Carmarthen and Cardigan as a man whose loyalty would 
change upon the failure of Llywelyn to return the castles when the king came of 
age.
40
  This implies that his position in Llywelyn‘s retinue and his support was as 
important to Llywelyn and the prince‘s control of Gwynedd as Ednyfed was.  
Einion appears as a witness in one other charter, issued to Ynys Lannog Priory at 
Caernarfon on the 15
th
 of October 1221.
41
 Einion‘s presence with Llywelyn can be 
assumed from this to at least be occasional, and given his position as a justice of 
the court it would be assumed that he might travel in the same peripatetic 
circuit—cylch—as Llywelyn with the court to provide judgements.   
                                                 
38
 Stephenson, Governance, p. 14. 
39
 ibid, p, 98. 
40
 Pryce, Acts, no. 242, p400.  
41
 ‗Hiis testibus: … Ennio filio Walchmei, … Actum apud Kaerinaruon anno gratie m° cc° 
xx°priomo idus octobris.‘ ‗With these witnesses: .. Einion son of Gwalchmai, … Act at 
Caernarfon, in the year of grace 1221 on the ides of October.‘ – ibid, no. 250, p. 411. 
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 The teulu
42
 forms an important portion of the king‘s court in the legal codes.  
However, there are few, if any, references to Llywelyn‘s teulu in the sources 
available for 13
th
 century Gwynedd.  Stephenson argued that the teulu was ‗a 
potent fighting force‘ with siege engines for battle,43 they served as the prince‘s 
personal bodyguard, and the larger force used for warfare outside Gwynedd was 
formed from them, and the freemen of Gwynedd were required to ‗go with their 
lord in his war for forty days at their own cost and thereafter at his cost;‘44 this 
service commenced at the arrival of the men at the assembly point for the siege.
45
  
However, the teulu had a peacekeeping role within Gwynedd as well and was 
often used for raids within the country exercising distraint,
46
 and members of the 
teulu were not responsible for galanas payments to victims of the teulu‘s 
activities.
47
  The officer in charge of the teulu, the penteulu
48
 still existed in the 
reign of Llywelyn‘s grandson, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, as Llywelyn ap Gruffudd‘s 
younger brother Dafydd ap Gruffudd served his other older brother Owain ap 
Gruffudd in this role by 1255.
49
  However, there exists no record of any particular 
man with the title of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s penteulu, and it is therefore 
impossible to know how important the role of the penteulu was to Llywelyn‘s 
government.   
 Stephenson, when considering the beginnings of a chancery in Gwynedd, suggests 
that the repetitions in phraseology and naming point towards a single clerk 
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 teulu (MW), warband (E) or household (E). 
43
 Stephenson, Governance, p.15.  
44
 ibid, p. 90. 
45
 ibid, p. 89. 
46
 ibid, p. 46. 
47
 ‗Nyt a galanas yn ol teulu6ryaeth‘ ‗No galanas after the job of a member of the teulu.‘—Dafydd 
Jenkins (ed. And trans.), The Law of Hywel Dda, (Llandysul, Gomer Press, 2000), p. 356. 
48
 Penteulu (MW), captain of the household force (E). 
49
 Pryce, Acts, p. 637. 
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working for Llywelyn at any given time, rather than a fully developed chancery.
50
  
Because of the limited references to clerical men in Llywelyn‘s letters and 
charters, it is possible that many of the charters may have been written at one or 
another of the religious houses.  Llywelyn used the abbeys of Aberconwy, Cymer, 
and other religious institutions as document storehouses;
51
 this is probably 
because Llywelyn assumed—somewhat incorrectly52—that these buildings were 
safe from the wrath of the English king or other raiding parties.   
However, these individual clerks that could have become the beginnings 
of a chancery and a chancellor developed from the offeriad teulu,
53
 the priest of 
the household.  The law codes claim that the offeriad teulu has the right to four 
pence for each open seal the king gives for land and earth or for other great 
things.
54
  The first recorded cancellarius of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth was Instructus, 
who Stephenson assumes to also be ‗Ystrwyth‘ and ‗Ostrcius‘.55  Instructus 
appears in two charters,
56
 once named as chancellor of Llywelyn.
57
  Ystrwyth 
appears in two charters as a witness.
58
  Instructus appears as Llywelyn‘s envoy to 
Stephen Segrave regarding the release of Einion Fychan‘s son in 1230.59  
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 Stephenson, Governance, pp. 26, 28. 
51
 ibid, p. 34. 
52
 In 1211 King John lead two campaigns into Gwynedd, the first aborted when the army was 
surrounded at Degannwy and cut off from their supplies the army starved, and withdrew from 
Gwynedd.  The second campaign was, according to R. R. Davies, ‗devastatingly successful‘ and 
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 ‗Ef a dely pedeyr keynnyavc o pob ynseyl agoret a rodho e brenhyn am tyr a daear neu am 
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 Stephenson, Governance, p. 31. 
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 Pryce, Acts, nos. 250 & 259, pp. 411, 424.  
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 ‗Hiis testibus: magistro Instructo cancellario nostro‘ ‗With these witnesses: Master Instructus 
our chancellor.‘— ibid, no. 259, p. 424. 
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 ibid, no. 229, & 252, pp. 382-383, 414. 
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Sometime between 1230 and 1231,
60
 Joan, wife of Llywelyn and half-sister to 
King Henry III, wrote to her brother assuring him of the loyalty of Instructus to 
both the king and her husband.
61
  Joan often served as emissary between the two 
rulers, and her letter has the poignancy of a person who knows how it feels to be 
torn between two masters. ‗Know this, lord, they suggest that which are most 
unjust of your suspicions to have of Instructus your clerk and clerk of my lord, 
which I believe you cannot have in England a more faithful clerk, if God adjudges 
to me; the same [Instructrus] is not less loyal to you if he faithfully goes to carry 
out business for his lord, which in the same place now he has in going of your 
actions the heart of his lord; you can trust to confide in himself and not others, if 
he chooses to neglectfully contract the business of his lord.‘62  Instructus, in his 
role as chancellor, clearly acted as an ambassador and envoy between the English 
king and the Vendotian leader during his tenure of the office, and was seen as 
acting for both of them, to the dismay of Henry III.  This role, encompassing 
envoy and clerk for both Henry and Llywelyn suggests that the emergence of a 
chancellor in Gwynedd was encouraged in part by Anglo-Norman/Welsh 
relationships.  Perhaps, rather than merely being an attempt to emulate the Anglo-
Norman office, the title of cancellarius afforded to Instructus was an attempt to 
find something that fit the requirements of the function he performed for both 
masters. However, the important aspect of this is that under Llywelyn‘s rule, the 
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 ibid, no. 280, p. 447 
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 ‗Assures him that his suspicion of Instructus, clerk of the king and of her husband, are entirely 
unjustified.‘—Edwards, CACCW, p. 20. 
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domin sui, quia eodem modo se habet in agendas vestries coram domino suo; nec vos nec aliquis 
in ipso posset confidere, si domini sui tepide vel negligenter negocia tractaret.‘—Pryce, Acts, no. 
280, p. 447. 
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office of chancellor developed from merely the scribal aspect of the job of the 
offeriad teulu to include a role as diplomat for the ruler of Gwynedd.   
It is worth comparing the evolution of this role in Gwynedd under 
Llywelyn to the position of clerks in the households of other magnates.  David 
Crouch, for instance, notes that for William Marshal his clerks ‗added a certain 
tone to the Marshal‘s reputation...a respectability and profundity of counsel.‘63  
He points out that the Marshal had a large clerical staff made up of ‗chaplains‘ 
and ‗clerks‘ with the clerks being responsible for keeping accounts and 
conducting his correspondence.
64
  The existence of such men in the Marshal‘s 
retinue points to a broader development of similar offices not only within Wales 
and this may have been the impetus behind the changes within Gwynedd.    
Another of Llywelyn‘s clerks is ‗David‘65 who appears as a witness in a 
chirograph agreement concerning the marriage between Llywelyn‘s daughter 
Helen and the Earl of Chester‘s nephew and heir, John the Scot.  David reappears 
as one of Llywelyn‘s emissaries to Henry III in 1232 along with Ednyfed, and 
others from Llywleyn‘s court.66   
Religious men such as Master Philip ab Ifor also served as Llywelyn‘s 
clerks; Philip ab Ifor first appears in Llywelyn‘s service in the mid 1220s and 
disappears from the records in 1241.
67
  Philip was an archdeacon of St. Asaph and 
Stephenson suggests that his disappearance from the service of the Prince of 
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 ‗David clerico Lewel(ini)‘ ‗David clerk to Llywelyn‘— ibid, no. 252, p. 413-414. 
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Gruffudd in 1257 on a diplomatic mission.— ibid, p. 35. 
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Gwynedd relates directly to control of the Perfeddwlad and the St. Asaph diocese, 
the disputed land east of the Conwy River.
68
  Philip witnessed one charter of 
Llywelyn,
69
 and appears as a guarantor in a letter patent concerning a truce 
between Llywelyn and Henry III in 1238.
70
  Abraham, the Cistercian abbot of 
Aberconwy, also appears in 1221 as a witness in a grant to Ynys Llanog Priory,
71
 
and again in one of the many grants to Basingwerk Abbey given by Llywelyn 
throughout his rule of Gwynedd.
72
  He may have been the same man who became 
the Bishop of the St. Asaph diocese from 1225 until 1232.
73
  The lack of an 
organised chancery makes it difficult determine the full extent of the importance, 
and role of Llywelyn‘s scribal officers.  Whether the position of cancellarius, 
accorded to Instructus, was the same position that David, Philip and Abraham 
filled, or whether the term cancellarius was simply a title accorded to Instructus 
due to his simultaneous role of clerk to both Llywelyn and Henry III is unknown.  
Due to the limited nature of the sources, and the multiplicity of the men with the 
title ‗clerk‘ over the period of 1196 to 1240 it is doubtful whether the full extent 
of the role of the cancellarius in Llywelyn‘s government can be fully elucidated. 
 Llywelyn, as Prince of Gwynedd,
74
 was not able to closely oversee the 
administration of the localities within Gwynedd.  Instead, he employed local 
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administrators to govern the districts of his country.  The men who served 
Llywelyn on the local level made up a larger group than the officers of 
Llywelyn‘s court.  There were several different officials responsible for separate 
jobs within the administration of the localities.  The rhaglaw,
75
 the rhingyll, and 
the peace-keeping officials were among the various types of officers mentioned in 
the legal texts.  
 The office of the rhaglaw appeared not long before the thirteenth century.  
Stephenson argues that the rhaglaw developed to replace the maer and cynghellor 
as the leading local officials.
76
 He further argued that the title rhaglaw better 
illustrated the position as the representative of prince—here Llywelyn—in the 
localities.
77
  Llyfr Iorwerth gives the rhaglaw the responsibility of standing in the 
place of an accuser or prosecutor of a theft for which the plaintiff feels too 
frightened to charge the thief himself.
78
  Dafydd Jenkins notes that the alternation 
between arglwydd and rhaglaw in this section of the text in the ‗confused‘ manner 
suggests that the complier of Llyfr Iorwerth was aware that the ruler no longer 
preformed the function; rather it was his lieutenant who did so.
79
 The evidence of 
confusion regarding the role of the rhaglaw in Llyfr Iorwerth—its earliest 
manuscripts date from the thirteenth century
80—suggests that the position of the 
rhaglaw and his role was developing in the thirteenth century.  Stephenson 
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suggests that the rhaglaw was latinised to ballivus
81
 in the Latin law codes and in 
charters.
82
  If this is the case, Llywelyn‘s proscriptions for his bailiffs in Llŷn83 
near the church of Nefyn in a charter to Haughmond Abbey are written for his 
rhaglaw: ‗We prohibit those of our bailiffs or our heirs from exercising lordship 
over the land previously named of the canons.‘84  This suggests that, for the most 
part, Llywelyn trusted his rhaglaw to exercise lordship in his absence as his 
deputy.  Thus, Stephenson notes that they were responsible for awarding fines—
gobrau
85—on uchelwr86.87   However, if this post was developing in the early 
thirteenth century it is impossible to expect the details of the job of the rhaglaw to 
be fully developed in thirteenth century manuscripts of the law codes attributed to 
Gwynedd. 
 The obscurity, intricacy, and complexity regarding the roles of the lesser, more 
local officials of the Venedotian leader in the first half of the thirteenth century 
should not be overlooked or dismissed.  The role of the rhingyll also changed in 
the thirteenth century. Stephenson points to the fact that in the legal texts the 
rhingyll was the servant of the cynghellor; however, in post-conquest sources the 
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Faber, 1966), plate 33, plate 37. 
84
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rhingyll was the servant of the rhaglaw.  He uses these as evidence for the 
changing nature of local administration in the thirteenth century.
88
  The 
cynghellor, along with the maer, were officers who were in charge of the ruler‘s 
demesne land.
89
  The rhingyll acted as the apparitor—officer of a civil court—or a 
summoner in the Welsh law courts.
90
  The rhingyll in the law codes was the fourth 
officer
91
 addressed in the text of those who were not among the twenty-four 
officers that belonged to the ruler‘s court.92  The rhingyll appears in a description 
of the judicial court,
93
 he stands behind the cyngaws, the man who presents the 
case of the litigant.
94
 He therefore plays a nominal role as an overseer of 
Venedotian justice. Stephenson notes that from this nominal role in the law codes, 
the rhingyll evolved into a steward of the commotal llys.
95
 
 The other officials involved in the justice system of Llywelyn‘s government were 
the ceisiad.
96
  These men were in charge of controlling wrongdoers; they were 
permitted to stop, distrain, or suppress them, and in peaceful times were aided in 
this job by the teulu.  These men also replaced the maer and cynghellor who were 
granted the same roles in the law codes, thus removing these two officials in 
favour of the ceisiad, the rhingyll, and the rhaglaw.
97
  The role of the cais—
sergeants of the peace—in dealing with peacekeeping is illuminated in Llywelyn‘s 
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grant to Aberconwy Abbey on 7 January 1199.  ‗I granted, furthermore the same 
which if thieves or robbers or wrongdoers in the granges or lords or land of these 
monks by my attendants or ministers or other whoever they are capture or find, 
the monks themselves and their servants and familiars shall not be troubled on 
account of this, because to my attendants and ministers who protect the peace they 
are to consign important robbers, thieves and wrongdoers to investigate, prosecute 
and capture.‘98  This suggests that officers who served as officials to keep the 
peace had an important role in Llywelyn‘s governmental style.  He deliberately 
provided in his charter for his ‗policemen‘ to seize any thieves or wrongdoers; it 
can be assumed that Llywelyn maintained an interest in keeping his lands quiet 
and peaceful, rather than allowing the monks to harbour criminals who fled the 
justice of Llywelyn‘s court.   
 Stephenson highlighted the loyalty of the men serving the Venedotian leader as 
one of the necessities when governing Gwynedd.
99
  The creation of a recognised 
heir, designated by the ruler during his lifetime and associated with him, was 
designed to alleviate the problem of strife amongst the royal family.  The law 
codes provide for the heir, named the edling, to be selected from among the 
‗members of the king‘100.  Llyfr Iorwerth, the law code most closely associated 
with thirteenth century Gwynedd, elucidates the list of possible heirs: ‗Namely, 
the members of the king are the sons and the nephews and the cousins.  Some say 
all of them are edlings.  Others say no one is edling except the one given hope and 
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expectation by the king to him.‘101  The selection of an edling was meant to 
provide the ruler with a powerful ally to support his decisions, and possibly also 
to prevent the quarrelling of possible heirs upon the death of the ruler.  However, 
this was not always the case.  Despite Llywelyn‘s preference for his second--but 
legitimate in the eyes of the church--son Dafydd, over his firstborn, illegitimate 
son Gruffudd, Gruffudd twice rebelled against Llywelyn, seeking to claim that he 
should have been made edling.  The text of Llyfr Iorwerth illustrates the problem.  
There are two possible ways to determine the edling, either he is the one to whom 
the king gives ‗hope and expectation‘ or he is the one of the male members of the 
king‘s family and simply by virtue of that, is a possible heir.  However, despite 
this, Llywelyn couched his letters to the papacy in terms of his dislike of the 
partible inheritance practice of the Welsh.  ‗Soundly our petitions, delivered to 
you in succession, in which a certain detestable custom had grown in my land, 
hence it can corrupt the land bordering upon your sovereignty, that it should be 
easy to see the son of a handmaiden is an heir with the free son and illegitimate 
sons inherit just as the legitimate hold.‘102  Llywelyn had one interpretation of the 
law from Llyfr Iorwerth on his side for support in his decision to pick Dafydd as 
his successor.  Dafydd was one of ‗the king‘s members‘:  he was the son of 
Llywelyn and his English wife, Joan, and on the basis of that he could be chosen 
from amongst these ‗members‘ and then ‗given hope and expectation‘, i.e. named 
as heir.  Llywelyn also had the support of Pandulf, the Papal legate; Stephen, the 
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Archbishop of Canterbury; and Henry III, the English king for his decision to 
name Dafydd his heir.
103
  Moreover, in the summer of 1222 pope Honorius III 
confirmed the ordinance by which Llywelyn ab Iorwerth made provision for 
Dafydd‘s inheritance of Gwynedd.104   
However, an argument in favour of Gruffudd could be made that he was 
the eldest son of Llywelyn, and there is no differentiation in Welsh law between 
legitimate and illegitimate sons.  Nevertheless, the same law that allows for all 
possible ‗members of the King‘ as edling also provides for the disinheritance of 
possible ‗members of the King.‘  By providing these ‗members‘ with land, they 
become landholders and are thereby discounted from the position of edling.  ‗The 
edling and those who we named above will be of that status until they take land 
and after that against the land that take is his status all together, except this: if it 
happens that they obtain a settlement of villains the status of the land is raise to 
free land.‘105  The text suggests that the status of the ‗members‘ is dependent upon 
the king until they become landholders in their own right, when they gain their 
own status.  Gruffudd was given lands before 1220, and his status had thus 
changed from a ‗member of the King‘ or possible edling to an uchelwr, or land-
holder.
106
  Gruffudd, in fact, fell out of favour twice.  In 1221 his father reclaimed 
the lands he had given his eldest for support of Gruffudd‘s retainers and in 1228 
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Llywelyn imprisoned Gruffudd for a further six years.
107
  Given the relative dates 
of these disputes, it is probable that at least the first quarrel related directly to 
Llywelyn‘s preference for Dafydd as heir.  It was at Shrewsbury in May of 1220 
that Dafydd was recognised as Llywelyn‘s heir was recognised by the English 
court; although this recognition was missed out of the Welsh chronicles, 
Gruffudd‘s rebellion the following year was not.  Dafydd‘s position of edling was 
eventually accepted not only by Honorius III in 1222, but also by the magnates of 
Gwynedd; by May of 1230 Dafydd appears as a witness to Llywelyn‘s grant to his 
seneschal, Ednyfed Fychan, named explicitly as ‗our heir.‘108  Stephenson points 
that although Dafydd only succeeded his father in ruling Gwynedd upon 
Llywelyn‘s death in 1240, Llywelyn‘s choice was not a complete failure because 
Dafydd did maintain control of the central patrimony.
109
  This seems perhaps an 
oversimplification of the outcome; while Dafydd‘s rule of Gwynedd was not an 
unmitigated disaster, his control of Gwynedd relied upon the incarceration of 
Gruffudd and his sons in English hands and the influence his father had held over 
native Wales disappeared in Dafydd‘s hands.  
 Llywelyn‘s control of Gwynedd required more than just the support of his heir 
and an uncontested claim to leadership.  Llywelyn needed the support of his 
council and teulu—household retinue—to help him administrate Gwynedd.  
Llywelyn pointed to the importance of councillors in a letter to Henry III in 1228, 
stating he would be hard-pressed to come to a decision without the King‘s 
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councillors.
110
  The reason for Llywelyn‘s decision not to send his messengers 
until the king‘s councillors were with him is lost to history, and Stephenson 
argued that it echoed Llywelyn‘s bond with his own council.111  However, the best 
example of Llywelyn‘s deference to the powerful men in his country is in his 
letter to Eva de Braose in May 1230.  ‗And know that we cannot prevent the 
magnates of our land from making the justice which they made.‘112  Regardless of 
the issue of whether Llywelyn wanted to take justice upon William de Braose for 
his affair with Llywelyn‘s wife, Joan; the fact remains that Llywelyn could point 
to his magnates as people who could force change to Llywelyn‘s justice.   
 Little evidence remains of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth‘s internal structure and 
governmental style.  What can be gathered from the sources is that Llywelyn 
maintained a close circle of advisors who worked with him to shape both the 
external and internal policy.  However, this curia was not fully developed, nor was 
any other aspect of his governmental system.  During Llywelyn‘s rule of 
Gwynedd in the first half of the thirteenth century, the internal governmental 
system evolved, with new officers such as the ceisiad replacing older officers 
such as the maer and cynghellor of the law codes.  This does not mean that this 
process began in Llywelyn‘s rule, or that he was the driving force behind the 
changes. Rather, the confusion in the law codes and in the charters suggests that 
change was gradual.  The evidence suggests an evolving governmental structure 
that changed to meet the needs of the thirteenth century prince and the 
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expectations of the wider world of which thirteenth century Gwynedd was now a 
part.  These are not the innovations of Llywelyn, but rather part of a greater 
European shift, into which Gwynedd‘s older governmental style found itself 
forced to adapt. 
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CHAPTER 7  
THE CONSORT, JOAN: MORE THAN WIFE, LESS THAN PERFECT 
Llywelyn‘s wife, Joan, illegitimate daughter of King John and sister of 
Henry III, does not escape historical records as some of her predecessors did.  
While Joan did not go down in history for actively campaigning on behalf of her 
son through warfare, as Matilda had done, nor in her own right as her 
grandmother Eleanor of Aquitaine had, her actions are nevertheless recorded in 
the historical records of both England and Wales.  Her role at Llywelyn‘s court 
has been picked over in a variety of studies.  Robin Chapman Stacy studied the 
comparative expectations of a Queen with Joan‘s role and the implied criticism by 
Welsh Jurists compiling legal codes now known as the ‗Iorwerth‘ redaction.1  She 
has been studied as an example of consort behaviour by Louise Wilkinson
2
 and 
her infidelity has been picked apart, discussed, and considered in terms of 
Llywelyn‘s relationship with the Braose clan by J. J. Crump.3   
 Joan was the ‗natural‘ or illegitimate daughter of John of England.  In the 
spring of 1226 Joan applied to be declared legitimate by the church.
4
  This 
application for legitimacy would not have been necessary had Joan been to date 
accepted as a legitimate daughter.  Messer, in her study, notes that the 
Tewkesbury Annals claim one ‗Queen Clemencia‘ as Joan‘s mother, but provides 
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no viable identification for Clemencia.
5
  Wilkinson is more specific, pointing out 
that Joan is the ‗only identified illegitimate daughter‘ of John and on this basis 
suggests that he took an interest in her welfare – in 1203 the Norman pipe roll 
recorded the expenses for a ship to carry ‗the king‘s daughter‘ from Normandy to 
England.
6
  
 In 1204, Joan was betrothed to Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.  It appears this 
marriage was the brainchild of John, and not Llywelyn, who was in the process of 
arranging his own marriage to another princess, this one the daughter of the Manx 
King, Reginald.  In fact, in April of 1203, Llywelyn secured papal approval for a 
marriage between himself and the Manx princess, who had been previously been 
betrothed to his uncle Rhodri.
7
  Llywelyn‘s actions indicate that as of April 1203, 
a marriage-alliance with the daughter of the English King was not considered.  
However, in February of 1204, Pryce notes Llywelyn was not adverse to using 
Church doctrine for his own ends and that he had a volte-face with regards to his 
Manx bride, when he provided the papal court with four witnesses that testified to 
the consummation of the marriage between Rhodri and the Manx princess. This 
provided the prohibited degree of kinship between Llywelyn and the princess to 
void both the childhood betrothal and adult marriage, thereby freeing Llywelyn 
from the bond with Reginald‘s daughter.8  This seems to indicate that Llywelyn, 
unsurprisingly, saw his marriage to the Manx princess as less politically 
significant than an alliance with the English King.  That John instructed the sheriff 
                                                 
5
 Messer, Dana, ‗Medieval Monarchs, Female Illegitimacy and Modern Genealogical Matters: Part 
II: Joan of England, c. 1190-1236/7,‘ Foundations for Medieval Genealogy, Vol 1, 2004, pp. 294-
298, p. 296. 
6
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 82. 
7
Pryce, Native Law p. 84-85. 
8
 ibid, p. 85. 
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of Shropshire to hand over to Llywelyn 20 librates (that is to say, 20 pieces of 
land with value £1pa each) of land which ‗we have given with our daughter‘ in 
October of 1204, suggests that a betrothal between Joan and Llywelyn had been 
finalised by this point.
9
  Ellesmere, too, was handed to Llywelyn in March of 
1205, with the royal charter that recorded the settlement written at Dover, 3 weeks 
later.
10
  There is a bit of uncertainty as to the exact date of Joan‘s marriage to 
Llywelyn, with the Annals of Chester recording it in 1204 and the Worcester 
Chronicle as 1206.
11
 However, in either case it is clear that by 1206, Llywelyn 
was married to King John‘s illegitimate daughter.   
 The marriage of Joan to Llywelyn proposed significant political 
advantages for both rulers.  The alliance between the English crown and 
Venedotian household was not without precedents.  In 1175, Llywelyn‘s uncle 
Dafydd had married Emma, the illegitimate sister of Henry II, in order to protect 
his lands against royal interference.
12
  Although the Welsh texts are silent on the 
marriage of Joan and Llywelyn, it is certainly possible that Llywelyn had similar 
expectations of his own marriage.  When considering the repudiated marriage to 
the Manx King‘s daughter and the attendant naval support, it is clear that 
Llywelyn was expecting not just Ellesmere, but also some sort of political or 
military concessions in exchange for his marriage to John‘s illegitimate daughter.  
                                                 
9
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 83 & Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum, vol. 1, p. 12.  
10
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 83 & Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum, vol. 1, p. 23, and Rotuli Chartarum, p. 
147. 
11
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ 83. Also, ‗Rex Johannes filiam suam Nocham Lewelino principi Wallie dedit 
et cum ea castellum de Hellesmer.‘—Annales Cestrenses, pp. 48-49. and ‗Lewelinus desponsavid 
filiam regis post Ascensionem.‘—Annales Monastici, Henry Richards Luard, Rerum 
Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, Vol IV, London, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869, 
p. 394. 
12
 Brut: RBH, pp. 164-165.  The reason presented for the marriage is also stated in Peniarth 20. 
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 However, Joan was more than a mere representation of the Anglo-
Venedotian alliance; she appears repeatedly as an instrument, acting either for 
husband or father.  After his disastrous losses to John in 1211, Llywelyn sent Joan 
as envoy to her father to negotiate Llywelyn‘s surrender.13  It appears that Joan 
was trusted in this job not only by Llywelyn, but also by ‗the leading men‘ upon 
whose council he sent his wife.
14
  Wilkinson noted that the Worcester annalist 
confirmed Joan‘s role in Llywelyn‘s surrender and pointed out that Joan‘s 
position as Llywelyn‘s wife ‗directly influenced‘ the terms of the resulting 
agreement.
15
  Were Llewellyn to die without direct male heirs from Joan, then 
Llywelyn‘s lands would revert to the English Crown.16  Wilkinson suggests that 
Joan‘s position as Llywelyn‘s wife ‗directly influenced‘ this particular term of 
settlement, forcing Llywelyn to adopt the English (and canon law) style of 
recognising the claims of heirs born in wedlock before those claims of other, 
illegitimate, offspring, including Gruffudd.
17
  She implies that this concession to 
the wider European inheritance practice, sanctioned by canon law, was a 
stipulation added because of Llywelyn‘s marriage to Joan and created the 
‗possibility that [Llywelyn‘s] lands might escheat to John on his death.‘18  
However, the second part of the clause could be seen to weaken this argument.  
Llywelyn quitclaims to John all the land ‗apart from the lands that it pleases him 
to give to my son and mine.‘19  This phrase implies that John would potentially 
return part, or all, of Gwynedd to Llywelyn‘s illegitimate son to hold as a gift of 
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ibid, pp. 190-193. 
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 ibid, pp. 190-193. 
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 Wilkinson, ‗Joan‘, p. 85. 
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 Pryce, Acts, no. 233, p. 387.  For full text of Llywelyn‘s submission, see Appendix B.  
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 Wilkinson, ‗Joan‘, p. 85-86. 
18
 ibid, p. 86 
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the English Crown.  Although the potentiality of Gruffudd‘s inheritance is limited 
directly by the lack of a direct heir by Joan‘s body, the generosity of the English 
Crown and the limitations of land held by direct ‗gift‘ of the English Crown, it 
does not explicitly exclude Gruffudd from any prospect of ruling a client 
Gwynedd.  This limits the eventuality of any of Joan‘s influence over the future of 
Gwynedd to a specific circumstance; that she has a son.  Wilkinson is correct in 
assuming that part of this clause, wherein a son of Llywelyn and Joan—in effect, 
Dafydd—inherits his land directly from his father without reference to the English 
Crown was influenced by the position of Joan as both Llywelyn‘s wife and also as 
John‘s daughter, may not have existed had Llywelyn not married the daughter of 
the English King.  But that is the extent of her involvement in this treaty.  John‘s 
aims, however, were grander.  It seems that with the 1211 submission of 
Llywelyn, John was providing for a more pliable ruler in the successive 
Venedotian generation than Llywelyn had proved to be.  Either John would see a 
grandson of his own blood, reared by his daughter, in charge of North Wales, or 
alternatively, a youth who had grown to manhood as a hostage in England, 
holding a part of his patrimony solely by gift of the Crown.  
 As with Joan‘s involvement in Llywelyn‘s submission at Aber in 1211, 
Joan‘s letter to John a year later could have two possible interpretations.  Just as 
John was preparing his newest invasion into Gwynedd, in order to subdue 
Llywelyn‘s revolt, John received two letters, both attesting to the fact that were he 
to invade Llywelyn‘s lands, his own barons would revolt against him.  One of 
these came from Joan and contained ‗secret‘ letters pertaining to the threat to 
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John.
20
  Wilkinson is uncertain as to Joan‘s motives suggesting ‗some sense of 
filial loyalty towards her father, even in the face of Anglo-Welsh conflict‘ but 
acknowledging despite this that the timing was critical for Anglo-Welsh affairs.
21
  
Joan‘s packet of letters, along with the supporting confirmation from William the 
Lion, the Scottish King, halted John‘s planned invasion of Gwynedd.  This 
allowed Llywelyn to quickly reclaim the Perfeddwlad.  Joan‘s actions—sending 
both warning, and supporting letters—could easily be construed as the work of a 
double agent.  The problem with this type of interpretation is that there is little 
supporting evidence, beyond Wendover‘s report, that would support the idea of 
Joan as a spy.  There are no further packets of letters sent to John or other reports 
that suggest John acted upon intelligence gathered by Joan, acting as a spy on her 
husband.   
The obvious alternative is that Joan‘s package of letters was sent on 
Llywleyn‘s orders to scare off John‘s invasion.  The problem with that concept is 
that Joan was not the only one reporting the rebellion of John‘s barons; William of 
Scotland provided independent confirmation of Joan‘s claim.  There is nothing to 
suggest that Alexander colluded with Llywelyn in stopping John‘s invasion of 
Gwynedd.  Further to that, it seems unlikely that Llywelyn would collude with 
rebellious barons against John, only to sell them out in an effort to keep John out 
of Gwynedd.  When taking into consideration Llywelyn‘s continued alliance with 
the baronial revolt through 1218, it seems unlikely that he would have betrayed 
them at that early stage.  This leaves Wilkinson‘s suggestion that Joan sent the 
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 These letters are only preserved as a reference in Matthew Paris‘s Chronica Majora.  p. 534.  
See Chapter 2, page 54, note 17.  
21
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 86. 
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letters in a fit of loyalty to her father, not as a spy or an agent of Llywelyn‘s, as 
the most plausible explanation.      
 Whatever the intentions of Joan in sending those letters to John in 1212, 
she appears repeatedly in the records petitioning her father on behalf of Llywelyn.  
There is evidence that it was Joan‘s petitions that secured the release of four 
Welsh hostages in December 1214, and a fifth in January of 1215.
22
  It appears 
that even as the hostilities between John and Llywelyn grew and Llywelyn took 
steps to cement his alliance with the rebel barons, Joan was working on 
Llywelyn‘s behalf to protect those hostages still living which Llywelyn had 
surrendered against his compliance with John in 1211.  In fact, Joan‘s actions in 
safe-guarding her father in 1212 may have increased her influence in getting the 
five hostages released.  Further to that, it is clear that Joan was playing the 
daughter card well, as John expressly released Gwyn ab Iorwerth to ‗our beloved 
daughter, Joan‘.23   
John‘s death in 1216 may have ended Joan‘s direct relationship with the 
English King, but it may not have ended her role as intermediary between 
Llywelyn and the English Crown.  Wilkinson argued that in her role as mother, 
‗although there is no direct evidence for Joan‘s participation, it is likely she 
helped to safeguard her son‘s future‘ in 1220, by supporting an application to have 
Henry recognise his half-nephew, Dafydd, as heir to Gwynedd.
24
  However, 
circumstances point to another interpretation of there being a lack of documentary 
evidence to Joan‘s role in the ascendancy of Dafydd.  Wilkinson herself admits 
that Joan‘s position as an illegitimate half-sister to Henry carried less political 
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 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 86 and Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, pp. 125, 126.  
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 Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, p. 126.  
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 Wilkinson, ‗Joan‘, p. 87. 
 161 
 
weight than Hubert de Burgh and the Earl of Pembroke, both of whom were 
enemies of Llywelyn.  In fact, Joan was not entirely silent in these years.  In 
February of 1220, Joan seems less concerned with the succession of her son to 
Gwynedd, as she is concerned that Henry is being misadvised as to the person of 
Hugh de Lusignan.
25
  As further proof that Joan‘s intercessions held little weight 
in the minority government of Henry III, it was Llywelyn who appealed directly 
to Henry regarding his men in Stuckley, the manor Llywelyn held in free marriage 
from John.
26
  
Although not a consideration at the time of her marriage to Llywelyn, 
Joan‘s illegitimacy presented an obstacle to Llywelyn‘s argument for choosing 
Dafydd as his heir over Gruffudd.  As discussed previously, Llywelyn requested 
papal and English support and recognition of Dafydd on the grounds of his 
legitimacy in 1222.
27
  At this point, Joan‘s illegitimacy may have become an 
issue.  To support Dafydd‘s right to the Venedotian inheritance, sometime before 
April of 1226, Joan formally applied to Honorius III to be declared legitimate in 
the eyes of the church.
28
  This was granted explicitly so that Joan‘s birth did not 
detract from the legitimacy of her husband and son.  Wilkinson argued that this 
application on Joan‘s part was evidence of her fulfilling one of her more 
important roles according to medieval conventions.
29
  Dana Messer has taken this 
argument further, suggesting that legitimisation would have strengthened Joan‘s 
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ties to the English royal court and ‗her family‘s position in royal society.‘30  This 
idea seems superfluous; by 1226 Joan had been acting as envoy between the 
Venedotian and English courts for over fifteen years.  Furthermore, as noted 
above, Joan‘s wrote often to her brother Henry III on family matters as well as 
Welsh affairs.   
Joan was, in fact, a regular visitor to the English court, and Wilkinson 
notes Henry seemed genuinely fond of his half-sister.
31
  Joan was with Llywelyn 
and Dafydd at Shrewsbury in August of 1226, when Henry granted her a manor in 
Shropshire,
32
 and in March of 1227 Henry exempted her manors from a tallage 
levy.
33
  Wilkinson claims it was due to his ‗high-regard‘ for Joan, that although 
reclaiming Rothley and Condover, Henry had undertaken conciliatory measures 
towards Joan during the Ceri campaign.  He allowed Joan‘s officials to remove 
her beasts and chattels and had the sheriff of Shropshire return the corn Joan had 
wanted planted at Condover.
34
  Wilkinson interprets Henry‘s actions regarding 
Joan‘s English manors as an inducement to aid his diplomatic overtures with 
Llywelyn.
35
  Considering Henry‘s relationships with his Lusignan half-siblings,36 
this may have been Henry‘s approach to maintaining familial loyalty.   
Joan continued to negotiate between Llywelyn and Henry, appearing more 
regularly in the records once Henry began to act on his own.  In September of 
1224, Henry issued a safe conduct to Joan, allowing her to visit him at 
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 Messer, ‗Part II, Joan of England,‘ p. 297. 
31
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Worcester.
37
  Similarly, when the truce was concluded after the disastrous Ceri 
campaign of 1228, Joan was issued a safe-conduct to visit the King at 
Shrewsbury.
38
  Wilkinson interprets this action by Henry as hopeful, suggesting 
that he saw Joan as his intermediary with Llywelyn.
39
  However, Wilkinson also 
attributes Henry‘s pleasure in the results to Joan‘s actions alone, noting in regard 
to her visit to Shrewsbury that ‗her efforts were rewarded with the return of 
Rothley in November.‘40  This seems a little over-simplified.  While Joan may 
have been instrumental in serving as a go-between for Henry and Llywelyn, it is 
clear that both sides intended to conclude a truce, and Joan was not the sole 
ambassador for Llywelyn.  In fact, the truce with Llywelyn had been concluded 
before Joan joined Henry at Shrewsbury at 1228.  Furthermore, it took until 
September of 1229 for Llywelyn and Dafydd to formally perform homage to 
Henry, ending the conflict.  Although Joan was in attendance at the English court 
with both her husband and son, she was not there as diplomatic envoy, but rather 
as consort and sister.
41
  This is not to suggest that Joan‘s status as wife of 
Llywelyn and her presence at Henry‘s court did not act to persuade her brother 
into being more favourably inclined towards Llywelyn; merely, it is an 
overestimate of Joan‘s role as diplomat that her influence concluded treaties both 
men clearly sought. 
 In 1230, Joan‘s affair with William de Braose undermined her position in 
the Welsh court.  Wilkinson argues that Joan‘s twenty-five year actions as 
‗capable consort‘ to Llywelyn, a woman who produced the needed male heir, 
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secured her son‘s future as heir to Llywelyn, and acted as envoy between the 
English and Welsh worlds in which she moved, made her adultery ‗shocking‘.42  
As discussed previously,
43
 Joan was found in her bedchamber with William de 
Braose on Easter day, 1230. William was hanged within a few weeks, and Joan 
confined.  Wilkinson viewed Llywelyn‘s reaction to his wife‘s infidelity as 
‗extreme‘ while simultaneously noting that adultery was ranked alongside 
apostasy, heresy, and excessive cruelty as grounds for ending marriages under 
canon law, and Welsh laws were similarly harsh for infidelity by wives.
44
  Kate 
Norgate did not describe Llywelyn‘s actions in quite such strong language, instead 
suggesting Llywelyn encouraged Joan‘s infidelity, in order to rid himself of 
William de Braose.
45
  As this interpretation is gathered from the Margam Abbey 
chronicle, which stated that Llywelyn only ‗suspected‘ Joan and William because 
of a long-standing dispute between William‘s grandparents and the native Welsh, 
and Wilkinson noted Margam was heavily patronised by the de Braoses,
46
 this 
seems unlikely.  Furthermore, J.J. Crump‘s studies disagree, presenting a cogent 
argument against the idea, pointing to the difficulties that Llywelyn faced in the 
aftermath of the de Braose execution.
47
  As discussed previously, Llywelyn‘s 
plans for a marriage between Dafydd and de Braose‘s daughter, Isabelle, and 
subsequent expansion of his influence in southern Wales were endangered by 
Joan‘s infidelity and William‘s subsequent execution.48   
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 More interesting is how Joan is perceived in the chronicles.  Wilkinson 
suggests that the chroniclers were ‗neutral‘ in tone when it came to relating the 
adultery itself, and points out that the annalists were more concerned with the 
actions of the ‗male protagonists‘ to record much about Joan.49  However, Brut is 
generally minimalist with respect to details, so the fact-based accounts of Joan‘s 
adultery cited by Wilkinson from Peniarth and the Red Book, are not dissimilar 
from the rest of these annals.  More importantly, Wilkinson noted that the Chester 
annalist referred to Joan as ‗the woman‘50 interpreting this failure to name Joan as 
part of the annalists preoccupation with the actions of William and Llywelyn 
rather than Joan.  There are two other possible interpretations of this refusal to 
name Joan.  The first is that the chronicler‘s disgust with Joan‘s actions was so 
powerful that he referred to Joan only as ‗the woman‘ as a form of censure.  The 
second possible interpretation is that the Earl of Chester pressured the annalist not 
to name Joan in order to protect his wife, Joan‘s daughter, from being shamed by 
her mother‘s actions.  However, it would have been impossible for the Earl to 
prevent Joan‘s name from being associated with her actions, and given that 
neither Llywelyn nor Henry sought to stop Joan from being associated with her 
actions to protect either Dafydd, or any of her daughters, this seems unlikely.   
 Joan‘s infidelity had the potential to cast serious doubts upon the 
legitimacy of Dafydd.  Having advanced Dafydd‘s claim over Gruffudd‘s on the 
basis of his status as Llywelyn‘s sole legitimate son, and furthering the position 
with the application for Joan to be declared legitimate, the knowledge that Joan 
had committed adultery could have seriously weakened Dafydd‘s status as son 
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and heir to Llywelyn.  Wilkinson states categorically that this ‗was simply not 
allowed‘ to be a problem for Dafydd‘s future.51   
 Despite the troubles brought upon Llywelyn by Joan‘s actions, and the 
censure she undoubtedly received, Joan was back at Llywelyn‘s court by 1231.52  
Wilkinson suggests several possible options for Llywelyn‘s reconciliation with his 
wife, including the ‗strength‘ of their earlier relationship, his need of her ‗talents 
as mediator‘ in 1231-1232, and possibly intercessions on the part of Henry.53  She 
does not suggest the possibility of a Welsh repugnance towards divorce.  In a 
persuasive article on divorce in medieval Welsh law, Robin Chapman Stacey 
suggests that the long list of items partitioned during a divorce in the Iorwerth 
redaction, was in fact, ‗a homily on the evils of divorce.‘54  Stacey points out that 
many of the items were divided in such a way as to render them useless to either 
recipient, such as the top and bottom of the quern, the coulter and ploughshare, 
and the coarse and fine sieves.
55
  Furthermore, he notes that the passage on 
division of movable goods in the event of divorce was moved to a more prominent 
place in the text.
56
  He suggests that the Iorwerth compiler was commenting 
specifically upon the separation of Llywelyn and Joan, by implying divorce was 
‗a purveyor of infertility‘57 and points out that the redactor has ‗deliberately 
extended the material...to make his point on the futility of divorce as strong as he 
could.‘58  If the Iorwerth compiler was echoing the consensus of the Welsh, this 
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indicates Llywelyn may have felt pressure, not from Joan‘s family, but from his 
own people, to take her back.   
This is interesting, especially in light of how the compiler viewed Joan‘s 
role in Llywelyn‘s court.  In a separate article, Stacey argues persuasively that the 
Iorwerth version of the ‗laws of court‘ carefully redefines the Queen‘s role in the 
court to criticise Joan‘s role in Llywelyn‘s.59  In Iorwerth, ‗the Queen‘ is entitled 
to eight officers,
60
 the steward,
61
 the priest,
62
 the chief groom,
63
 the chamberlain,
64
 
the handmaid,
65
 the doorkeeper,
66
 the cook
67
 and the candleman.
68
  This is up 
from the original four, and includes three that are entirely new, and represents her 
increase in status in the royal household.
69
  Stacey suggests this increase in 
household officials may suggest that Joan frequently maintained a separate 
household from Llywelyn,
70
 but it could also have evolved either during Joan‘s 
estrangement from Llywelyn in 1231 or from individuals she brought with her 
from England in 1205.  However, the authority of the Queen and her officers in 
Iorwerth were limited to an extent not found elsewhere.  For example, in Iorwerth, 
the Queen‘s steward can only protect an offender while he escorts the man as far 
as the king‘s steward, whose protection is far further reaching.71  Stacey notes that 
this limitation is not present in the Latin codes or the Cyfnerth or Blegywryd 
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redactions.
72
  Furthermore, she points out that in Iorwerth, the queen is 
synonymous with the chamber, whereas the king is linked with the court and 
household, and that this comparison creates a difference between the ‗political‘ 
court and the ‗domestic‘ chamber.73  Although Stacey acknowledges that a 
separate chamber envisioned for the queen seems to mirror the continental and 
Anglo-Norman royal arrangements that developed in the thirteenth century, with 
queens holding separate households and chambers from their kings, he points out 
that in Iorwerth, this arrangement is carried to the extreme.  In fact, Joan‘s 
recurring role as mediator and envoy places her so securely in the King‘s 
politicised court of the Iorwerth redaction, that the compiler‘s representation of 
the queen as separate, domestic, non-political, with limited power almost feels 
like a parody.  Stacey argues that in reality, the Iorwerth queen represents a 
specific criticism of Joan‘s politicised role, either a dislike or distrust of Joan as 
an individual, or her actions on behalf of Llywelyn.
74
 
If the Iorwerth redaction of the Welsh lawcodes did explicitly react to 
Joan‘s role and actions as Llywelyn‘s consort and wayward wife, and the 
commentaries on divorce and the limitation on the role of the ‗queen‘ in the 
Venedotian court are a direct reaction to Joan‘s role at Llywelyn‘s court, then it is 
worth noting that Joan‘s role did not change after her infidelity.  Sometime after 
her incarceration, Joan wrote to Henry in order to dispel the discord that had been 
fostered between himself and her husband.
75
   Assuring him of Llywelyn‘s sincere 
affection for him, Joan warns against those who are fostering the discord and 
                                                 
72
 Stacey, ‗King, Queen, and Edling,‘ p. 56. 
73
 ibid, p. 58-59. 
74
 ibid, p. 61-62. 
75
 Pryce, Acts, no. 280, p. 447.  See chapter 5 for a full account of the dating of this text.  
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requests that Henry trust Joan‘s clerk, Instructus.76  Instructus is acting as Joan‘s 
envoy in this occasion, rather than Joan herself, but it is clear that, despite her 
infidelity, Joan is still acting on behalf of her husband as a mediator in Anglo-
Welsh disputes.  More importantly, this supports Wilkinson‘s suggestion that 
Llywelyn still needed Joan as an intermediary between himself and Henry, and 
that this may have been one consideration in his decision to reinstate Joan‘s 
position within his court.
77
   
Joan clearly held an important position in Llywelyn‘s court.  The daughter 
of an English king, she may not have brought Llywelyn the protection against 
royal interference that Dafydd ap Owain had expected from Emma, but she did 
prove a very useful consort for Llywelyn.  As his wife, Joan provided Llywelyn 
with an heir, served as intermediary and envoy to the royal court, negotiated a 
surrender and even prevented a potentially ruinous punitive invasion.  Her actions 
may not have always been popular with the Welsh, and her role as consort may 
have been criticised, but it is clear that Joan was not relegated to the background.  
Joan died in 1237 and Llywelyn founded a Franciscan friary in her name at 
Llanfaes.
78
  Not every action Joan undertook can be perfectly interpreted as 
supporting Llywelyn and in fact, some of her actions were direct threats to his 
plans.  However, she was still revered by Llywelyn upon her death. 
                                                 
76
 ‗Super quo non minus doleo propter vos quam propter dominum meum, presertim cum sciam 
quam sincerum affectum habebat et adhuc habet dominus meus egra vos, et quam inutile sit nobis 
et periscolum, salva reverential vestra, verso amicos amittere et iminicos proe amicis habere.  ... 
Ad hec sciatic, domine, quod iniustissime suggerunt vobis nonnulli suspicionem habere de 
Inst(ru)cto et vestro et domini mei cleric, quo non credo vos posse habere in Angl(ia) vobis 
fideliorem clericum, sic me  dues adiuvet; nec ideo minus fidelis est vobis, si fideliter agit negocia 
domini sui, quia eodem modo se habet in agendis vestries coram domino suo; nec vos nec aliquis 
in ipso poset confidere, si domini sui tepide vel negligenter negocia tracteret.’— ibid, no. 280, p, 
447.  
77
 Wilkinson, ‗Joan,‘ p. 92. 
78
 Brut: RBH, pp. 234-235. 
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CHAPTER 8  
THE MYTH IN THE MAN 
 Llywelyn ab Iorwerth has perhaps not reached the fame of his grandson, 
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in popular contemporary culture, but Llywelyn is still ‗The 
Great.‘  When speaking of the native Welsh hero, he is revered for uniting Wales 
against the forces of English invasion.  From David Moore to J. E. Lloyd, to 
Roger Turvey, historians interpret Llywelyn‘s successes with the authority of 
certainty.  Llywelyn‘s mistakes were mere stepping-stones to his successes; the 
learning curve foreshortened in the creation of a Welsh hero.  Unfortunately, this 
is the fate of many successful leaders whose achievements gain the veneration of 
their nation and is, to some extent, understandable.  The historian is asked to 
divorce modern nationalism and patriotism from his research, to interpret the 
known events and what remains of the supporting evidence in an unbiased 
manner.  It is because historians need to interpret rather than merely report, 
creating a more complete picture of events, that one can find evidence of national 
partiality, particularly where pride exists.  
 This nationalism, a modern construct, when applied to the medieval world 
seems immediately absurd and it is dismissed.  Historians do not acknowledge it; 
they look at Llywelyn within the construct of thirteenth-century Europe.  
Llywelyn is studied in relation to his affairs with England, with his fellow Welsh 
rulers, with the church, and with constructs of strong personal rulers.  Yet, if the 
average Welshman is asked about Llywelyn Mawr, they say that Llywelyn fought 
for Wales.  Llywelyn was a Welsh prince.  He wanted an independent Wales.  
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How was this Welsh hero created and perpetuated?  Where does the myth stem 
from, and what effect, if any, does it have on the historiography of Llywelyn? 
 It is the ‗Poets of the Princes‘, the twelfth to thirteenth century court poets 
that first elegise and elevate Llywelyn to the role of hero.  The Welsh lawcodes 
state that the bardd teulu
1
 must sing five poems, one to God, one to the ‗King‘, 
and then after an intermission by the pencerdd, a further three ‗of some other 
kind.‘2  The other main court poet, the pencerdd—chief of song—was not one of 
the king‘s officers as the Bardd teulu was, but was one of the most respected 
bards of the kings court.  The two posts were virtually indistinguishable by the 
12th century, if they ever were in fact separate, and many of the court poets from 
Cynddelw Prydydd Mawr and his successors in the princely court of Gwynedd 
sang as both poets as the occasion required.
3
  
The poet Llywarch ap Llywelyn, was one of the many beirdd who served 
Llywelyn as a court poet.  Llywarch wrote mostly awdlau to Llywelyn.  Awdl is 
roughly translated as ‗ode‘.  It is meant to be confined to lines of 8 to 9 syllables 
in a mono rhyme sequence, although the poet can alter the position of the main 
rhyme or insert an internal rhyme into the sequence.  The awdlau of Llywarch 
sing the praises of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Prince of Aberffraw.   
Llywarch was a political poet, serving a political and diplomatic prince, 
when he worked for Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.  Hurlock notes that it was well within 
the rights of the poets to criticise the princes and to advise them on conduct.
4
  
                                                 
1
 the poet of the household or poet of the warband 
2
 ‗Pan venher canu kerd, e bar kaderyavc a decrau; e kentaf o Duv, a’ eil o’r brenhyn byeyffo e 
llys... Guedy e ard cadeyravc e bard teylu byeu canu tri chanu o kerd amgen’—Llyfr Iorwerth, 
§13, p. 10. 
3
 Jenkins, Dafydd, ‗Bardd Teulu and Pencerdd,‘ in Welsh King and his Court, pp. 142-166, p. 163.  
4
 Hurlock, ‗Counselling the Prince,‘ p. 24. 
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Llywarch‘s poetry is certainly not removed from politics.  However, he is 
remarkably one-sided about every political triangle Llywelyn faced.  Emulating 
the ideal forged in the poetry of Llywarch‘s predecessors, the Cynfeirdd,5 
Llywarch perceived the actions of the Welsh, and particularly the Vendotian 
leaders, as justifiable, no matter the cause.  His poetry decries the actions of 
England and the English crown, and praises Llywelyn for actions towards 
England which would have ensured derision had he acted that way against 
someone else.  Llywarch wrote: ‗Llywelyn‘s assault, renowned helm of Britain / 
Pledge to England he spurns / Thousand bards‘ patron, praise-anointed / 
Ferocious, he makes for the field‘6  Llywarch, here, praises Llywelyn for breaking 
faith with John after 1211.   
Among the qualities credited to Llywelyn by Llywarch was generosity.
7
 
Llywelyn was also gracious, merciful, fearless, valiant and fearsome in pursuit.
8
  
These qualities are not unique to Llywelyn, appearing elsewhere in descriptions of 
other rulers by both Llywarch and other gogynfeirdd.  However, Llywarch also 
praises Llywelyn‘s looks.9  Moreover, the term ‗pryd’ refers specifically to the 
appearance of a person; here Llywelyn‘s beauty means his looks.  This is the first 
evidence that Llywelyn was considered a ‗beautiful‘ or handsome man.  However, 
there are far more references to Llywelyn‘s battle prowess, and his skills as a 
warrior and commander than to his being handsome.  Llywelyn is the first among 
                                                 
5
 Early Poets – c. Ninth to eleventh century.  
6
 Tremyn Llywelyn, llyw ryddyrch—Prydain / Pryd i Loegr ei dissyrch, / Milfeirdd glydwr, glod 
Neintyrch, / Moes terwn, maes twr a gyrch--Gwaith Llywarch ap Llywelyn ‘Prydydd Y Moch’.  
Ed.Elin M. Jones, and Nerys Ann Jones, in Cyfres Beirdd y Tywysogyon Vol 5. Caerdydd: Gwasg 
Prifysgol Cymry, 1991. No. 20, Lines 29-34, p. 189. 
7
 ‗Hyddn Lyerlyn, hydolawg—I feirdd‘—Llywarch, no 20, line 9, p. 189. 
8
 ‗Gwrhydri Benlli, ban llocher—ys gwlyd,/Is gwledig cymynner,/Ys gwrdd yni‘I gorddiner,/Ys 
gorddrud ffwyr ddylud ffer.‘—ibid, no. 20, lines 21-24, p. 198. 
9
 Draig Brydain ei bryd a‘i nerth/A‘I deall guall gannerth‘—ibid, No 17, lines 35-36, p. 164.  
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many, the great leader of the Venedotian people.
10
  Similarly, Llywarch references 
Llywelyn‘s title as prince of Aberffraw.11  This reference to the title Llywelyn 
adopts around 1230
12
 is intriguing, as Llywarch‘s death in 1220 means it predates 
the stylistic titular change in Llywelyn‘s acta.  It is perhaps even possible that 
Llywarch is setting the stage for Llywelyn‘s new title.  The idea of a chief leader, 
common throughout his poetry and the term is used quite frequently. There are 
also references to the mythic king Arthur, whom Llywarch compared to 
Llywelyn.
13
  The Welsh embraced the mythic Arthur as their own and he appears 
among the Welsh legends as one of the great leaders.  Here, the comparison of the 
mythic king who fended off the Saxons and was the chief leader of the Britons in 
their battle against the Saxons is clearly stated.  Llywarch sees Llywelyn as 
another Arthur leading the Vendotian people to battle against the evil English.  
This image of Llywelyn appears to permeate modern interpretations of the prince, 
and his life.  This is partly because the poets and their elegiac poetry, fuelling the 
image of a heroic Llywelyn, have been used by historians as sources.  But these 
are not the only places where the story of Llywelyn‘s greatness has survived in 
popular memory. 
 Gelert was, according to the Welsh myth, Llywelyn‘s ‗faithful hound‘.  
Although the tale differs slightly in each re-telling, the crux is the same.  A 
‗faithful hound‘ guarding a sleeping child, is discovered beneath the overturned 
cot, blood round its mouth, and then is slain by the angry father.  The child is then 
discovered un-harmed, a dead wolf nearby.  The story of why Gelert was with the 
                                                 
10
 pendragon, draig un ddengmlwydd‘ ibid, no. 17, line 31, p. 164. 
11
 ‗Llywelyn, o liwiaw—gwendorf, / Gwyndeyrn Aberffraw‘ --ibid no. 17, 45-46, p. 165. 
12
 See above, chapter 3,(pp. 91-100) for a discussion of Llywelyn‘s titular changes 
13
 Hy byddai Arthur, eirthiaw hyn—a‘I lu, / Eilyw oedd o‘I gylchyn, / Milwr gwlydd milwr gryd 
gryn, / Mal ydd wyt heddiw, hyddyn. –Llywarch, no. 20, lines 5-9, p. 189. 
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child depends on the edition of the tale.  In Siân Lewis‘s adaption of Elena 
Morus‘s children‘s tale, Gelert stays behind to watch over Llywelyn‘s son on 
orders from his master.
14
  Borrow, similarly records that Llywelyn left ‗his infant 
son in a cradle, in his tent, under the care of his hound Gelert, after giving the 
child his fill of goats milk.‘15 But the poet William Robert Spencer, wrote that he 
simply fails to accompany his master on his hunting trip.
16
  
This legend, carved in stone, stands as fact in the small Snowdonian 
hamlet of Beddgelert, where they claim that Llywelyn named their town after his 
faithful hound.  However, Michael Senior notes that it was not always the lure 
used in guidebooks.  In 1778, Thomas Pennant described both the church and 
monastic history of the settlement at Beddgelert, but mentions nothing in his 
Tours in Wales about Gelert, the hound, or his grave.
17
  When edited and re-
published by John Rhys, the Jesus Professor of Celtic at Oxford, in 1810, Rhys 
notes only the improvement to the houses of the area, and nothing of a tale of a 
prince and a dog.
18
  In fact, the first mention of the hound in a guidebook is in 
Borrow‘s tale of his travels in Wales, where he devotes a chapter to the town and 
legend of Gelert.
19
  Using David Erwyd Jenkin‘s book Bedd Gelert, Its Facts, 
Fairies and Folklore, forwarded by John Rhys, Senior notes that Thomas Jones of 
Bryntirion, founded the Bedd Gelert Hotel to replace the less savoury 
accommodation already available in the town to travellers drawn from nearby 
                                                 
14
 Morus, Elena and Siân Lewis, Stories from Wales: Gelert, Llanrwst, Gwasg Carreg Gwalch, 
1997, p. 6. 
15
 Borrow, George Henry, Wild Wales: it’s people, language and scenery, Vol. II, London, John 
Murray, 1862,  p. 147. 
16
 Spencer, Beth-Gelert, or the Grave of the Greyhound, York, 1815. 
17
 Senior, Michael, Faithful Hound: Beddgelert and the truth about it’s legend, Llanrwst, Llygad 
Gwalch, 2009, pp. 17-18. 
18
 ibid, pp. 18-19. 
19
 ibid, p. 26.  Borrow, Wild Wales, ‗Chapter XIV‘, pp. 147-149. 
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Carmarthen.
20
 The name Gelert, for the hound, and the story‘s placement at 
Beddgelert appears to have been the addition of David Prichard from South 
Wales, the tenant-manager of the Bedd Gelert Hotel
21
 in 1802.
22
  Although the 
cairn of stones marking the grave is regularly visited by tourists, it does not date 
from the medieval period, but rather, in 1861, William Jones recorded that it had 
been placed there by Prichard and Richard Edwards, the parish clerk.
23
  
Furthermore, that the tale had been imported, wholesale, from elsewhere in 
Wales.
24
  The myth seems to have exploded quickly in popularity; certainly, by 
1811William Robert Spencer made it the subject of his rather famous ballad, 
‗Beth Gellert‘.25  But as a mythological tale, is not that distinct from the similar 
tales focusing on the rash actions of scared parents when their beloved pets save a 
child.  Senior notes its similarity to ‗Kalilah wa Dimnah‘ from the Pancatantra of 
Indian legend.
 26
  In that case, it is a Brahmin who beats to death a mongoose who 
killed a cobra who threatened the life of the Brahmin‘s son.  He points that the 
tale was translated into Latin between 1263 and 1278 – and printed for the first 
time in 1480.  He noted the English translation by Thomas North dated to 1570, 
and also points to the Welsh version of the tale contained in ‗Chwedlau Saith 
Doethion Rhufain‘ in the Red Book of Hergest,27 a late fourteenth century 
compilation that includes not only historical chronicles, such as Brut, but also 
tales such as The Dream of Rhonabwy and the four branches of the Mabinogion.  
                                                 
20
 ibid, pp. 30-31. 
21
 Later the ‗Royal Goat‘ after the Bryntirion family coat of arms, a goat climbing among 
mountains and the visit of Prince Arthur in the 1870s.–ibid, pp. 30-31. 
22
 ibid, p. 31. 
23
 ibid, p. 32. 
24
 ibid, p. 34. 
25
 First published 11 August, 1800 at Dolmelynllyn (Dolgellau).–ibid, p. 36. 
26
 ibid, pp. 42-43. 
27
 Jesus MS 111 127v, (column 527) – 134v (column 555).  
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In the RBH version, it is a knight who, at the insistence of the child‘s mother, 
slays the hound that had saved the child from a serpent.
28
  In France, ‗Guinefort‘ 
was the dog who saved a baby from a snake while his father, the knight, was out 
hunting.  Although never officially canonised by the Church, the local cult of 
Saint Guinefort, has been venerated near Lyon since the 13
th
 century.
29
  The 
attribution of Gelert as the hound, Llywelyn as the knight and Beddgelert as the 
place, are much later editions of an older tale, but ones that indicate his 
importance in the national psyche.   
 The reality of Beddgelert is perhaps more striking.  Gerald of Wales 
mentions it as the ‗Mirror of the Church,‘ an order of Culdees at Snowdon.30  
Moreover, Llywelyn made a grant to Beddgelert priory,
31
  pointing to the 
establishment of the community, and the name, long before Prichard associated 
the tale with the place.  Senior points to the foundation of the religious community 
here for the creation of the place-name, Beddgelert.  He argues that Celer (not 
Celert)
32
 was the foundation ‗saint‘ of the local religious community and that 
‗somewhere here is [his] grave.‘33  Celer was a local Welsh saint in 
Carmarthenshire, and two Churches dedicated to St. Celer exist.  One at 
Llangeler, east of Newcastle Emlyn,
34
 and a second chapel dedicated to the saint 
in Llandysul.  In fact, St. Mary‘s Church at Beddgelert shows evidence of being 
                                                 
28
 ibid, 128v (Col 530) line 38, 129r, (Col 532) line 18. 
29
 Senior, Faithful Hound, p. 44.  
30
 ibid, p. 59. 
31
 Pryce, Acts, p. 347. 
32
 Bartrum argued ‗Celert‘ was a ‗back-formation‘ from Beddgelert, and could not have been 
‗genuinely Welsh‘ because of the ‗rt‘ combination.  Instead, he suggested the name Celert came 
from the English ‗Kill-hart‘ linking it to the ‗faithful hound‘ legend, but once again, when 
considering the age of the priory in Beddgelert, this seems unlikely.—Bartrum, Peter C.  A Welsh 
Classical Dictionary, Aberystwyth, National Library of Wales, 1993, pp. 118. 
33
 Senior, Faithful Hound, p.  63. 
34
 Bartrum, Welsh Classical Dictionary, p. 118. 
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part of a major priory, with work around the west door of the church dating from 
1220-1240 and further archaeological evidence from excavations in the mid 19
th
 
century shows grave coins dating from the reign of Henry III.
35
  While Llywelyn 
founded a Franciscan house at Llanfaes for his wife upon her death, it seems 
unlikely that he would have founded a priory for his hound, regardless of how 
faithful! 
 One certainty is that Llywelyn and his faithful hound have been useful for 
the tourism of Beddgelert, and Wales in general.  Despite the age of the original 
tale, the fact that Llywelyn had been co-opted into the role of mistaken-avenger 
by the late eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries illustrates the growth of his 
position as a Welsh national hero.    
 Barrow‘s book—with Gelert‘s legend contained within—increased 
nineteenth-century English awareness of Wales as a separate nation.
36
  This is just 
one small aspect of a larger movement.  Although mainly centred around 
Presbyterian nonconformity, the appearance of Welsh Language newspapers, such 
as Y Diwygiwr, and Yr Amserau point to the movement‘s gathering strength.  
Morgan pointed out that although political nationalism had been ephemeral, the 
disestablishment of the Welsh Church, the development of the University of 
Wales and the revival of Welsh language and literature, lead to a surge of Welsh 
scholars.
37
  It is against this backdrop that Lloyd wrote his History of Wales from 
the Earliest Times.  Published in 1911, it is not surprising that Lloyd sought to tell 
a narrative of a continuous history of strong, independent Welshmen.  In doing 
                                                 
35
 Senior, Faithful Hound, pp. 63-65. 
36
 Morgan, K. O, ‗Radicalism and Nationalism,‘ in A. J. Roderick, ed., Wales through the Ages, 
Vol. II, Aberystwyth, Christopher Davies, 1960, pp193-200, p194.    
37
 ibid, p. 199. 
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this he interpreted Llywelyn‘s successes, and his wider hegemony in the best 
possible light, whilst downplaying his failures. 
 Nor was Lloyd alone, Philip Jenkins noted that the need to interpret Welsh 
history in terms of its greatest heroes continued to the point that it forms the 
structure of the GCSE course in Welsh schools.
38
  Unfortunately, this has set the 
tone for future Welsh historians.  Turvey‘s recent monograph on Llywelyn echoes 
Lloyd heavily.  Focusing primarily upon Llywelyn‘s achievements and 
minimising his failings, his work borders upon hero-worship rather than historical 
debate.  Davies is generous when considering the aftermath of Llywelyn‘s death.  
Moreover, the fact that Llywelyn‘s career is one of the most heavily studied in 
medieval Welsh history belies the complex nature of Llywelyn‘s career.  The 
pick-and-mix nature of scholarly articles as allowed historians to study the 
highlights of Llywelyn‘s rule.  There are some exceptions to this; Insley‘s study of 
Llywelyn‘s early years is an exception to this.  His close look at the 1190s 
acknowledges not only the problematic nature of the sources and its limitations in 
creating an accurate picture of Llywelyn‘s actions, but also the limits to Llywelyn 
actual power in Wales during this time.
39
  Walker‘s frank discussion of Hubert de 
Burgh‘s career in Wales is far less laudatory towards Llywelyn.40  That is not to 
suggest that historians have actively shied away from addressing the more 
dispiriting aspects of Llywelyn‘s rule, but rather that the complexities of his less 
successful periods are lost often lost in the detail of focused articles.   
The problem with this lies in Llywelyn‘s popularity as a Welsh national 
hero.  The national consciousness that gave rise to Llywelyn being attributed with 
                                                 
38
 Jenkins, Philip, A History of Modern Wales, 1536-1990, London, Longman, 1992. 
39
 Insley ‗Wilderness years,‘ pp. 163-173.‘ 
40
 Walker, ‗Hubert de Burgh and Wales,‘ pp. 465-494. 
 179 
 
the Gelert still has an effect on the general population.  Recently, Llywelyn‘s 
reputation as a Welsh hero has been illustrated in his role as a central character of 
not one, but three separate novels of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  Probably the best known
41
 of these is Sharon Kay Penman‘s Here be 
Dragons,
42
 a historical fiction romance focusing primarily upon the life and 
relationships of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Joan and King John.  First published in 
1985, it is primarily a romance centring upon ‗Joanna‘ and Llywelyn, but attempts 
to put their lives and love in the wider context of the Anglo-Norman world.  
Llywelyn comes across as larger than life, a highly successful monarch, intelligent 
and insightful, and committed to the cause of Welsh independence.  Although the 
characters in the book attribute Llywelyn‘s successes to luck, it is clear that 
Llywelyn is master of his own destiny, and a skilful one at that.
43
  In Penman‘s 
                                                 
41
 Currently, the bestseller of the three novels on the international internet bookseller Amazon; it is 
ranked 92,135
th
, compared to 167,325
th
 for The Heaven Tree and 7,732,684
th
 for the disastrous 
Ascent of an Eagle in the USA and in the UK the ratings are similar: 11,936, 344,289, 1,318,781 
respectively.  –http://www.amazon.com/Here-Dragons-Sharon-Kay-
Penman/dp/0312382456/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1303973822&sr=8-1,  
http://www.amazon.com/Heaven-Trilogy-Green-Branch-
Scarlet/dp/0446517089/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1303973893&sr=1-1, 
http://www.amazon.com/Ascent-Eagle-Gaius-
Demetrius/dp/1424119987/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&qid=1303974043&sr=1-3-spell, 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Here-be-Dragons-Sharon-
Penman/dp/0140133402/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1303973552&sr=8-1; 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Heaven-Tree-heaven-tree-
trilogy/dp/0751504734/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1303973656&sr=1-1; 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ascent-Eagle-Gaius-
Demetrius/dp/1424119987/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1303973738&sr=1-3.  Rankings 
correct as of 28 April 2011.  
42
 Sharon Kay Penman, Here be Dragons, New York, Ballantine Books, 1993. 
43
 ‗There are men who be born lucky.  All their lives, fortune does favor them, does play the whore 
for them.  My brother Richard was one, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth is another.  And he is clever 
enough, ambitious enough and ruthless enough to one day rule all of Wales if he is not reigned 
in.‘—Penman, Dragons, 179. 
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book, Llywelyn manages to outwit John at his surrender in 1211.  Insulting the 
king and surviving, Llywelyn admits only his submission to superior forces.
44
     
Penman is careful with the details, admitting to a ‗factual liberty‘ in 
placing Llywelyn‘s capture of Mild to April rather than January of 1199 and even 
cites the use of Bartrum‘s Welsh Genealogies for both the additional third son and 
the brother of Llywelyn she adds to round out her characters.
45
   
However, in creating Llywelyn the hero, she clearly relies heavily on 
Lloyd for her interpretations of his successes.  Lloyd remarked that Llywelyn‘s 
‗power began to be felt‘ in 1199 with the capture of Mold Castle, comparing it to 
Owain Fawr‘s similar glory.  Penman echoes this, when she gives Llywelyn 
voice: ‗My grandfather took Mold Castle, too, Rhys.  The garrison held out for 
three months before yielding, and he later said it was his sweetest victory ever.‘46  
Penman‘s Llywelyn is remarkably astute and insightful throughout.  Although she 
introduces him as a ten-year old boy, these qualities are consistent throughout his 
life in her book.  This echoes Lloyd‘s constant admiration of Llywelyn‘s actions, 
even in his early years.
47
  In fact, in Penman‘s Dragons’ Lair, a less factually 
based historical mystery set in 1193, under Dafydd ab Owain‘s rule in Gwynedd, 
Llywelyn, the rebel, appears as a main protagonist, remarkably sure of himself 
and astute in his interpretations of events.
48
  Moreover, her main character 
                                                 
44
 ‗I submit myself unto the King‘s will...Would it not make more sense to speak of hard, 
irrefutable facts, of power?  You‘ve won.  I admit your victory, acknowledge your authority as my 
King and liege lord.‘—ibid, p. 342. 
45
 ibid, p. 702. 
46
 ibid, p. 109. 
47
 Lloyd, History of Wales, p. 587-590; See also refuting arguments, above in Chapter 1.   
48
 Penman, Dragon’s Lair,  London, Penguin Books, 2005, pp. 87-97, 218-224, 256-2635, 267-
276, 295. 
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respects Llywelyn because he is both clever and lucky, which would be ‗good for 
Wales‘ but not so for England.‘49  
Penman‘s Llywelyn is definitively a Welsh nationalist.  It is Wales that 
Llywelyn seeks to see, free of English influence or interference.
50
 Llywelyn 
expressly states this early on, ‗My people ... speak to the difficulties of dwelling in 
England‘s shadow.‘51  However, Penman‘s Welsh nationalist interpretation of 
Llywelyn does not always echo Lloyd.  When King John arranged the marriage of 
Joan with Llywelyn, Lloyd praised the fact Llywelyn had forged a ‗close tie with 
the king‘ and pointed towards the marriage between Emma and Dafydd ap Owain 
as evidence the marriage ‗proved of very great service.‘52  Penman recounts the 
marriage alliance in John‘s words, ‗This marriage...is the answer to so much...  It 
was an inspired solution to the Welsh problem.  I do...secure a border for England, 
all for the price of one castle and a wedding wing.  Rarely has a war been so 
cheaply won...‘53  In Penman‘s version, Llywelyn also gains a promise from John 
that he will not interfere when Llywelyn attacks Gwenwynwyn,
54
 adds that 
Llywelyn ‗would have been utterly mad... to refuse.‘55  Historians have only 
speculated on the possible aims both parties had for the marriage alliances, and 
certainly, none have gone so far as to suggest that Joan‘s marriage to Llywelyn 
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prevented a war, but it is likely Llywelyn was gaining military advantages from 
this marriage.
56
   
Penman has created, in ‗Joanna‘, a character that vastly resembles 
Wilkinson‘s interpretation.  Joanna is torn, trapped between her father and 
Llywelyn, and sends the 1212 packet to John to both save her father and protect 
her husband.
57
  Similarly, Joanna‘s reconciliation with Llywelyn after the 1230 
affair echoes Wilkinson‘s suggestion of the strength of their previous 
relationship.
58
  However, Penman‘s Joanna serves less of an envoy, only once 
truly negotiating on behalf of Llywelyn, in 1211, when she begs for Llywelyn‘s 
life and the security of Gwynedd for her son.
59
  The rest of the time, Joanna is less 
of a political figure, bemoaning the fact that to Llywelyn, Wales will always come 
first.
60
 
Penman‘s novel is popular and has been reprinted at least once a decade 
since the original publication, both in the UK and the United States, where the 
author lives.
61
  Her Llywelyn is believable, and constantly presented as a Welsh 
hero, fighting for Wales.  Penman, herself admits that ‗historical novelists can do 
... damage, almost as much as Hollywood screenwriters.‘62  She acknowledges the 
difficulties in avoiding the creation of false impressions of historical persons 
when bringing them to life and elaborating upon events that have only the barest 
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background. She argues that in all her works of historical fiction. she has tried to 
stay as close to the ‗truth‘ as possible, and used her author‘s notes to address any 
inconsistencies.
63
  
In Edith Pargeter‘s 1960 novel The Heaven Tree, Llywelyn first appears in 
mention only, as one of the Welsh who ‗raided almost daily.‘64  Historical events 
are only dealt with in passing, normally through discussion between the 
protagonist Harry Talvace and his patron Isambard, as they pertain to the central 
story.  John‘s losses on the continent, his attack on Ireland and invasion of 
Gwynedd in 1211 is dealt with in passing,
65
 to create mood and set the scene, 
characters relate the wider world to Harry.  However, there are a few places where 
Pargeter acquits Llywelyn of actions that could be construed as questionable.  
During his submission to John, Llywelyn blames Harry‘s patron Isambard, ‗You 
are he who put into his [John‘s] mind to believe that I was conspiring with de 
Breos.‘66  Llywelyn was not attacked in 1211 because he was suspected of 
conspiring with William de Braose, but rather his attacks on Gwenwynwyn‘s 
lands in 1208 and his growing hegemony in Wales were perceived by John as a 
threat.
67
  
Despite the fact that Harry grew up in Shropshire, he is always respectful 
of Llywelyn and it is Isambard that portrays the anti-Welsh sentiment.  Llywelyn 
is lauded by Harry for not attacking England, whilst the rest of the native Welsh 
rulers rose up against John.
68
  Isambard claims John will not touch Gruffudd 
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because he fears Llywelyn‘s wrath,69 argues that John spared Gruffudd to isolate 
Llywelyn from the rest of the Welsh, and that Joan sent the news of the rebellion 
of the English barons in order to scare off John‘s invasions.70  Isambard in 
contrast to Llywelyn, is Pargeter‘s ‗petty English lord‘, someone biased in his 
approach to Llywelyn, casting blame upon him, perceiving him as a threat, and 
refusing to visit court, despite royal command, while Llywelyn is in residence.
71
  
Moreover, it is Harry who takes in Llywelyn‘s foster-son ‗Owen‘ and then 
protects him when Isambard was ordered by John to hang the boy.
72
 
Gaius Demetrius‘s Ascent of an Eagle, can also be accused of glorifying 
Llywelyn.  In Demetrius‘s book, Llywelyn is introduced as ‗wiry and tall‘, 
‗athletic‘ and ‗even by the extraordinary standards of medieval Europe, a devout 
Catholic.‘73  Remarkably undeveloped for a main character, Llywelyn is only a 
hero in as much as Demetrius repeats it.  Repeatedly referring to him as a ‗noble‘, 
Llywleyn is credited with ‗almost legendary and unbreakable power‘; he is ‗a 
magnificent and beloved ruler.‘74  This repetitive statement of Llywelyn‘s 
greatness only serves to highlight the author‘s lack of study of any scholarly 
research as well as to illustrate his inability to create a realistic or multi-faceted 
character.  Llywelyn is only ‗great‘ because Demetrius insists upon it, repeatedly.  
Llywelyn is also innocent of any ambition or avarice when it comes to his Welsh 
neighbours.  Safe in his mountainous sanctuary at Dolwyddelan, Llywelyn has to 
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be encouraged into uniting with Gruffudd ap Cynan against Dafydd.
75
  Llywelyn 
is also reluctant to attack Hywel, despite Hywel‘s attack on Bangor.76  Llywelyn 
must be ‗tricked‘ into invading Powys in 1208 by Joan.77  And it is Joan, in her 
guise as English mole, who suggests the idea of Llywelyn as ruler of a united 
Wales.
78
  
The rest of the characters are similarly one-dimensional.  Tangwystl, 
despite all evidence to the contrary, is named Llywelyn‘s wife and ‗Queen‘ and 
merely stands to support Llywelyn and approve his decisions.  Joan is slightly 
more interesting, but still lacks breadth.  Sent to Wales as an emissary in 1201 to 
negotiate a truce,
79
 she is also expressly tasked by John with enticing Llywelyn 
from Tangwystl.
80
  Llywelyn proves incorruptible, but Joan encourages Hywel to 
kill Tangwystl so that she can marry Llywelyn instead.
81
  Once married, Joan 
relentlessly pursues the preferment of her son, Dafydd,
82
 and the ambitions of 
John.
83
  However, she suffers an inexplicable about-face and suddenly declares 
her love for her husband.
84
  Llywelyn‘s friend and confidant, Ednyfed ‗Vychan‘, 
is flat; supposedly a military hero, he is called for his so-called ability to 
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safeguard the Snowdonian mountains from the English King.
85
  John is 
remarkably one-dimensional and predictably malevolent in the way painted by 
any contemporary chronicler of ‗evil King John.‘  In order to convey his love of 
power, John is addressed as ‗Most Excellent and Unsurpassable Majesty‘86 to add 
to Demetrius‘s inflated sense of royal authority, and further portray John‘s wicked 
nature, John beats and then has shot a turncoat Welshman for failing to bow, 
asking for a reward, and bringing dated intelligence.
87
 William de Braose appears 
as ‗the Ogre of Abergavenny‘88 and Hywel ab Gruffudd is the only character to 
come even realistically to life as a petulant teenager envious of Llywelyn‘s power.  
However realistic the sour and miserable the teen is, Demetrius can‘t resist the 
need to inform the audience that he is an antagonist, Hywel is ‗pale and spotted,‘ 
‗repulsive‘ and ‗skeletal‘ using unfavourable description as a crude device to 
portray Hywel‘s inward depravity.89  When Hywel betrays Llywelyn to John, he 
decays even more, becoming ‗horrible to behold‘ with ‗grotesquely disfigured 
flaps of skin‘ on his face.90    
The narrative voice is also poorly constructed.  It may have been that 
Demetrius was trying to emulate the medieval chroniclers, but the directives read 
more like stage directions than narrative transitions.  More distressing than the 
author‘s continual break in narrative voice, are factual inaccuracies that could 
have been addressed with even limited research.  Demetrius‘s story bears only a 
nominal relationship to the life of Llywelyn or Anglo-Welsh history in the late 
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twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.  Not only has Demetrius absolutely no 
understanding of native Wales, her rulers,
91
 laws or inheritance practices,
92
 but in 
his naivety, he makes sweeping erroneous statements.  In reference to Llywelyn‘s 
attack on Mold, he stated that a Welsh attack on ‗English territory‘ was 
‗inconceivable‘ and ‗alarming.‘93  Alarming it may have been, for Mold was a 
significant outpost for the Earl of Chester, but Llywelyn‘s attack was neither the 
first, nor the only Welsh attack on Anglo-Norman border castles.
94
  Nor was the 
attack on Mold an attack on England; the Anglo-Welsh border was far more fluid 
than Demetrius envisions.
95
  Worse is his suggestion that under Llywelyn, by 
1210, Gwynedd was equal in wealth to England and the Angevin treasury.
96
     
However, Demetrius‘s knowledge of the names, places, and events 
suggests that he has clearly drawn from some source, even if these have been 
misunderstood.  It is entirely possible that he consulted modern historians.  
Although, Lloyd‘s History of Wales focuses exclusively upon the pre-eminent 
ruler in Wales, it does mention both the 1197 attack on Aberystwyth and 
Gwenwynwyn‘s attack on Painscastle,97 both events that distract Demetrius.  
Similarly, Davies‘s Age of Conquest discusses both the fratricidal wars that 
divided the Lord Rhys‘s lands upon his death and Gwenwynwyn‘s bid for 
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hegemony in the wake of Lord Rhys‘s death.98  However, as noted above, 
Demetrius lacks the nuanced understanding of Welsh ideas of kingship, 
inheritance, and identity.  It would be impossible to consult these texts without 
retaining some sort of understanding of medieval Wales.  Moreover, the use of 
‗King‘ for the rulers rules out Turvey‘s Welsh Princes,99 and Turvey‘s Llywelyn 
the Great was published after Demetrius‘s book.100  What Demetrius must have 
consulted primarily, is something with less nuance.  I would suggest Brut as this 
source; the random shifts in the storyline to accommodate events that are 
seemingly unimportant to the story of Llywelyn coincide with Brut‘s timeline.  
The jolt from Llywelyn‘s tale to Maelgwn‘s attack on Aberystwyth and 
subsequent capture of his brother, does little to feed Demetrius‘s tale, and the 
similar digressions about William de Braose illustrates absolutely no 
understanding of the complexities of William‘s relationship with John.  Demetrius 
has clearly ignored any events that either paint Llywelyn in an unfavourable light, 
or present a version of Welsh rule outside his vision.  Gruffudd ap Rhys is handed 
over to William de Braose, rather than Gwenwynwyn in 1197,
101
 Hywel 
encourages Maelgwn and Gwenwynwyn to attack Llywelyn in 1211, rather than 
John,
102
 and Joan does not report Llywelyn‘s alliance with the barons to her 
father.
103
  As Joan‘s packet to John was the only evidence suggesting she served 
as spy for her father, an idea Demetrius seized upon, ignoring Joan‘s letter and its 
aftermath illustrates Demetrius‘s need to create a hero in Llywelyn.  Instead of 
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forestalling the invasion, in Demetrius‘s story, John‘s invasion takes place, and 
Llywelyn is victorious. 
Ultimately, Demetrius‘s story fails as historical-fiction.  It bears little 
relevance to the events in twelfth and thirteenth century Gwynedd and her 
neighbours.  However, it illustrates a keen point.  The synopsis, and author‘s 
website, claim that Llywelyn was the focus of this travesty because he was 
‗Wales‘ greatest hero‘104 ‗who does not receive anything like the attention he 
deserves as a true hero of history‘105 and that Demetrius ‗attempted to make it as 
historicaly [sic] accurate as possible.‘106  Demetrius was clearly influenced by the 
popular mythology and hero-status of Llywelyn the Great and sought to create 
what he felt was an accurate portrayal of the hero.  Demetrius‘s book illustrates 
that the glorified, nationalised myth of Llywelyn far outweighs, in popular 
conception, the historical research of the academic scholar. 
 The Welsh poet and play-write, Saunders Lewis, also addressed Llywelyn 
in 1954 with his play ‗Siwan‘.  First produced in 1956 and performed as recently 
as 2008 by the Theatre Genedlaethol Cymru
107
 on tour, from May 20 until June 
14, ‗Siwan‘ is still part of the Welsh national consciousness.108  ‗Siwan‘ is a three-
act play, the first act of which takes part in Joan‘s bedchamber.  Joan,109 
obviously, is the adulterous wife, but is treated with sensitivity.  She may be an 
adulteress, but she still seems worried about her husband‘s reaction to de Braose‘s 
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intrusion into his chamber
110
 and spends much of the time babbling about their 
upcoming marriages and politics
111
 until William calls her on it.
112
  Llywelyn 
looms large in Act I, initially as the great bogeyman, the husband that Joan fears.  
But his return changes all, as he strides in, the aggrieved husband, laughing 
bitterly at William‘s excuses.  Act II focuses upon Joan.  Although initially 
fearing for herself, Joan becomes distressed and falls to the floor in a faint on 
hearing of William‘s sentence.113  What is most striking is that Lewis captures the 
mood of the Welsh, when Joan has Alis, her maid, open the window, and hears 
the chants ‗Death to the Frenchman/ Hang the Braose‘.114  This conveys the 
disgust of the Welshmen that, according to his letter to William‘s widow, forced 
Llywelyn to hang William.
115
  Joan‘s grief leads her to curse Llywelyn when he 
appears at the end of the scene, ‗See the hell of my grief, my curse upon you, 
Llywelyn!‘116  Llywelyn‘s anger is stronger, but interestingly, his grief seems 
more sincere as he questions his decision to hang William.
117
  Moreover, 
Llywelyn is softer in the final act, sharing news, admitting his need for Joan, both 
out of love and for political expediency, and telling Alis, ‗to be weak is to be 
human.‘118  Llywelyn may not be the ultimate hero, but in Lewis‘s play there are 
none.  De Braose hung for acting the seducer, Joan was punished for her love and 
lust, and Llywelyn remains a ruler, but a hurt, humanised prince in Lewis‘s play.  
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It is a testament to Llywelyn‘s ‗greatness‘ that his story survives in so 
many modern formats.  However in many cases, the facts get obscured by 
nationalistic pride and the desire for a great and enduring story. While this may be 
understandable for the purposes of entertainment, it becomes problematic when 
claims of historical accuracy are made. Although historians are required to apply 
their own interpretations to cold facts and records of events, they must take care 
not to cross the line, lest they be compared to the amateur historians whose more 
biased literary works are designed to appeal to, and even inflame, an already 
strong sense of Welsh nationalism.  Although Llywelyn ab Iorwerth is ―the 
Great‖, it is clear that he has become even more so with the passage of time, and 
the keen story-telling culture of the Welsh people.   
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CONCLUSION 
 By any measure, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth was ultimately a successful Welsh 
Prince.  By the time of his death in 1240, he had united the native Welsh into 
federation that could withstand the combined pressures of the individual 
ambitions of the Welsh nobility, as well as those of the Anglo-Norman Marchers 
and the English crown.  He had stemmed the onslaught of Marcher advance into 
native Welsh territories and obtained external recognition of his achievements as 
‗Prince of Aberffraw, Lord of Snowdon,‘ not ‗one of many‘, but the voice heeded 
by the Welsh and English alike.  Proclaiming himself leader of all native Wales, 
he sought even to make the position hereditary, encouraging the native Welsh to 
swear allegiance to his son, ensuring Dafydd‘s status as Llywelyn‘s heir.    
These are not inconsiderable successes.  Llywelyn achieved as much as 
any of the Welsh leaders of renown; like the ninth-century Venedotian King, 
Rhodri, and his grandfather, Owain Gwynedd before him, Llywelyn earned the 
epithet ‗Mawr‘ for his achievements in uniting the Welsh under one ruler.1  
Laying claim to a titular style that separated himself from other native rulers 
indicated his primacy amongst the native Welsh, and like the Lord Rhys,
2
 
Llywelyn achieved recognition by the Crown as the leader and prince who kept 
maintained peace and kept his fellow Welsh in line.  The poets, chroniclers, and 
historians who have praised Llywelyn in the centuries since his death for his 
successes were not wrong in their assessment of his achievements; his successes 
were indeed ‗Great‘.   
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Historians who have therefore presented Llywelyn as a great Welsh hero, 
are not wholly wrong in their assessment.  However, although he united the native 
Welsh rulers, stalled the Marcher advance, and limited the interference of the 
English King in Wales, they are overly generous in their assessment of these 
successes.  The status Llywelyn had earned and attempted to pass on to his 
descendants was not enduring and this ultimate failure cannot be dismissed simply 
because it came after his death.
3
   
Llywelyn‘s career was bloody and war-torn.  He gained his patrimony not 
by direct inheritance, but at the point of his sword.  In order to do so, Llywelyn 
first allied with his uncle and cousins, before turning on them in succession, or 
pitting them against each other, in a bid to become the sole surviving edling.
4
  He 
augmented his holdings the same way, wresting control of both castles and land 
from English and Welsh neighbours with little regard to the aftermath of his 
actions.  Llywelyn was clearly intelligent and a gifted military leader, his early 
successes on the field and his ability to play his fellow edlings off against one 
another was what led to him being the recognised ruler in North Wales by 1201.  
The method by which Llywelyn rose to prominence in Gwynedd marks 
the tone of his initial relationships with his fellow Welsh rulers.  Llywelyn was 
not nostalgic in his alliances or his quest for power; his alliances with his cousins, 
and probably, his uncle Rhodri, lasted only as long as they supported his aims in 
dispossessing Dafydd.  Within a few years of the exile of Dafydd, Llywelyn‘s 
self-interest is apparent in his expulsion of Maredudd from Llyn and his hand is 
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clear in the further dispossession of Maredudd from Meirionnydd by Hywel ap 
Gruffudd.  Llywelyn‘s interest in expansion did not stop at Gwynedd‘s borders.  
Llywelyn repeatedly sought to extend his own holdings, most notably when it 
came to the lands held by Gwenwynwyn in Powys.  His capture in 1202 of 
Penllyn, Ederion, and the Castle of Bala are illustrative of his ambitions, as are his 
further attacks in 1208 on Powys and Ceredigion while Gwenwynwyn was in 
John‘s prison.  The fact that Maelgwn ap Rhys destroyed several castles ‗from 
fear of Llywelyn,‘5 supports the contention that Llywelyn was focused upon the 
aggrandisement of himself and Gwynedd at the point of a sword. 
Although there is evidence that Llywelyn did form some alliances when it 
suited him, such as those with his cousins in the 1190s and his support of the joint 
letter from the Welsh rulers to Innocent III at the close of the twelfth century, 
alliances with fellow Welsh leaders in the years before 1211 are few and rarely 
maintained for long.  However, Llywelyn‘s defeat in 1211 changed the nature of 
his relationship with his fellow Welsh leaders and his approach to alliances in 
general.  By 1212, Llywelyn had joined his erstwhile enemies: Gwenwynwyn, 
Maelgwn ap Rhys, Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor and Maredudd ap Robert, in 
rebellion.  It is there that there is a clear shift in the focus of Llywelyn‘s 
relationships with his fellow Welsh rulers.  Working jointly with the other Welsh 
against the greater threat of the might of the English crown replaces the petty 
interests in land aggrandisement within native Wales.   
This is not to suggest that Llywelyn lost his self-interest in light of the 
interests of an ‗independent Wales.‘  Rather, what becomes clear is a new 
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approach to holding power within Wales on the part of Llywelyn.  Instead of 
dispossessing fellow rulers, he seeks their recognition as the leader and 
spokesman of the native Welsh.  In fact, in a letter to Philip Augustus in the same 
year, Llywelyn ‗bound [the other Welsh rulers] together in the friendship of this 
treaty‘6  It is clear here, and again in 1218 with the peace agreed between 
Llywelyn and the English crown that it is Llywelyn who negotiated on behalf of 
the Welsh princes as a whole.   
Llywelyn‘s primacy among the Welsh princes is reinforced several times 
in the succeeding decades.  It was Llywelyn who called the Welsh princes to a 
meeting to reapportion the lands in South Wales amongst the local leaders in 
1216.  His summons for an attack on Rhos and Pembroke in 1220 is evidence of 
his position within the Welsh, as were the appearance of his fellow Welsh in his 
repeated military campaigns of the 1220s an 1230s.  The fact that Llywelyn could 
protect his position amongst the Welsh princes with the fealty pledged to Dafydd 
as Llywelyn‘s heir at Strata Florida in 1238 further illustrates how accepted his 
position had become by the end of his life. 
In contrast to Llywelyn‘s successes as a leader and spokesman, the ninth 
and tenth century rulers able to lay claim to extended hegemony within Wales 
appear to have done so largely by their strength as war leaders.  Rhodri Mawr 
(d.878) appears to have claimed his greatness from his ability to conquer 
neighbouring Welsh kingdoms and withstand Danish invasion at the same time.
7
  
Hywel Dda, who could lay claim to the title ‗by the grace of God, ruler of all 
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 Pryce, Acts, no. 235, p. 393. 
7
 Lloyd, History of Wales, Vol. 1, pp. 324-326. 
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Wales‘8 is better remembered for his supposed role in the creation of the Welsh 
Law codes, than how he acquired his titular position amongst the Welsh.  
Moreover, Gruffudd ap Llywelyn‘s successes were also founded upon his military 
might.
9
  Davies points out that it was the ‗dazzling successes of Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn‘ that created a unity within Wales under his rule.10  The successes of 
these Welsh rulers were clearly fleeting.  The same goes for the successes of the 
Lord Rhys in the south and Owain Gwynedd in the north in the twelfth century.  
None of these rulers left dominions that retained the same hegemony into the 
succeeding generation.  Although Llywelyn‘s military successes were not used to 
impose unity on the other Welsh, uniting them under his rule, but rather to support 
a confederation of princes with Llywelyn at its head as spokesman, it was not for 
lack of trying.  What his predecessors had managed by sword, Llywelyn managed 
through alliance and support.  Despite this, his successes remained just as fleeting.  
His attempts to pass the position he had gained onto his heir, Dafydd, were 
ultimately unsuccessful. 
However, Llywelyn‘s status amongst the Welsh by the end of his life, 
although ephemeral, has foreshadows the successes of his grandson Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd.  That Llywelyn, ‗The Last,‘ was described by Lloyd as ‗not only the 
foremost of the princes of Wales,
11
 but also the single force which is of any 
account in Welsh politics.‘12  As early as 1258, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, unlike 
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, was able to lay claim to the title ‗Prince of Wales‘ as well 
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 Davies, Age of Conquest, p. 24. 
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 ibid, pp. 25-26. 
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ab Iorwerth. 
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as pledges of loyalty and allegiance from his fellow Welsh rulers.
13
  In fact, 
Beverly Smith goes so far as to state that ‗Llywelyn looked for nothing less than a 
contractual relationship of lord and vassal.‘14  Llywelyn ab Iorwerth never 
achieved anything like a contractual lord-vassal relationship, or recognition of a 
title as encompassing as ‗Prince of Wales‘ but that does not diminish his success 
as spokesman for the Welsh.  After all, it is upon the strength of his successes 
amongst the Welsh that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd expanded. 
Llywelyn‘s relationships with the marcher barons are more difficult to 
classify.  Llywelyn‘s approach to the marchers seems in the first instance more 
random than his dealings with his fellow Welsh princes.  However, there are some 
correlations.  In the first instance, the pre/post 1211 split is just as apparent here as 
it is in other aspects of Llywelyn‘s life.  Whether Llywelyn had lost or captured 
Mold in 1199,
15
 doesn‘t matter as much as the fact that his interests in this time 
clearly lay in the expansion of Gwynedd east, towards Chester.  That Ranulf 
supported Gwenwynwyn against Llywelyn in this early period, in order to keep 
Llywelyn‘s focus upon Gwenwynwyn‘s Powys rather than Chester, supports the 
contention that the interests of these two young men were in opposition of each 
other.  This is further supported by Ranulf‘s role in rebuilding the castle of 
Degannwy in 1210.  This suggests a distrust and animosity between these two 
neighbours, as does the fact that Chester was the staging point for John‘s 
campaigns the following year. 
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 Brut: Pen. 20, p. 111 and Brut: RBH, pp. 250-251. 
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 J. Beverly Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Prince of Wales, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 
1998, p. 109. 
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 For full discussion, see above, pp. 27-29. 
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Alliances with marcher barons become clear only after Llywelyn‘s defeat 
in 1211.  Joan‘s letter to her father in 1212 attesting to the defection of his nobles 
once he crossed the Welsh border are the first instance of an alliance between 
Llywelyn and the marcher lords.  Despite John‘s abandonment of a Welsh 
invasion, this alliance, between Llywelyn and his fellow Welsh on the one hand 
and the barons in rebellion against John on the other, was either renewed or 
maintained throughout the succeeding years.  In fact, the alliance between the 
Anglo-Norman rebels and the Welsh is attested to in Brut in 1215,
 16
 and the 
meeting at Brycheiniog may have been the impetus for the marriage of 
Llywelyn‘s daughter Gwladus to Reginald de Braose, in a clear attempt to solidify 
an alliance of expediency into something more permanent.  Moreover, this 
alliance proved useful for Llywelyn; amongst the provisions of the Runneymede 
charter were clauses attesting to the return to Llywelyn and his fellow Welsh of 
their charters, hostages, lands, and liberties.
17
 
Despite the marriage, the alliance between the rebel barons and the Welsh 
was not as lasting as Llywelyn‘s alliance with his fellow countrymen.  In fact, the 
Anglo-Norman lords who opposed John readily accepted the peace agreement 
with Henry III‘s minority government in 1216.  This was something Llywelyn 
was not prepared to do.  Moreover, the decision on the part of Reginald de Braose 
to accept the peace terms, led Llywelyn to attack his new son-in-law, within two 
years of the marriage. 
Nor is this to suggest that Llywelyn‘s alliance was with all marcher lords.  
Llywelyn and William Marshal never saw each other as anything other than a 
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 Stubbs, Select Charters, p. 300.  See also above, chapter 2, pp. 59-60.  
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threat to their respective security.  In fact, the argument has been made that the 
marriage of Llywelyn‘s daughter Gwenllian to William de Lacy sometime before 
1224, may have been an attempt to gain support from an Anglo-Norman baron 
also opposed to the Marshal.
18
   
Taken together, there is a clear trend on the part of Llywelyn to barter his 
daughters to Anglo-Norman barons who will help him further his interests in 
Wales.  The marriage of Margaret to John de Braose, who contested Reginald‘s 
claim to the de Braose lands, takes place after Reginald‘s decision to come to 
terms with the English Crown.
19
  The second marriage in 1230 of Gwladus to 
Ralph Mortimer, who held Wigmore Castle on the Hereford border retained ties to 
the Anglo-Welsh border surrounding the de Braose lands.  The same can be said 
for the second marriage of Margaret to Walter Clifford sometime after 1232; 
Walter held castles on the Hereford border.  Even Dafydd, Llywelyn‘s son, 
married into marcher families of the southwest.  One of the conditions of William 
de Braose‘s release in 1228 was an agreement to marry his daughter, Isabella, to 
Dafydd ap Llywelyn, in return for the castle of Builth on the same Hereford 
border.   
When put into that context, Helen‘s marriage to John the Scot seems to be 
an outlier.  However, when considering the role these marriages played as a surety 
for alliance, it appears less so.  Llywelyn‘s alliance with Ranulf, Earl of Chester, 
did not begin until after peace was concluded between Llywelyn and the Crown, 
but it became a marked alliance, one that Llywelyn tried to ensure into the next 
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generation with the marriage of Helen to Ranulf‘s heir, John.  The benefits of such 
an alliance are clear: Llywelyn gained a powerful ally in Henry‘s minority 
council.  In fact, Ranulf was a trusted  member, never having sided with the 
baronial revolt, and someone one who had the potential capability to temper 
undue Marshal influence in the minority council and thereby protect Llywelyn 
and other Welsh interests in south Wales. 
Taken together, this presents a story of alliances designed to support 
Llywelyn in his quest for supremacy within Wales.  His alliance with Ranulf of 
Chester offers him the opportunity for a strong voice of support in Henry‘s 
regency council, and the opportunity to block William Marshal.  The marriages to 
the de Braose family also seem to illustrate a need to reinforce ties in the 
southeast.  Moreover, the alliance with Richard Marshal, towards the end of his 
career further supports this argument.  These alliances were forged in expediency, 
and did not always last, but they do suggest, after 1211, a systematic attempt to 
seek support and protect Llywelyn‘s hegemony within Wales.  
Having already touched on Llywelyn‘s relationship with contacts outside 
Gwynedd and the marcher border, it is perhaps necessary to discuss them in more 
detail.  It is clear that after 1200, Gwynedd is less involved with the Irish Sea 
world than it had been under the leadership of Gruffudd ap Cynan and even 
Owain Gwynedd.  In 1204, Llywelyn actively rejects the daughter of the Manx 
King in favour of Joan as his wife.  The decision to tie his fortunes more closely 
to those of the Angevin house points towards an acceptance that his and 
Gwynedd‘s future would be determined by events taking place to the east and 
south of Wales rather than the north and west.  Although links can be made to the 
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north and west in the form of the alliances to John the Scot and William de Lacy, 
these can be shown to have an effect upon Llywelyn‘s often troubled relationship 
with William Marshal in Pembroke, and the English Crown during the minority.  
In fact, although Robin Frame is quite correct to point out that the Marshal‘s 
attack on Llywelyn in 1223 had been launched from Ireland and that the Lacy 
family fit into a broader Irish Sea world,
20
 it is clear that Irish Sea links are not the 
focus of Llywelyn‘s interest.  The Lacy family were long-time opponents of the 
Marshals in Ireland, and Llywelyn‘s alliance can be taken, as an attempt to ally 
with an enemy of William, rather than an attempt to draw him closer into the Irish 
Sea world. 
This is not to suggest that Llywelyn ignored everything that did not share a 
land border with Wales.  In fact, it is clear that he was aware of the rivalries 
between the Lacys and the Marshals.  Moreover, in his quest to increase his 
autonomy within Wales, Llywelyn dealt with both Philip Augustus and the 
Papacy on occasion.  This, combined with the fact that the Scots King, William, 
was able to provide John with evidence of Llywelyn‘s alliance with barons in 
1212, makes it clear that Llywelyn reached beyond Wales in his attempts to forge 
alliances and provide for his aspirations within Gwynedd and Wales as a whole.  
However, these do not form the main part of Llywelyn‘s alliances.  It is clear, 
rather, that the wider contacts only serve to reinforce Llywelyn‘s goals within 
Wales and in relation to England.  
What does all this mean for Llywelyn‘s relationship with the English 
Crown?  On the one hand, it is clear that Llywelyn realised very early that his 
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goals could not be achieved without at least the tacit acceptance of his goals from 
his powerful neighbour, England.  While, it is also clear that, at least initially, 
Llywelyn only sought to rule as much as he could of Gwynedd.  This constant 
self-aggrandisement is prevalent throughout Llywelyn‘s life, and when considered 
across its entirety, seems to take precedence over any more selfless desires for 
Welsh independence or freedoms from English interference.  In 1201, Llywelyn 
conceded English overlordship and promised homage to John in exchange for 
acknowledgement of his acquisitions, even as he argued for the independence of 
the Welsh Church from Canterbury.
21
  Moreover, his marriage to Joan in 
1204/1205 is a direct re-focusing of his interests towards England and away from 
an alliance with the Manx.   
It was an inspired move, in that Joan would prove an invaluable ally and 
ambassador throughout Llywelyn‘s lifetime.  As seen above,22 it was she who 
opened negotiations for Llywelyn‘s surrender in 1211, and possibly even ensured 
that Gwynedd would not escheat back to the crown, provided she gave birth to an 
heir, thus protecting the potential for sustained native rule in Gwynedd.  This is 
not the only instance.  Repeatedly, Joan serves as an intermediary, not only 
reassuring Henry of Instructus‘s loyalty to both his masters, but also appearing 
regularly at Henry‘s court once the King reached his majority.  The fact that she 
was issued several safe-conducts, both before, and immediately after Henry‘s 
disastrous Ceri campaign of 1228, illustrates her continued position as link 
between Henry and Llywelyn.  However, there were limits to Joan‘s influence.  
Although, Joan‘s affair with William de Braose in 1230 undermined her position 
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within Gwynedd, it did not ruin relations between Llywelyn and Henry, and this 
illustrates that the relationship between the English Kings and Llywelyn was more 
complex than a simple marriage tie. 
What becomes clear from a prolonged study of the interaction between 
Llywelyn and John and later, Henry, is the conclusion that is that a combination of 
misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and goals at odds with one another, led to a 
varied and often difficult relationship.  Llywelyn may have seen his marriage to 
Joan and John‘s imprisonment of Gwenwynwyn as tacit agreement on the part of 
the English King to Llywelyn‘s conquest of Powys Wenwynwyn.  However, that 
was not how John viewed the alliance; rather he saw it as a way to control 
Llywelyn‘s ambitions.  Similarly, it is clear in 1224 that Llywelyn and Henry 
viewed the harbouring of Falkes de Bréauté on different terms.  Llywelyn argued 
for the independence of his rule on the same level as the King of Scotland, while 
Henry saw Llywelyn in a more obedient role, such as vassal.  In fact, the 
campaigns of his majority provide further evidence of the gaps between Llywelyn 
and Henry.  Llywelyn‘s campaigns in the south in 1232 were linked by Brut23 to 
Henry‘s decision to rebuild Painscastle.   
On the other hand, it is also clear that Llywelyn‘s understanding of his 
relationship with the English Crown and especially with Henry improved over the 
course of his career.  Llywelyn‘s continued direct appeal towards Henry 
throughout his minority shows a remarkable sensitivity towards the emotional 
state of a child king.  It is a testament to Llywelyn‘s ability to read Henry‘s 
insecurities that Henry supported Llywelyn‘s letter to Honorius in 1222 related to 
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the abolition of equal inheritance between legitimate and illegitimate sons.  This is 
not to say that Llywelyn‘s career during Henry‘s minority was peaceful.  
Llywelyn lost Cardigan and Carmarthen to the Marshal in 1223.  However, it is 
clear that Llywelyn understood the young Henry a bit better than he did the adult 
King of later years. 
Although his goals never fully change over the course of his career, it is 
possible to see some shifts in Llywelyn‘s approach.  Llywelyn‘s early desire to 
acquire lands made enemies of his neighbours, native Welsh rulers and Anglo-
Norman Marchers alike, and this aggression ultimately helped lead to his downfall 
in 1211. 
As discussed above, one feature of Llywelyn‘s ‗greatness‘ was his ability 
to learn from his mistakes, and to adapt his methods in order find better ways to 
achieve his aims.  Where, in the early days, Llywelyn sought self-aggrandisement 
at the expense of his neighbours, after 1211, he turned towards more diplomatic 
approaches to reach his goals in its aftermath.  Although no stranger to the idea of 
uniting against a common enemy, Llywelyn‘s actions after 1211 display a 
remarkable shift in his willingness to understand the political situations in which 
he found himself and adapt to them.  Llywelyn‘s planned union with the English 
rebel barons in 1212, his willingness to ally with his erstwhile Welsh enemies, 
and his ability to convince them that he acted in the interests of them all is an 
indicator of this shift in his methods.  Indeed, by 1218, Llywelyn was acting as the 
leading Welsh prince and it was he who determined when and on what terms 
peace with the English Crown would be arranged.  It is this change in Llywelyn‘s 
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manner and skills in diplomacy that ultimately lead to Llywelyn‘s successes and 
the plaudits of history.   
By the end of his career, Llywelyn‘s primacy amongst the Welsh was even 
more apparent.  Twice, he was able to demand his fellow Welsh rulers swear 
allegiances to Dafydd, and it was negotiations with him that determined the 
‗Peace of the Middle.‘  These are the glories which made him ‗great,‘ a Welsh 
hero.  They also illustrate his failings as a leader.  The ‗Peace of the Middle‘ was 
but a series of truces that were renewed until Llywelyn‘s death.  Therefore, 
Dafydd was never fully secure in his rule and Llywelyn‘s hegemony crumbled in 
the wake of his death.   
Moreover, although there is consensus amongst Welsh historians as to the 
glories of Llywelyn‘s career, there is a need to remember that he was a man, not a 
legendary hero in the abstract.  Although Llywelyn built a hegemony over native 
Wales, at no point did he rule it outright as ‗Prince of Wales,‘ nor is there 
evidence that he was a Welsh hero intent on Welsh independence from English 
rule.  Llywelyn was quite content, throughout his life, to acknowledge his client 
status in relation to the English Crown.  As long as he was the pre-eminent leader 
in Wales, then he was happy to do homage to the King for his lands.  Moreover, 
when he did go to war against the Marcher lords or the Crown, it was at times 
when a resurgence of royal aspirations or an expansion of Marcher territories was 
threatening his lands, his hegemony or the lands of his native Welsh allies.  It 
seems that Llywelyn was always much more interested in his own strength and 
power, than in an idea of Welsh independence, and although he often acted or 
argued for Welsh independence, it was only ever as it would support his own 
 206 
 
power.  In fact, throughout his career, Llywelyn never lost his self-aggrandising 
visions even as he learned new methods of gaining them.   
Moreover, Llywelyn would not have achieved so much without the 
support of his council, his court officers such as Ednyfed Fychan and Gwyn ab 
Ednywain, his wife, and the Church.  His seneschals and other court officers 
allowed him to govern his patrimony while he focused upon aggrandising his 
position within Wales.  It is clear that these changes to Gwynedd‘s internal 
government were part of a pan-European evolution in governmental styles.  They 
mirror similar changes taking place across the twelfth and thirteenth century 
throughout Europe, most noticeably the English court and those of the great 
Anglo-Norman magnates with whom Llywelyn had regular contact.  This is not to 
suggest that Llywelyn was the driving force behind these changes within 
Gwynedd, rather that his exposure to these governmental styles and the sharing of 
Instructus between Llywelyn and Henry may have increased the rate of change 
already present within Gwynedd. 
Llywelyn‘s relationship with Joan gifted him with an envoy to the royal 
court and a direct line of appeal to the King.  It also gave him daughters with 
which he could barter for alliances, and a son who would ultimately inherit from 
him.  Although Llywelyn could never be called much more than ‗conventionally 
pious,‘24 he was quite adept at using the Church for his own ends, securing papal 
recognition of Dafydd‘s supremacy as rightful heir.  In addition, he supported the 
cause of an independent Welsh Church and an archepiscopacy at St. David‘s in 
order to limit the control Canterbury could hold over the Welsh Church and its 
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abilities and interest in arranging peace accords in favour of the English rather 
than Llywelyn‘s own interests.   
Perhaps it is easier to objectively consider the limitations to Llywelyn‘s 
successes when approaching the subject with an outsider's perspective.  
Llywelyn‘s main successes were perhaps as much a product of fortune as they 
were of his own abilities.  The internal divisions within Gwynedd, and disputes 
between Dafydd, his brother and nephews provided Llywelyn with useful allies.  
Chester‘s lack of interest allowed him to extend his holdings without interference.  
His alliance with the rebel barons and his fellow native Welsh rulers after 1211 
came only because John had made such enemies of them.  Moreover, the intense 
competition between the sons of the Lord Rhys in the south and the death of 
Gwenwynwyn in 1216 made it easier for Llywelyn to claim pre-eminence within 
Wales.  The minority of Henry III left Llywelyn with little interference from the 
Crown and even allowed him to act as guardian of Carmarthen and Cardigan for 
his nephew.  Perhaps it is possible to go so far as to say that Henry‘s regency 
council needed Llywelyn as unifying force to allow them to deal with Wales and 
the Welsh as a single entity, rather than attempting to balance the competing 
interests of the Crown with the varied interests of a multiplicity of Welsh rulers.  
Moreover, the death of William de Braose—albeit at Llywelyn‘s order—created a 
power vacuum, quickly exploited by Llywelyn.   
Had Llywelyn lived in more peaceful times, had he faced English Kings 
who did not alienate their barons or were older, wiser and stronger, he may not 
have achieved as much or been a Welsh ruler of much note.  Nevertheless, what 
Llywelyn achieved and the manner in which he did it, is certainly worthy of study.  
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His successes, although perhaps inflated in the intervening years, became the stuff 
of legend, and the blame for his failure to create a lasting hegemony was passed 
on to the next generation.  Even if he was greater in legend than in life, that is not 
to say that his deeds are in any way unworthy of historical record.  He remains to 
this day, Llywelyn the Great. 
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APPENDIX A: THE 1201 TREATY 
 
Hec est forma pacis qua Leulinus filius Ioruert venit ad ervitum domini regis. 
[i] Primo coram Rob(er)to Bagorensi et R. De Sancto Asaph‘ epicopis et domino 
G. filio Pet(ri) comite Essex‘ iusticiario domini regis et baronibus multis et 
pluribus aliis iuravit idem Leulin(us), et maiores terre sue post eum iuraverunt, 
fidelitatem domini regis I. contra omnes homines se inperpetuum observaturos de 
sua vita et membris suis et de suo terrento honore. 
[ii] Et idem Leulin(us) receipt de manu domini iusticiarii saisinam ominum 
tenemtorum suorum que tunc possidebat et ea in pace tenebit usque 
adventum domini regis in Anglia(m). 
[iii] Et cum dominus rex in Anglia(m) venerit idem Leulin(us) ad mandatum 
eius veniet ad eum et homagium ei faciet sicut domino suo ligio de predictis 
tenementis.  
[iv] Et homagio facto in pace redibit ad propria nec ab aliquo implacitabitur 
donec in patria sua competentem receperit summonitionem, et dominus rex 
omina retro forisfacta ante diem pacis si quia sunt ei condonabit. 
[v] Si vero postmodum aliquis puerelam moverit super aliquo tenementorum 
suorum predictorum, in eius electione erit utrum causa illa tractetur 
secundum legem Anglie vel secundum legem Wallie, et non respondebit alicui 
nisi de proprietate, ‘tamen’ exclusa penitus questione possessionis. 
[vi] Et si secundum legem Anglie causam illam tractari elegerit, dominus rext 
ponet curiam suam in Anglia in loco competenti et ibi quod iustum fuerit 
secundum legem illam iudicabitur. 
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[vii] Si autem legem Walle(n)se(m) elegerit, quicumque eum super predictis in 
causam taxerit, primo discernetur utrum ipse Leulin(us) curiam suam habere 
debeat vel non; quam si habuerit, causam illam in curia sua tractabit. 
[viii] Si vero curiam suam non habuerit, dominus rex mittet de fidelibus suis viros 
discretos in terram Leulini de qua questio fuerit coram quibus a Wallensib(us) ad 
hoc electis et partibus non suspectis quod iustum fuerit statuetur et a partibus 
firmiter observabitur.  Similiter fiet de omnibus aliis de quibus decetero querele 
venient ad dominum regem vel iusticiarum eius de ipso Leulino. 
[ix] Porro ‗si idem‘ Leulin(us) aut sui domino regi vel suis forisfecerint post 
pacem predictam, dominus rex fideli consilio domini Cant(uariensis) 
archiepiscopi et domini G. filii Pet(ri) iusticiarii vel alterius illorum si ambo 
interesse non poterint et aliorum fidelium suorum emendationem recipiet, 
nichilominus predicta pace observata.  Dominus etiam Cant(uariensis) et dominus 
G. filius Pet(ri) iusticiarius, episcopi, comites, barones qui huic paci componende 
interfuerunt ad honorem Die et domini regis causam Leuiini secundum iusticiam 
fovebint. 
[x] Preterea si qui dampna in terra domini regis fecerint et in terram Leulini 
venerint, dampna passi vel alii eos cum clamore et cornu usque ad terram 
predicti Leulini in secuiti
c
 fuerint, idem Leulin(us) dampna restituet et de 
malefactoribus iustitiam faciet. 
[xi] Si vero malefacores terre domini regis per terram ipius Leulini furtive 
transierint velibi se occultaverint, super sacramentum suum promisit quod omnen 
diligentiam adhibebit ad hoc emendandum sicut faceret si dampna sibi vel terre 
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sue
d
 illata essent.  Facta fuit pax iusta ill
tio
 anno regni regis Ioh(ann)is v
to
 idus 
iulii.  Et ad maiorem huius rei securitatem dominus Can(uariensis) et dominus G. 
filius Pet(ri) iusticiarius sigilla sua huic scripto apposuerunt et pepigerunt quod 
dominus rex pacem istam sigillo suo convirmabit.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 Copied in full from Pryce, Acts, no. 221, pp. 372-373.   
The full text can also be found, with similarly numbered clauses in Rowlands, ‗1201 Peace, pp. 
165-166. 
In manuscript: PRO, C 66/1. 
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APPENDIX B: THE 1211 SUBMISSION 
Omnibus Cristi fidelibus presentem cartam inspecturis Lewelinus princeps 
Norwall(ie) salutem.   
Sciatus quod pro habenda gratiam et benevolenctiam domini [mei regis 
Anglie] Iohannis dimisi ‘ei’ et imperpetuum quieta clamavi castrum de 
Gannoch’ cum Ros et omnibus pertinentiis suis et Roui(n)a cum Dunbeig’ et 
Estrede et omnibus perti[nentiis suis] et Defreneclud’ cum Ruthin et omnibus 
pertinentiiis suis. 
De Derenia(n) autem cum pertinentiis suis nichil me intromitto nisi 
supplicando pro Oeno de Porkinton [avunculo] meo quia numquam tenuit 
terram illam de me vel aliquo antecessorum meorum set de domino rege. 
Et concessi quod Hoelus filius Griffini seisinam [habeat de] terra sua ita quod 
postea stet recto in curia mea. 
Et si in curiam meam venire vel in ea recto stare noluerit, dominus rex ad hoc 
ipsum dis[tringere] faciet.   
Et concessi quod dominus rex faciat voluntatem suam de Roelan‘ et Monte Alto 
cum Englefeld‘ et omnibus pertinentiis suis salvo in iure meo et [... vel ...] petere 
dirationare per ius quod in eis clamo; quod disrationavero dimittam in manum 
domini regis quamdiu ei placuerit.   
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Homines autem terrarium quas domino [regidi]misi si voluerint ad dominum 
regem venire et terras suas de eo tenere, faciant ei bonam securitatem quod 
fideliter ei servient et servitia sua bene ei reddent nec aliquo modo perquirent 
quod ab alio quam a domino rege receptentur. 
Faciam etiam habere domino meo regi ligantias omnium hominum meorum 
de quibus voluerit, et liberabo ei filium meum Griffinu(m) tenedum semper 
et ad faciendum inde voluntatem suam, ita quod si de filia domini regis uxore 
mea heredem non habuero, concede ipsi domino meo regi tanquam heredi 
meo omnes terras meas tam illas quas retinui quam illas quas et dimisi preter 
terras quas ei placuerit dare eidem filio meo et meis. 
Preterea dabo eidem domino meo regi pro expensis suis decem milia 
vaccarum et quadraginta dextrarios et sexaginta chascuros, ita quod homines 
terrarum quas domino regi dimisi tam illi qui ad dominum regem ibunt ut de eo 
terras suas teneant quam illi qui mecum remanebunt auxilium michi facient 
rationabiliter ad solvendam predictam pecuiniam.   
Liberabo etiam ei obsides de terra mea quos et quot et de quibus habere voluerit 
pro fideli servitio meo, et pro conventione predicta tenenda et hec in bona fide et 
sine malo ingenio tenenda tactis sacrocanctis iuravi et hanc cartam meam eidem 
domino meo regi inde fiery feci. 
Dominus vero Norwic(ensis) episcopus, Will(elmu)s [comes Sarresberiensis], 
comes Will(elmu)s Mar(escallus), comes W. Warronn‘ et Petrus filius Hereb(er)ti 
manuceperunt quod dominus rex omnem malivolentiam et ind[ignationem] michi 
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per predictam coventionem remisit quam erga me habuit usque ad diem Veneris 
proximam post festum Sancti Laurencii [Martiris anno regni] domini regis xiii. 
Et ad maiorem huius rei securitatem dominus I. Norwic(ensis) episcopus W. 
comes Sarr(ensberiensis), comes W. Mar(escallus), comes W. W[arronn‘] et 
Petrus filius Hereb(er)ti ad petitionem meam sigilla sua cum sigillo meo huic carte 
apposuerunt.
2
  
 
                                                 
2
 Taken in full from Pryce, Acts, no. 233. pp387-388. 
In manuscript: PRO, E 163/4/47  
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APPENDIX E: ENGLISH INVASION OF 1211 
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APPENDIX F: LLYWELYN'S CAMPAIGNS OF 1218, 1231 AND 1233. 
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